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Abstract 
Prior research from the U.S. and abroad reveals a sizable lesbian earnings advantage over 
otherwise-similar heterosexual women. Using data from the 2000 U.S. Census and 2005-2010 
American Community Surveys, we estimate traditional earnings equations and find robust 
evidence of a lesbian premium, corroborating the findings of previous studies. Using within-
sample maternity incidence as an estimate of employers' forward-looking expectations, we 
then examine whether differences in the perceived likelihood of an employee requiring 
maternity leave, here-labelled 'maternity risk', contribute to the lesbian pay gap. Results from 
a direct assessment suggest that maternity risk adversely affects income, and that accounting 
for near-term differences in maternity risk reduces the lesbian premium by approximately ten 
to fifteen percent. Further analyses, using proxy variables for differential maternity risk, yield 
similar results. As such, the persistent finding of a lesbian earnings advantage in previous 
studies can be attributed, at least in part, to employers' aversion to maternity risk and its 
associated costs. 
These findings are also of critical importance to the general labour-market 
discrimination literature. Given the adverse earnings effect of maternity risk, our analysis 
suggests that estimates of the well-established gender earnings disparity are likely to be 
considerably smaller when incorporating maternity risk into the analysis. Absent the ability to 
adequately control for maternity risk, strict attention should be paid to potential upward bias 
in estimated earnings differentials. Moreover, policymakers should consider the broader 
implications of maternity-leave policy on the labour-market outcomes of females. In this 
respect, maternity-leave policy may influence the hiring and promotion decisions of 
employers, thereby indirectly affecting sexual-orientation and gender equality in the labour 
market. However, further research in this area is still required, given the limitations inherent 
in the direct and indirect analyses. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction to the Study 
Homosexual women earn more than heterosexual women. Theorists have proposed various 
potential reasons for the observed lesbian pay gap, such as differences in child-rearing status, 
labour supply, occupational choice and investments in human capital. Empirical studies 
testing the plausibility of a number of these theories generally find that an unexplained 
income differential in favour of lesbians exists, even after controlling for the proposed sources 
of the premium. If we take unexplained earnings differences as demonstrating labour-market 
discrimination, what are we to make of the persistent finding of a lesbian premium? Do 
employers discriminate in favour of lesbians, contrary to popular belief, or is the observed 
behaviour simply consistent with employer profit maximisation? 
Petit (2007) proposes that, all else equal, employers may selectively hire workers to 
minimise expected costs of maternity leave. Specifically, employers are averse to bearing the 
interruption, replacement and maternity-benefit costs associated with employees' labour-force 
separation to give birth to or care for a child. The 'maternity-risk hypothesis' thus asserts that a 
reluctance to employ women exhibiting a greater likelihood of child-bearing results in a 
compensatory wage reduction to induce employers to bear the higher expected costs. Given 
that training and replacement costs are likely an increasing function of a position's salary, 
differences in the perceived likelihood of labour-market separation due to maternity, here-
labelled 'maternity risk', may also result in discriminatory promotion practices. As lesbians 
represent a comparatively lower maternity risk relative to heterosexual women, a favourable 
lesbian pay gap may arise, even among women with equal productivity.1 
Although previous studies have hinted at the importance of fertility and labour-force 
commitment in wage determination, no study has explicitly examined whether the forward-
looking likelihood of temporary labour-market separation to bear children adversely affects 
earnings, thus giving rise to a lesbian premium. Using data from the 2000 United States (U.S.) 
Decennial Census, and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys (ACS), this study attempts 
to fill this void in the literature by estimating the effect of maternity risk on earnings and the 
lesbian pay gap. In addition to illuminating whether the observed premium can be partially 
1 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 prohibits "sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy" (U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, n.d.). Even if the law were strictly enforced, which is unlikely, the 
extent to which it would prevent discrimination on the basis of perceived maternity risk is minimal.  
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attributed to differences in maternity risk across demographic groups, the investigation 
reveals information of critical importance to the general labour-market discrimination 
literature. In particular, if maternity risk exerts a negative effect on earnings, holding all other 
factors constant, then existing studies examining the gender and sexual-orientation pay gaps 
may present biased estimates of discrimination. Moreover, policies affecting employers' 
maternity-cost incidence may influence hiring and promotion decisions, thereby affecting 
both labour-market prospects for females and earnings disparities across genders and sexual 
orientations. The implications of the analysis are thus of far-reaching consequence. 
1.2. Overview 
Using cohabitation to identify sexual orientation and marital status, we first assess whether a 
lesbian premium exists in three non-overlapping samples from the 2000 U.S. Census, pooled 
2005-2007 ACS and pooled 2008-2010 ACS. Estimating traditional earnings equations, we 
uncover a statistically and economically significant lesbian pay advantage in all three 
samples. This finding is robust to the inclusion of controls for work and personal 
characteristics, region of residency, occupation and industry. Moreover, robustness checks 
show the presence of a lesbian pay gap is not conditional upon the dependent variable 
specification or the estimation method implemented. In the remainder of the thesis, we then 
examine whether this premium can be partially attributed to sexual-orientation differences in 
maternity risk. 
Using intra-household relationships to infer fertility among householders, we allocate 
maternity rates by age group, sexual orientation, and marital status, applying within-sample 
maternity risk as an estimate of employers' forward-looking maternity-leave expectations. 
Including perceived maternity risk as an additional control in earnings regressions reveals 
mixed evidence as to the effect of maternity risk on earnings and the lesbian premium. We 
argue that prior promotion effects of maternity risk and sexual-orientation differences in 
accrued human capital, which we cannot disentangle, generate bias in the coefficient 
estimates. To minimise such bias, we allow observable human capital measures to 
differentially affect earnings by sexual orientation. 
The results from this 'direct analysis' of the maternity-risk hypothesis strongly indicate 
a negative effect of maternity risk on earnings. This finding applies to both comparison 
groups, namely cohabiting and married heterosexual women, and is robust to various tests of 
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model robustness. Importantly, the results also appear to be robust to further disaggregation in 
the maternity-risk allocation procedure. With respect to the magnitude of the pay gap, the 
majority of the results imply that accounting for near-term maternity risk reduces the lesbian 
premium by approximately ten to fifteen percent when evaluated at the mean level of 
potential experience.2 Bias in the effect of potential experience and the inclusion of sexual-
orientation interaction terms, however, pose problems in interpreting the results. 
To supplement the direct analysis and circumvent its shortcomings, we assess whether 
contextual factors that likely affect the lesbian-heterosexual maternity gap alter the lesbian 
premium. Specifically, controlling for individual-level variables, as well as state-level 
ideology and other income-affecting factors, we examine whether state-level proxies exert the 
expected influence on the lesbian pay gap. The four proxies used include laws mandating 
insurance coverage of infertility treatment, domestic partnership laws, same-sex marriage 
bans, and lesbian prevalence rates. 
Overall, the indirect tests of the maternity-risk hypothesis reveal considerable 
evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis. All four of the proxies generally affect 
the lesbian premium in a manner consistent with prior expectations. This finding withstands a 
host of robustness checks, including different dependent variable specifications, the addition 
of further individual and state-level controls, and alternative estimation techniques. 
Stratification by age and repeating the analysis for an analogous sample of males provide 
useful validity checks, demonstrating that mandated insurance coverage may not be an 
appropriate proxy for differential maternity risk. The estimated effect of lesbian prevalence 
also appears to be augmented by non-maternity-related factors. Although the results must be 
interpreted with caution, accrued maternity-risk effects appear to account for a significant 
portion of the lesbian premium over otherwise-similar heterosexual women. 
Extending the analysis to the gender pay gap also demonstrates an adverse effect of 
maternity risk, correcting for which is shown to reduce the male-female earnings disparity by 
approximately fifteen percent, on average. Therefore, a plausible interpretation of the results 
from this thesis is that apparent sexual-orientation and gender discrimination in the labour 
market can, at least in part, be explained by the rational response of employers to differential 
maternity risk among employees.  
2 In the context of this paper, "near-term maternity risk" refers to the likelihood of a female requiring maternity 
leave in the next one to five years.  
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The remainder of this thesis proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 provides a 
review of the empirical literature examining the lesbian pay gap, including a more detailed 
discussion of the purpose of this study. Section 3 examines whether a lesbian premium exists 
in each of the three samples, forming the base upon which the remainder of the paper builds. 
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, present the direct and indirect tests of the maternity-risk 
hypothesis. Section 6 provides a discussion of the findings, including implications for the 
gender pay gap, improvements and ideas for future research, and finally offers concluding 
remarks.  
2. Literature Review
2.1. Current Explanations of the Lesbian Pay Gap 
Although analysing the sexual-orientation pay gap appears prone to fewer problems than that 
of the gender pay gap, substantial heterogeneity still exists between lesbians and heterosexual 
women. Importantly, many income-determining factors, such as human capital, labour-force 
attachment and occupation, differ systematically by sexual orientation, leading to a sizable 
earnings differential. As previously noted, prior studies find that controlling for observable 
characteristics reduces, but does not eliminate, this differential, leaving an unexplained pay 
gap.3 In this section, we discuss potential explanations of the lesbian premium as proposed in 
the literature and offer evidence regarding the plausibility of each theory.  
Becker's (1971) "taste for discrimination" argument is often cited in studies examining 
the effect of sexual orientation on labour-market outcomes, despite discrimination against 
homosexuals being unable to explain the presence of a lesbian premium. In short, the theory 
implies that if homosexuality is stigmatised by customers, co-workers or employers, then we 
would expect to observe a lesbian earnings penalty.4 Despite gay males repeatedly being 
shown to earn less than heterosexual males, as Becker's argument would suggest, few studies 
find evidence consistent with his proposition when examining the lesbian pay gap.5 
Considering this result in the context of the broader labour-market discrimination literature 
further suggests this is an anomalous finding. Specifically, field experiments by 
3 The magnitude of the lesbian pay gap estimated in previous studies is discussed in greater depth in Section 2.2.   
4 The extent to which employer discrimination translates into earnings differences depends on the level of market 
competition. For example, employer discrimination cannot persist in a perfectly competitive market. 
5 For an overview of the gay-male income penalty, see Badgett's (2006) summary. In the context of the lesbian 
pay gap, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2010), Badgett (1995) and Carpenter (2008b) obtain results at least partially 
consistent with Becker's discrimination theory.  
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Weichselbaumer (2003, 2013), Drydakis (2011) and Ahmed et al. (2013a) show that lesbians 
are discriminated against in the hiring process, receiving fewer call-backs than otherwise-
similar heterosexual women.6 Badgett et al. (2009) summarise evidence from several recent 
surveys assessing the extent of discrimination against lesbians and gay males. They note that 
15% to 43% of lesbian, gay and bisexual respondents experienced some form of workplace 
discrimination. Although the reliance on convenience samples and perceived discriminatory 
treatment reduces their applicability, the studies summarised by Badgett et al. (2009) provide 
further evidence that lesbians face adverse discrimination in the labour market. Explaining the 
observed lesbian premium thus represents an important area of research for academics and 
policymakers, particularly as the premium may be attenuated due to discriminatory treatment.    
Traditional explanations of the lesbian pay gap attribute the observed premium to 
differences in child-rearing status and consequent differences in human capital accumulation. 
Using 1990 U.S. Census data, Black et al. (2000) estimate that 22% of partnered lesbians 
have children present in the household, compared with 38% of cohabiting heterosexual 
women and 59% of married heterosexual women. Similarly, using pooled 1989-1996 data 
from the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS), Blandford (2003) estimates that 25% of lesbians 
have borne children, compared with 62% of unmarried and 84% of married heterosexual 
women. On average, lesbians are thus less likely to have children than otherwise-similar 
heterosexual women, as we would expect. Children represent both an erosion of work-
relevant human capital and time outside of the workforce. As a result, lesbians, with fewer 
children, enjoy higher wages than otherwise-similar heterosexual women. This explanation 
can be traced back to the motherhood earnings gap literature. Korenman and Neumark (1992) 
observe that women without children earn significantly more than women with children, even 
after accounting for observable characteristics. More recent studies by Budig and England 
(2001) and Zhang (2009) reach similar conclusions. On this basis, we would expect to 
observe a wage disparity in favour of lesbians relative to heterosexual women. Among several 
other studies, Black et al. (2003) test this theory by including the number of children present 
in the household as an additional regressor. They find that the number of children has a large 
negative effect on annual income but only modestly reduces the estimated lesbian premium. 
Jepsen (2007) divides her sample according to the presence of children and finds that the 
6 In contrast, a recent study by Baert (2013) finds weakly significant evidence of higher call-back rates among 
young lesbians relative to their heterosexual counterparts. 
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results do not differ substantially across groups. There is thus little evidence to support that 
the lesbian earnings premium can be attributed to differences in child-rearing status. 
Black et al. (2003) argue that observed income differences may be due to lesbians' 
exhibiting a comparatively greater degree of specialisation in market production than 
heterosexual women. A plausible explanation is that lesbians, on average, will be in 
relationships that share household tasks more evenly than in heterosexual relationships, where 
household tasks are primarily undertaken by females (Kurdek, 1993). If a reduction in 
household responsibilities leads to greater labour supply, lesbians should accrue more work-
related human capital. To the extent that the resulting unobservable differences in human 
capital are not captured by observable human capital measures, such as potential experience 
and education, earnings regressions are likely to find a lesbian premium. Moreover, studies 
that do not control for annual hours worked likely estimate larger sexual-orientation 
remuneration differences. Assuming that a partner’s contribution to household tasks is 
inversely related to the number of hours devoted to market production, Jepsen (2007) includes 
partners’ hours worked into her regressions to test the household specialisation argument.7 
She finds no economically significant effect of partners’ hours worked on annual income, 
failing to corroborate the theory. Controlling for standard factors affecting labour supply, 
Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) find that lesbian women display stronger labour-market 
commitment than both married and cohabiting heterosexual women, working longer hours 
and exhibiting greater willingness to partake in full-time employment. Klawitter (2011) 
reports similar results. Further, Klawitter (2011) and Elmslie and Tebaldi (2007) demonstrate 
that the lesbian premium is considerably smaller when controlling for annual hours worked. 
Their findings are consistent with the view that earnings differentials are, in part, driven by 
differences in the division of household labour between lesbian and heterosexual couples.  
Another oft-cited explanation is that lesbians are more likely to invest in human 
capital for their careers. Becker (1991) makes the case that heterosexual women and lesbians 
will differ in terms of career choices and investments in human capital. Because heterosexual 
women anticipate forming a traditional household, and thus expect to participate more in non-
market production than lesbians, they would invest less in work-relevant human capital, 
giving rise to a lesbian wage premium. Black et al. (2003) offer a similar explanation. 
7 Jepsen notes that “This approach relies on the debatable assumption that partner hours are exogenous to the 
woman’s earnings.” (Jepsen, 2007, p. 716). Arguably, the household specialisation theory is less relevant in the 
case of childless couples. Jepsen's results, however, hold for both women with and without children. 
11 
Daneshvary et al. (2009) provide an indirect test for this by examining whether previous 
marriage can explain the sexual-orientation wage disparity present in the 2000 Census data. A 
previously married lesbian may have anticipated forming a traditional household and thus 
early career decisions of previously married lesbians are more likely to mirror those of 
heterosexual women. They find that accounting for previous marriage significantly reduces 
the lesbian wage premium. Furthermore, allowing the effects of previous marriage to differ by 
sexual orientation reveals a larger negative wage effect for lesbians and a much smaller wage 
disparity, lending strength to Becker’s argument. 
Several other explanations build upon a similar premise. Berg and Lien (2002), for 
example, claim that lesbians suffer from a negative income effect due to having a partner with 
depressed earnings as a result of the gender pay gap. In this situation, lesbians respond by 
supplying more labour, giving rise to an earnings differential in a similar manner to the 
household production specialisation case. Peplau and Fingerhut (2004) stress that lesbians’ 
greater labour-force attachment arises not only out of differences in household production and 
child-rearing responsibilities, but also due to their desire to be financially independent. That 
is, lesbians emphasise equal sharing of financial responsibilities and are less likely than 
heterosexual couples to pool financial resources (Peplau and Fingerhut, 2004). Involvement in 
a committed relationship therefore does not reduce a lesbian’s need for full-time employment 
to the same extent as it does for a heterosexual woman. Ahmed et al. (2013b) and Badgett 
(2001) argue that greater career devotion and independence from family-related career 
interruptions are primarily responsible for stronger labour-force attachment among lesbians. 
As previously discussed, higher full-time employment rates and annual hours worked among 
lesbians provide evidence consistent with these explanations. Badgett (1995) offers an 
alternative method to assess whether the data are consistent with this theory by including an 
interaction between the lesbian indicator dummy and potential experience in her regression 
models. If lesbian absences from the labour force are fewer and shorter in duration, then 
potential experience should more accurately reflect actual experience for lesbians and 
systematically overstate that of heterosexual women, resulting in a positive coefficient on the 
interaction term. Badgett (1995) estimates a positive, but statistically insignificant, 
interaction-term coefficient, providing only weak support for the labour-force-attachment 
theory. Further studies by Jepsen (2007) and Daneshvary et al. (2008), however, obtain 
economically and statistically significant coefficients which substantiate Badgett’s 
proposition. 
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Further explanations of the sexual-orientation earnings gap include Blandford’s (2003) 
argument that lesbians are disproportionately represented in traditionally male-dominated 
occupations. Generally, these professions entail greater remuneration and hence, when failing 
to include occupational variables in wage decompositions, we would expect to see a positive 
coefficient on the lesbian indicator variable.8 Blandford (2003) finds that moving from one-
digit to two-digit occupational controls reduces the lesbian premium by approximately 25%, 
and argues that controlling for more subtle occupational clustering may further diminish the 
estimated earnings effect of sexual orientation. Conversely, Antecol et al. (2008), Daneshvary 
et al. (2009), and Carpenter (2005) find that although lesbians are over-represented in male-
dominated professions, the apparent effect of occupational sorting on the lesbian premium is 
minimal.  
Another candidate explanation relates to sexual-orientation differences in 
aggressiveness in wage negotiations. Babcock and Laschever (2003), among others, argue 
that gender differences in assertiveness may be partially responsible for the observed male-
female pay gap. To the extent that hormonal or social differences result in lesbians exhibiting 
greater aggressiveness in seeking higher pay than their heterosexual counterparts, lesbians 
may be able to avoid some of the gender disadvantage, thereby resulting in the observed 
earnings premium. Frank (2006) presents a similar argument. Unfortunately, evidence 
supporting or refuting this theory is severely lacking. 
Finally, Plug and Berkhout (2004) note that AIDS incidence among heterosexual 
women exceeds that of lesbians. To the extent that worker health translates into productivity 
differences, one should thus expect to observe a lesbian premium. Elmslie and Tebaldi (2012) 
analyse whether the reverse holds true for gay males. They find a weak positive correlation 
between negative HIV–related news and the gay-male penalty, but interpreting this finding in 
the context of their overall analysis reveals little support for statistical discrimination on the 
basis of HIV/AIDS incidence. Moreover, AIDS is sufficiently rare among both lesbians and 
heterosexual women that it is unlikely to significantly drive the sexual-orientation earnings 
differential. Given that mental and physical health likely differ by sexual orientation for 
reasons unrelated to HIV/AIDS, examining the effects of health status on the lesbian pay gap 
may represent a promising area for future research.     
8 In Section 2.3 we discuss the theoretical concerns relating to the inclusion of occupational controls in earnings 
regressions. 
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2.2. Estimates of the Lesbian Pay Gap 
2.2.1. Evidence from the United States 
Badgett (1995) was the first to employ an econometric analysis to examine the earnings effect 
of sexual orientation. Her study pooled 1989-1991 data from the U.S. GSS and classified 
lesbians as women with at least as many same-sex partners as opposite-sex partners.9
Implementing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and controlling for several factors known to 
affect earnings, such as years of formal education, race, potential experience, geographic 
location, and occupation, she finds that lesbians are at an earnings disadvantage of 
approximately 21-30% as compared to heterosexual women.10 Estimates obtained using the
Heckman two-step procedure suggest a lesbian earnings disadvantage of 11% relative to 
unmarried heterosexual women and a premium of 15% over currently married women.11 The
lack of statistical significance among Badgett’s estimates, however, renders her results 
inconclusive.  
Several studies have followed Badgett (1995) in utilising data from the GSS.12 The
first of these was Badgett’s (2001) update to her original study, which pooled data from the 
1989-1994 GSS and 1992 National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS). Estimating a 
specification similar to her original study, absent the sexual-orientation interaction term, and 
relying on the same sexual orientation definition, Badgett finds an insignificant lesbian 
earnings premium of roughly 2-11%. Black et al. (2003), using 1989-1996 GSS data, replicate 
and substantially extend Badgett’s pioneering work. Using Badgett’s sexual orientation 
definition, Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) reveals a lesbian earnings advantage of 
6% over unmarried heterosexual women, and 9% compared to married women, although their 
estimates are also statistically insignificant. In contrast to Badgett (1995), Black et al. find 
that invoking alternative definitions of sexual orientation considerably affects their results. 
Specifically, considering sexual behaviour over the past year or five years, they find that 
9 Technically, this was Badgett’s definition of lesbian/bisexual; however, she makes no distinction between the 
two, most likely due to concerns over sample size. 
10 Badgett includes the interaction between sexual orientation and potential experience as an additional regressor. 
11 Throughout this paper, we refer to unmarried heterosexual women as "cohabiting heterosexual women" when 
they are identified via the cohabitation procedure, and "unmarried heterosexual women" when sexual orientation 
is determined via other methods. We elaborate on the cohabitation procedure in Section 3.1. As the majority of 
this paper focuses on females, we often refer to cohabiting heterosexual women and married heterosexual 
women as "cohabiting heterosexuals" and "married heterosexuals", respectively.   
12 All cited studies examining the GSS restrict their samples to full-time employed individuals to minimise 
distortions resulting from differences in hours worked and lower hourly wages generally received by part-time 
employees. Further details pertaining to each study are provided in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
14 
annual earnings of lesbians exceed those of otherwise-similar heterosexual women by 22-
40%, a result that is highly robust to equation specification. Blandford (2003), with the same 
dataset, estimates similar models using OLS and the Heckman two-step procedure. He defines 
“open” lesbians as those women who are behaviourally lesbian based on sexual experiences 
in the past year (or five years if an individual reports having had no partners in the past year), 
and are not currently married. This final restriction limits the analysis to lesbians who are 
most likely to be perceived as such by employers. These differences appear to have a minimal 
impact on the results, as Blandford’s findings suggest that lesbians earn between 15 and 38% 
more than heterosexual women, mirroring Black et al. (2003). 
Three additional published studies use GSS data to examine the lesbian pay gap, 
although the analyses presented diverge more materially from Badgett’s original (1995) 
paper. Using data spanning 1991-1996 and defining sexual orientation based on behaviour 
over the previous five years, Berg and Lien (2002) estimate an ordered-probit type (MLE) 
model, controlling for broadly-defined occupational categories, human capital proxies, and an 
incomplete set of geographic dummies. Their regression model suggests lesbians earn 13-47% 
more than heterosexual women, reflecting the uncertainty surrounding the point estimate of 
30%. Carpenter (2005) supplements his primary analysis of California Health Interview 
Survey (CHIS) data by considering the sensitivity of earnings differentials found in the GSS 
to the choice of time period analysed. Employing 1988-2000 GSS data, and classifying 
lesbians as women with exclusively same-sex relations in the past five years, he finds a 
lesbian premium of 21-31%, with temporal differences in both the size and significance of the 
estimates. Cushing-Daniels and Yeung (2009) analyse data from 1988-2006, offering separate 
analyses for different sub-periods and definitions of sexual orientation. Models estimated via 
OLS over the periods 1991-1996 and 1988-2006 produce results consistent with previous 
studies, with lesbians earning 9-15% more than heterosexual women.13 An identical 
specification for the 1998-2004 period, however, reveals a small lesbian earnings 
disadvantage. Moreover, results obtained through Heckman Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) estimation suggest that lesbians receive 13-14% lower annual 
compensation than married heterosexual women, and 5-7% higher earnings than unmarried 
heterosexual women, a finding inconsistent with even Badgett’s original (1995) paper. 
13 Unlike many of the previous studies, Cushing-Daniels and Yeung fail to obtain statistically significant lesbian 
earnings differentials in any of their specifications.  
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Despite the initial popularity of the GSS, many recent studies examining the sexual-
orientation earnings gap have used Public-Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data from the 1990 
and 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The first such study, by Klawitter and Flatt (1998), used a 
5% sample from the 1990 Census to analyse the effects of state and local anti-discrimination 
policies on income and the lesbian pay gap. Similarly to subsequent studies using census data, 
they define lesbians as females cohabiting with an “unmarried partner” of the same sex. In 
addition to the standard controls used in the aforementioned studies, Klawitter and Flatt 
account for state-level social factors that may affect earnings differentials in their OLS 
regressions. Among all employed women, they estimate a lesbian premium of 3-16% relative 
to cohabiting heterosexual women and 11-23% compared with married heterosexual women, 
depending to some extent on the presence and type of anti-discrimination policies. 
Importantly, however, they find that restricting the sample to full-time, full-year workers 
eliminates any statistically significant earnings difference. Clain and Leppel (2001), using 1-
in-1000 data from the 1990 Census, implement the Heckman two-step procedure on all full-
time employed individuals. Their models, which are obtained using stepwise specification 
search, notably include controls for partner’s income and interactions between the lesbian 
indicator dummy and several variables, making interpretation of their results difficult. 
However, they find that lesbians are not at an earnings advantage over partnered heterosexual 
females unless they live in the Midwest or with dependents. Including women not cohabiting 
with a partner in their sample, they generally find a statistically significant lesbian premium, 
but this varies substantially across observable characteristics.   
Many studies have used more recent data from the 2000 Census (5% sample). Jepsen 
(2007), for instance, estimates a range of OLS models to assess various theories of earnings 
differentials. Her base specification, which is similar to previous studies, suggests lesbian 
premiums of 9-14% over married heterosexual women and 10-17% relative to cohabiting 
heterosexual women, for those in full-time employment.14 In models with several interaction 
terms, lesbians appear to earn significantly more than other women, although the published 
results preclude evaluation of the premium at the means of interacted variables. Arabsheibani 
et al. (2007) stratify their analysis of the lesbian premium by education, job sector, region, 
age, and employment status. Their OLS analysis of the U.S. Census data implies a lesbian 
premium of 3-12% over heterosexual couples, with the premium being greater for older 
14 In robustness tests, Jepsen relaxes this constraint to include part-time employed women. She finds the results 
are robust to their inclusion. 
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women, those employed full-time or in the private sector, and among women with lower 
educational attainment. Antecol et al. (2008) decompose the sexual-orientation pay gap 
among full and part-time employed white women via two alternative techniques. Their 
Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions suggest a lesbian premium of 4% over cohabiting 
heterosexual women, but no difference relative to married women.15 Adopting the 
decomposition method of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), they find lesbians receive 
8% higher hourly pay than heterosexual women at the lower end of the wage distribution, but 
there is minimal divergence among higher-earning women. Daneshvary et al. (2008) analyse 
the effects of education on the sexual-orientation wage gap. Using Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions, they find evidence of a lesbian premium of approximately 8-10% among 
women without a bachelor's degree, but a wage advantage of only 2% at higher levels of 
education. Their OLS models further suggest that the premium is greater among women with 
higher levels of potential experience. Daneshvary et al. (2009), using the same dataset, 
investigate the impact of a previous marriage on the lesbian wage premium. They find a 
premium amounting to 4-8% for never-married lesbians. Having had a previous marriage 
reduces the premium to 2-4% over cohabiting and single women, and the wage advantage 
over married women disappears altogether.16 
Gates (2009) combines the 1% and 5% PUMS from the 2000 U.S. Census to examine 
the effects of sexual-orientation anti-discrimination policies on the wages of lesbians. 
Restricting his sample to full-time employed women and interacting sexual orientation with 
the policy variable in OLS regressions, Gates finds that lesbians earn 4-8% higher wages than 
other women in states with sexual-orientation anti-discrimination laws, while absent such 
policies the premium drops to 3-6%. Two final studies using the 5% PUMS estimate 
Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM), or 'multilevel models' to analyse the effects of state-level 
factors on the lesbian premium. Controlling for individual factors and state-level gay 
tolerance, Baumle and Poston (2011) estimate lesbian premiums of 4% and 8-9% over 
married and cohabiting heterosexual women, respectively, among all employed women. 
Klawitter (2011) updates her co-authored 1998 paper using more recent data from the 2000 
Census, superior methodology (multilevel models and quantile regression), and a number of 
additional robustness tests. She finds a significant lesbian advantage in hourly wages of 3% 
15 See Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) for more information on this approach. 
16 Both studies by Daneshvary et al. restrict their analysis to full-time employed women, although in their latter 
study the authors report robustness checks including part-time workers. 
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and 7% relative to married and cohabiting heterosexual women, respectively, while 
comparisons of annual income yield respective premium estimates in excess of 16% and 9%. 
Other studies employ more unique datasets. Carpenter’s (2005) primary analysis uses 
data from the 2001 CHIS, allowing him to classify lesbians based on self-reported sexual 
orientation. Across several specifications, he finds that hourly wages of lesbians are between 
6% lower and 4% higher than otherwise-similar heterosexual women, although none of the 
estimates are statistically significant. This study may not be representative of the U.S. as a 
whole, due to the highly liberal nature of California.17 Thus, the absence of a sexual-
orientation earnings differential in California is not necessarily indicative of the same on a 
national scale. Elmslie and Tebaldi (2007), using data from the 2004 Current Population 
Survey (CPS), adopt the cohabitation procedure in defining sexual orientation. Implementing 
the Heckman two-step procedure, they find no significant hourly wage differences between 
lesbians and married women and a lesbian premium of roughly 2-8% compared with 
cohabiting heterosexual women. Importantly, Elmslie and Tebaldi find that failing to control 
for hours and weeks worked produces qualitatively similar results to previous studies, with 
the estimated lesbian premium jumping to approximately 19% in one specification.18 
2.2.2. International Evidence 
The abundant evidence of a lesbian earnings premium in the U.S. has spawned a growing 
literature establishing whether this phenomenon extends to other countries. Plug and Berkhout 
(2004) provide one of the first international examinations of the sexual-orientation earnings 
gap using 1998-2000 survey data of recent Dutch university graduates. Their study departs 
from the U.S. analyses along a number of important dimensions. Namely, they define lesbians 
based on self-identified sexual preferences,19 their sample includes only young women with 
high educational attainment, and their OLS analysis combines both males and females. 
Among all employed females, they find no significant sexual-orientation differences in 
17 Although greater gay-friendliness should reduce sexual-orientation discrimination and increase the premium, it 
may also enhance lesbian maternity incidence, reducing the premium. The direction of the bias induced by the 
use of a California-specific sample is thus indeterminate. 
18 Carpenter (2004) compares household incomes of different-sex and same-sex couples using independent 1996-
2000 data from the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). He finds that same-sex female 
households obtain lower incomes than different-sex couples. The empirical findings from this study are not 
discussed in detail, nor are they included in Table A.1, as household income differences are significantly affected 
by the earnings of male partners in heterosexual households.  
19 The relevant question stated "Concerning your sexual preference, what do you prefer?". Respondents could 
choose between three alternatives: 1) only men; 2) only women; and 3) both men and women. 
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monthly or hourly earnings across several specifications. Restricting the analysis to full-time 
employed individuals, however, reveals a lesbian premium of 3-4%. Carpenter (2008b) 
similarly studies both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects of sexual orientation among 
young women using confidential data obtained from the Australian Longitudinal Study on 
Women's Health (ALSWH). Using self-reported sexual orientation and interval regression, 
Carpenter estimates a number of models by progressively adding controls for human capital, 
health status, occupation, and other factors, along with several robustness checks. He finds 
that the lesbians in his sample are significantly disadvantaged in the labour market, receiving 
24-31% lower compensation than otherwise-similar heterosexual women. Frank (2006) also 
analyses a non-representative sample obtained from the United Kingdom (UK) Association of 
University Teachers (AUT) 2000-2001 survey of employees at six British universities. 
Pooling data for both genders and using self-reported sexual orientation, Frank’s OLS results 
suggest an insignificant lesbian premium of approximately 8% among all staff. Limiting the 
sample to academics reveals a statistically significant premium of 17%, but including further 
controls for occupational rank renders the estimated premium (5-14%) insignificant. 
Arabsheibani et al. (2004) provide the first such analysis of nationally representative 
UK data by pooling the 1996 Quarter I (Q1) to 2001 Quarter IV (Q4) waves of the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS). They classify lesbians via the cohabitation procedure and stratify their 
OLS analysis by region and age. Their results show that lesbians receive 10-13% higher 
hourly wages than single women, and 3-21% greater hourly remuneration than partnered 
heterosexual women, with the estimates being larger among older women and non-
Londoners. Arabsheibani et al. (2005) extend their 2004 study by including four additional 
quarters of data (1996Q1-2002Q4) and opting for Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions over OLS. 
Their results are consistent with their previous study, finding a lesbian wage advantage of 8% 
and 9% over coupled and all heterosexual women, respectively. As noted in the previous 
section, Arabsheibani et al. (2007) examine the lesbian premium in the U.S., disaggregated by 
several factors known to influence wages. In their paper, they concurrently examine 1996Q1-
2004Q4 LFS data with a comparable model specification and report qualitatively similar 
findings to those in the U.S. and their earlier studies. Specifically, their results reveal that 
lesbians receive 2% lower to 12% higher wages than heterosexual women, with larger 
premiums observed among older and less educated women, part-time workers, and 
individuals employed in the public sector.  
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Carpenter (2008a) pools data from the 2003 and 2005 Canadian Community Health 
Surveys (CCHS) in order to assess whether the results obtained from U.S. studies carry over 
to Canada. Using self-reported sexual orientation and OLS, he estimates a lesbian premium of 
16-17%, a result highly consistent with those found in U.S. studies. Re-estimating his models 
by relationship status, Carpenter observes this premium is predominantly driven by a 
substantial lesbian advantage among partnered women (43%), while that for single lesbians is 
virtually non-existent (1%). Using 1994 data from the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP), Heineck (2009) offers a truly international examination of the earnings effects of 
sexual orientation.20 Applying the Heckman two-step procedure and defining homosexuality 
based on exclusivity of same-sex relations in the past five years, Heineck estimates the 
lesbian premium among all employed females to be approximately 10% in both his gender-
pooled and female-specific regressions. His estimates, however, are not statistically 
significant. Laurent and Mihoubi (2012) evaluate the wage effects of sexual orientation in the 
French labour market by aggregating 1996-2007 data from the French Employment Survey. 
Although data collection issues preclude use of the “spouse” response to identify same-sex 
couples, the authors classify homosexual households as those comprising two adults of the 
same gender reporting a friendship and imposing several filters to minimise 
misclassification.21 Implementing OLS and the Heckman two-step procedure, they estimate 
that lesbians employed in the private sector earn 2% and 4% more than cohabiting and 
married heterosexual women, respectively. This earnings advantage disappears almost 
entirely when considering females in public sector employment, with lesbians boasting a mere 
1% earnings advantage over their married heterosexual counterparts and receiving no such 
premium relative to cohabiting heterosexual women. 
Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2010) use Swedish register data from the Longitudinal 
Database for Education, Income and Employment (LOUISE) to compare 2003 annual income 
of all lesbians living in a civil union with those of married heterosexual women. Their OLS 
results, which are stratified by residence in a metropolitan area, suggest that lesbians earn 
between 20% less and 8% more than married heterosexuals, with the largest income penalties 
being observed in non-metropolitan areas. Inspecting the quantile regression estimates also 
20 Included in the analysis were U.S., Australia, Ireland, Poland and Bulgaria. In addition to standard controls 
seen in prior studies, Heineck includes country fixed-effects to control for international earnings differences. 
21 These filters include removing all couples where either member is a student, apprentice, farmer, or retiree; 
applying minimum and maximum age constraints; retaining couples only where both members are French; and 
including minimum and maximum income restrictions.    
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reveals a large and significant earnings disadvantage for lesbians, particularly among those at 
the lower end of the income distribution. A subsequent study by Ahmed et al. (2013b) uses 
2007 register data from the extended LOUISE database, renamed LISA (Longitudinal 
Integration Database for Health Insurance and Labour Market Studies), permitting 
comparisons of both annual income and full-time monthly income. Closely following the 
method of Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2010), they find lesbians in a civil union earn between 
4% less and 3% more than their married heterosexual counterparts, based on full-time 
monthly earnings. Moreover, their complete results reveal larger lesbian premiums when 
comparing annual income, as well as in the public sector and at the upper end of the earning 
distribution.    
2.3. Theoretical Considerations 
Evidently, the majority of studies emanating from both the U.S. and abroad uncover a positive 
and significant lesbian pay gap, although this varies substantially depending on the country 
and dataset analysed, as well as the model specification and estimation technique 
implemented. In this section, we highlight several shortcomings pertaining to a number of 
previous studies which reduce the applicability of their findings. We then discuss the purpose 
of this thesis, with specific reference to how it builds upon the previous literature.  
2.3.1. Deficiencies in Prior Research 
Although prior research provides evidence of a clear and convincing lesbian earnings 
premium, several contributing studies suffer from deficiencies which limit their dependability 
in informing debate and policy decisions. As noted by Elmslie and Tebaldi (2007), the major 
shortcoming of many studies is that they incur bias in coefficient estimates on lesbian 
indicator variables by failing to account for differences in hours worked. Studies seeking to 
attribute the residual pay gap to discrimination thus overstate true sexual-orientation 
remuneration differences. As shown in Table A.1, estimates of the lesbian earnings premium 
are markedly higher among studies lacking controls for annual hours worked. A second 
potential problem in the current literature is that inadequate consideration is given to marital 
status and its effect on labour-market outcomes. Elmslie and Tebaldi (2007) argue that 
marriage significantly affects labour-market outcomes and this effect must be separated out 
before addressing concerns relating to sexual-orientation discrimination. Several studies, 
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however, include a marital status variable and fail to articulate its importance in interpreting 
the pay gap or neglect its inclusion altogether.  
Some datasets, such as the GSS, suffer from the additional problem of containing a 
small sample, even when data is pooled across a number of years. As a result, estimates 
obtained using these datasets are highly sensitive to the time period analysed, as discussed in 
Black et al. (2003) and Cushing-Daniels & Yeung (2009). Another major drawback of some 
studies is that their narrow research population hinders inferences relating to the overall 
population of interest.22 For example, region-specific results do little to illuminate nationwide 
earnings differentials, while an earnings disadvantage for young lesbians does not imply an 
analogous penalty among older women.23 A further problem present in the literature is the 
inconsistent treatment of occupational choice. Blandford (2003) argues that due to the 
unequal occupational distribution of heterosexual women and lesbians, studies failing to 
incorporate individuals' occupation likely bias earnings differentials upwards as a result of 
occupational remuneration differences. Conversely, Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) suggest that 
occupational segregation may itself be evidence of labour-market discrimination and, in the 
absence of selectivity corrections, including occupational controls may bias earnings 
differentials downwards.24 These divergent views must be considered when deciding on an 
appropriate model specification. Finally, present empirical studies have not considered 
maternity risk and its consequent wage effect, resulting in potentially misleading inference. 
2.3.2. Purpose of the Study 
In this study, we attempt to build on the prior literature by explicitly accounting for the 
various shortcomings highlighted above. To remove potential biases associated with differing 
labour supply, we control for differences in annual hours worked in annual income 
regressions. While data limitations prohibit extensive use across all samples, where available 
the log of hourly wages is used as the dependent variable in robustness checks. Following 
Daneshvary et al. (2009), we stratify the analysis by marital status to allow for the presence of 
22 Carpenter (2005), Carpenter (2008b) and Frank (2006) are good examples of such studies. Although these 
studies do not allow generalisations pertaining to the entire population, which we cite here as a shortcoming, 
they provide a valuable contribution to the literature in examining a subset of the population of interest. 
23 Absent unobservable differences in human capital, the finding of an earnings disadvantage for young lesbians 
may be somewhat inconsistent with the maternity-risk hypothesis. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, sexual-
orientation differences in human capital are likely directly related to potential experience and thus age, 
prohibiting such inference on the basis of an age-stratified analysis. 
24 Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) argue this in the context of the gender pay gap, although the same argument 
applies to the sexual-orientation pay gap. 
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a marriage premium or penalty.25 Consideration is also given to the potential implications of
prior marital history in determining maternity incidence in Section 4.3.26 We avoid the
robustness problems associated with a small dataset by obtaining large samples from the U.S. 
Census and American Community Surveys. Implicitly, the choice of datasets also removes the 
difficulties inherent in extrapolating results from a non-representative sample to the 
population level. Finally, the issue of endogeneity is not exclusive to occupational choice and 
as such should not be treated in isolation. Carpenter (2005) for instance, expresses concern 
that choices relating to occupation, geographic location and educational attainment may 
reflect responses to real or perceived discrimination and including these variables in 
regressions may thus lead to an “over-controlling” problem. Following Carpenter (2005), we 
account for this possibility in the initial analysis by estimating a number of models, 
incrementally adding controls which become progressively less exogenous.  
This thesis attempts to provide an insight into the source of the lesbian pay gap, using 
more recent data relative to much of the current literature. In order to do so, a key purpose of 
this study is to investigate whether maternity risk adversely affects labour-market outcomes. 
Petit (2007) argues that employers may selectively hire employees in order to lower expected 
maternity-leave costs. Wage discrimination thus arises out of reluctance to employ women of 
greater maternity risk in highly paid jobs. Alternatively, differential treatment may be a result 
of compensatory pay reductions to induce the employer to bear higher maternity risk. In each 
case, the resulting earnings discrepancy represents a rational response on behalf of the 
employer.27
 The second objective of this paper is to ascertain whether the lesbian earnings 
premium can, at least in part, be attributed to sexual-orientation differences in maternity risk. 
The 'maternity-risk hypothesis' asserts that maternity risk adversely affects earnings and thus 
sexual-orientation differences in maternity risk contribute to the observed lesbian premium. 
To our knowledge, no current empirical study examines the effect of maternity risk on income 
25 The results of unreported Chow tests support this partitioning of the sample, as the test statistic is statistically 
significant at conventional levels in each case. Combining all partnered heterosexual women into one group may 
thus impose unnecessary restrictions on the coefficient estimates. 
26 We do not include prior marital history as a control in regression analyses as selection into divorce may pose 
problems in the analysis, as noted by Daneshvary et al. (2009). 
27 In addition to reduced earnings, discrimination on the basis of maternity risk may manifest itself in 
employment discrimination. Namely, if employers exhibit an aversion to bearing maternity risk, one would 
expect to see lower employment rates among women with greater perceived levels of maternity risk. This study 
focuses on the earnings effect of maternity risk, while an examination of the employment effect is left for future 
research. 
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or the lesbian premium. This suggests that current studies, when controlling for number of 
children present in a household, are only incorporating one aspect of the sexual-orientation 
maternity differential. A significant void in the literature is thus evident, which may have 
implications for current analyses of the gender and sexual-orientation pay gaps. Importantly, 
if maternity risk is shown to adversely affect wages, present studies which do not control for 
maternity risk may produce upward-biased estimates of gender and sexual-orientation wage 
inequality. In Appendix B, we discuss the available evidence regarding the maternity-risk 
hypothesis in previous studies. 
Finally, with this thesis, we hope to contribute to a strand of the literature which is 
currently in its infancy. Although policies affording rights to homosexuals and attitudes 
towards homosexuality vary considerably across states, few studies exploit this cross-state 
variation to examine sexual-orientation earnings differences. To our knowledge, only four 
such published studies exist, among which only two implement multilevel analyses similar to 
those estimated herein.28 Furthermore, the timing of this thesis affords us the benefit of using
more recent ACS data in addition to the census data used in previous studies. 
3. The Lesbian Earnings Premium
3.1. Data Sources and Sample 
As previously noted, this study relies on Public-Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data from the 
2000 U.S. Decennial Census (5% sample) and 2005 to 2010 American Community Surveys. 
The 2000 Census is the largest available dataset that allows an assessment of sexual 
orientation, while providing detailed information on labour-market outcomes (such as 
employment status, weeks worked and income) and demographic characteristics (such as age, 
education and race). Following the 2000 Census, the annual American Community Survey 
replaced the long form of the decennial census, providing more timely and often more 
complete information regarding socioeconomic status and demographics. The ACS PUMS 
provides information on approximately 1% of the U.S. population, requiring the data to be 
pooled across years to obtain a sample comparable to the 2000 Census. Due to differences in 
the censoring, surveying and reporting procedures implemented by the U.S. Census Bureau 
28 The indirect analysis contained in Section 5 was originally estimated using multilevel models. However, the 
complex model specifications led to difficulties in estimation when using the full dataset. As such, the use of 
multilevel models in this thesis is confined to assessing the robustness of findings to the choice of estimation 
technique. 
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across years, which may affect the compatibility of the data, we split the ACS data into two 
samples so as to combine only those years in which similar procedures were adopted.29 This
also facilitates a test of whether the results are invariant to the choice of sample period, which 
has often not been the case in previous studies, such as those using GSS data. The three 
resulting samples are the 2000 Census, pooled 2005-2007 ACS, and pooled 2008-2010 ACS. 
Similarly to previous U.S. Census analyses, we categorise the relationship status of 
respondents based on the cohabitation procedure.30 Specifically, female respondents are
classified as lesbians when they reside with a female householder who identifies them as their 
"unmarried partner", bypassing other classification options for non-relatives, including 
"roomer/boarder" and "housemate/roommate". Cohabiting heterosexuals are identified when 
the householder classifies a different-sex individual within the household as their "unmarried 
partner", while married heterosexuals are identified by selection of the "husband/wife" tick-
box. Although this thesis primarily compares the labour-market outcomes of the three 
aforementioned groups (individuals cohabiting with a partner or spouse), a collectively 
exhaustive set is formed for completeness, by creating a fourth group, here-labelled "no co-
residential relationship". This group comprises all individuals not represented in the former 
categories, including children, single persons, coupled individuals living in separate 
households and cohabiting couples where neither partner is the householder. Implementing 
this identification procedure for each dataset yields the sample sizes contained in the first 
column of Table A.2. This shows, for example, that prior to any deletions, the 5% PUMS 
from the 2000 Census contains 7,211,710 females, of which 32,756 are classified as lesbians 
and 220,847 as cohabiting heterosexuals.31 Due to computation constraints, fifteen percent
random samples are taken of married women and women not partaking in a co-residential 
29 For example, significant formatting changes in the questionnaire in 2008 likely affected the reporting of same-
sex spouses and same-sex unmarried partners, reducing the compatibility of the datasets (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2009). The effects of the global financial crisis further motivate the split in the ACS sample to pre-2008 and 
post-2008.     
30 Appendix C outlines alternative methods to identify lesbians within social science data and discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of using the cohabitation procedure. As noted in the appendix, the results in this 
thesis strictly apply only to coupled females. 
31 Although lesbians comprise only 0.99 to 1.20 percent of the coupled female population in the PUMS data, this 
is consistent with lesbian prevalence in other datasets, such as the GSS and NHSLS (Daneshvary et al., 2009). 
Moreover, as discussed in Appendix C, the lesbians in the sample are those most likely to be considered 
partnered lesbians by their employers, so potential undercounting of the lesbian population should not pose 
significant problems. 
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relationship.32 Table A.2. details the composition of the remaining sample following this and
subsequent restrictions. 
The research population is then restricted to females between the ages of eighteen and 
sixty-five years inclusive. Following Daneshvary et al. (2008), both partners' observations are 
dropped if either partner is less than eighteen years of age. To further reduce unobservable 
heterogeneity, all residents of group quarters are excluded from the sample. Moreover, as 
discussed in Appendix C, several studies express concern regarding measurement error in 
enumerating same-sex couples from the PUMS files. Specifically, the edit and allocation 
procedure followed by the U.S. Census Bureau in the 2000 Census and subsequent American 
Community Surveys may result in a contamination of the same-sex couples group. To provide 
assurance that the categories are not contaminated by miscoding of sex or an incorrect 
relationship allocation, both partners' observations are dropped when either partner's sex, age, 
relationship to the householder, or marital status is allocated by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Table A.2 emphasises the potential importance of this final restriction; excluding couples with 
allocated marital status significantly decreases the size of the lesbian sample while only 
marginally affecting the other subsamples. Finally, we exclude all individuals who were at no 
stage employed in the civilian labour force or reported zero wage/salary income in the 
previous year.33 This exclusion entails removing approximately fifteen percent of lesbians,
twenty percent of cohabiting heterosexuals, and thirty-two percent of married women from 
the sample. Our final sample from the 2000 Census consists of 12,204 lesbians, 163,834 
cohabiting heterosexual women, and 243,299 married women. Table A.2, Column (6) 
contains analogous information for all three samples. 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for lesbians, cohabiting heterosexuals and married 
women within each sample. In the interest of brevity, when discussing the summary statistics 
we focus predominantly on 1999 values, although we also highlight similarities and 
differences across samples.34 Unless otherwise stated, the explanations in this section are 'on
32 These samples are taken for each year prior to pooling datasets to ensure adequate representation across years. 
33 Those serving in the military and institutionalised individuals are therefore not part of the research population. 
Similarly to Klawitter (2011), we impose no further restrictions on class of worker as discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation or maternity risk may affect employment choices. 
34 The 2000 Census PUMS contains information for the 1999 calendar year, while the ACS PUMS contain 
information for the twelve months preceding survey completion. All real income figures account for this 
Variables Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals
Work characteristics
 Annual real income 47,175 29,540 33,831 50,982 30,288 37,243 50,497 30,291 38,472
(46,705) (29,510) (34,173) (49,318) (29,094) (38,310) (49,731) (29,245) (38,789)
 Weeks worked 46.74 44.31 44.76 46.70 44.23 45.00 46.88 45.26 45.85
(10.78) (13.07) (12.76) (11.08) (13.46) (12.66) (10.31) (12.11) (11.48)
 Hours worked per week 41.47 38.77 36.93 41.29 38.31 36.83 40.52 37.64 36.69
(10.17) (9.82) (11.21) (10.71) (10.08) (11.49) (10.43) (10.08) (11.41)
Personal characteristics
 Age 38.13 33.46 41.79 40.92 35.02 44.14 41.82 35.28 44.93
(9.78) (10.36) (10.46) (10.56) (11.47) (10.65) (11.14) (11.64) (10.82)
 Potential experience 18.54 15.42 23.22 21.02 16.67 25.13 21.86 16.77 25.77
(9.60) (10.59) (10.84) (10.38) (11.77) (11.09) (10.94) (12.03) (11.35)
 No high school 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.05
(0.26) (0.35) (0.29) (0.19) (0.30) (0.24) (0.17) (0.28) (0.22)
 High school 0.16 0.31 0.29 0.16 0.30 0.26 0.15 0.27 0.23
(0.36) (0.46) (0.45) (0.36) (0.46) (0.44) (0.36) (0.44) (0.42)
 Some college 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.22
(0.43) (0.45) (0.43) (0.41) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45) (0.42)
 Associate 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11
(0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31)
 Bachelor's 0.25 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.24
(0.43) (0.34) (0.39) (0.44) (0.38) (0.42) (0.44) (0.39) (0.42)
 Postgraduate 0.21 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.07 0.15
(0.40) (0.22) (0.30) (0.42) (0.25) (0.34) (0.43) (0.26) (0.35)
 Hispanic 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.09
(0.27) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.30) (0.34) (0.29)
 White 0.84 0.78 0.84 0.87 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.80 0.84
(0.36) (0.42) (0.37) (0.34) (0.40) (0.37) (0.33) (0.40) (0.37)
 Black 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06
(0.27) (0.31) (0.25) (0.22) (0.28) (0.24) (0.23) (0.28) (0.24)
 Asian 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05
(0.11) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.16) (0.21) (0.12) (0.16) (0.22)
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics by sample and sexual orientation
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Variables Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals
 Other race 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.25) (0.20) (0.18) (0.23) (0.18)
 Mixed race 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11)
 Disabled 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.34) (0.36) (0.33) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21)
 English proficient 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.94 0.94
(0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.15) (0.23) (0.23) (0.14) (0.23) (0.23)
 U.S. citizen 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.97
(0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17)
 No. own children under 18 0.33 0.64 0.98 0.29 0.56 0.87 0.31 0.59 0.85
(0.76) (1.00) (1.12) (0.69) (0.94) (1.09) (0.74) (0.98) (1.09)
U.S. residence
 Northeast 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.18
(0.41) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39)
 Midwest 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.25
(0.38) (0.43) (0.44) (0.39) (0.43) (0.43) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43)
 South 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.36
(0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
 West 0.31 0.24 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.21
(0.46) (0.43) (0.40) (0.45) (0.43) (0.41) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41)
 Metropolitan residence 0.84 0.72 0.69 0.83 0.74 0.71 0.83 0.74 0.72
(0.37) (0.45) (0.46) (0.37) (0.44) (0.45) (0.37) (0.44) (0.45)
Occupation
 Mgt. and professionals 0.49 0.28 0.40 0.52 0.31 0.45 0.52 0.33 0.47
(0.50) (0.45) (0.49) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50)
 Service occupations 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.14
(0.34) (0.41) (0.35) (0.34) (0.42) (0.34) (0.35) (0.43) (0.35)
 Sales 0.24 0.38 0.36 0.25 0.36 0.34 0.25 0.35 0.32
(0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.43) (0.48) (0.47) (0.43) (0.48) (0.47)
 Construction 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.19) (0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07)
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Table 3.1 (continued)
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Variables Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals
 Production and transport. 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05
(0.29) (0.32) (0.28) (0.25) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.23)
Industry
 Agriculture 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
 Construction 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
 Manufacturing 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.30) (0.33) (0.31) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
 Wholesale trade 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
 Retail trade 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10
(0.29) (0.35) (0.31) (0.30) (0.35) (0.30) (0.30) (0.35) (0.30)
 Transport. and utilities 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16)
 Information 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.21) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14)
 Finance and insurance 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09
(0.24) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28)
 Professional and mgt. 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09
(0.31) (0.29) (0.27) (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) (0.32) (0.30) (0.29)
 Education and health 0.30 0.23 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.41
(0.46) (0.42) (0.48) (0.47) (0.44) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49)
 Arts and entertainment 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.06
(0.27) (0.34) (0.24) (0.26) (0.34) (0.23) (0.27) (0.34) (0.23)
 Other services 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
 Public administration 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05
(0.24) (0.19) (0.22) (0.25) (0.19) (0.22) (0.26) (0.20) (0.22)
Number of observations 12,204 163,834 243,299 10,302 107,599 161,515 10,653 116,650 158,587
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Table 3.1 (continued)
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average'. In 1999, the average real income of lesbians was $47,175, significantly more than 
any other category. Married women earned $33,831 per annum, while cohabiting 
heterosexuals received the lowest compensation, with average real income of $29,540. As real 
incomes have risen, this relative income gap has persisted, with lesbians earning the most, and 
cohabiting heterosexuals the least, within each sample. The statistics are also suggestive of 
greater labour-market commitment among lesbians compared to heterosexual women, with 
lesbians working longer hours each week and more weeks in the previous year.35 Somewhat
unsurprisingly, married women work fewer hours per week than cohabiting heterosexual 
women in each sample.  
Personal characteristics vary noticeably between categories. In the 2000 Census 
sample, married women are the oldest at 41.79 years of age, while lesbians and cohabiting 
heterosexual women are significantly younger (38.13 and 33.46 years, respectively). Turning 
to the ACS samples reveals the same age ranking, although the average woman is 
considerably older than their Census sample counterpart. Educational attainment also differs 
across household types. Lesbians are the most highly educated, with twenty-five (twenty-one) 
percent of lesbians in the 1999 sample having a bachelor's (postgraduate) degree. The contrast 
with other women is marked, with only nineteen percent of cohabiting heterosexual women 
and twenty-nine percent of married heterosexual women obtaining at least a bachelor's 
degree. The situation at the opposite end of the education spectrum also highlights the 
significant disparity in educational attainment across categories. For instance, forty-five 
percent of cohabiting heterosexual women studied no further than high school, compared to 
only twenty-three percent of lesbians. Interestingly, in addition to an increase in overall 
education levels, the ACS data suggests a narrowing of the sexual-orientation education gap 
compared to both cohabiting and married heterosexual women. A comparison of potential 
experience levels largely mirrors the sexual-orientation age-patterning, with married women 
having the highest level of potential experience in each sample, followed by lesbians and 
cohabiting heterosexuals. Differences in potential experience thus do not appear to contribute 
to the unadjusted lesbian premium over married women. 
difference. In Appendix D, Table D.1 we note how real income is calculated and provide the definition of each 
variable used in the analysis that follows. 
35 It is important to note that the values for weeks worked in the 2008-2010 sample are inferred using the mid-
point of a categorical weeks variable. The descriptive statistics are therefore provided only for comparative 
purposes and the associated continuous variable is not used in subsequent regression analyses. 
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Regarding differences in ethnicity, cohabiting heterosexuals consist more heavily of 
Hispanic women than lesbians and married heterosexuals. In 1999, for example, eleven 
percent of cohabiting heterosexuals identified as being of Hispanic origin, relative to eight 
percent of lesbians and married women. Racial dissimilarities are also apparent, with an 
appreciably larger portion of lesbians and married women being white relative to cohabiting 
heterosexuals. Furthermore, in all three samples, married heterosexuals contain relatively 
more Asian women (four to five percent) than do lesbians (one to two percent) and cohabiting 
heterosexuals (two to three percent).   
Another notable attribute highlighted by Table 3.1 is that disability prevalence among 
partnered women appears to be falling over time. Minor differences in questions regarding 
disability status across census/ACS years may, however, be responsible for this apparent 
change.36 Nevertheless, a common feature among the samples is that married women are less
likely to be disabled than other women, but such differences are relatively small. Lesbians 
also exhibit greater proficiency in English and are more likely to be U.S. citizens compared to 
cohabiting and married heterosexual women. In addition, the average number of children 
residing in the household differs across subsamples. Households occupied by married couples 
have the highest average number of children present (0.98 in 1999), followed by cohabiting 
heterosexuals (0.64). Lesbian households contain the fewest children (0.33), a finding which 
persists across samples. 
In terms of regional grouping, married women exhibit a strong preference towards 
residing in the South. Lesbians, on the other hand, are relatively more likely to locate in the 
West of the U.S. and in metropolitan areas than other women, and display a relative aversion 
to living in the Midwest. In addition, the summary statistics are suggestive of occupational 
segregation between lesbians and other women. Lesbians are over-represented in construction 
and under-represented in sales positions. Four percent of the 1999 lesbian sample work in 
construction, compared with one percent of other women.37 Moreover, only a quarter of the
lesbians in each sample are employed in sales positions, compared with more than one-third 
of cohabiting and married heterosexual women. Cohabiting heterosexual women are also 
under-represented in management and professional occupations. Finally, the industry 
classifications display a strong tendency for cohabiting heterosexuals to undertake 
36 For example, additional disability questions were asked in the 2000 Census relative to subsequent American 
Community Surveys. 
37 Industry classifications and ACS data suggest a smaller sexual-orientation gap in this profession. 
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employment in retail trade and arts/entertainment, while married women are significantly 
more likely than other women to work in education and health. As the occupational 
categorisation suggests, lesbians are disproportionately employed in professional and 
management positions, which likely contributes to the lesbian earnings advantage. 
3.3. Method 
Evidently, lesbians earn significantly more income than heterosexual women. As the previous 
discussion highlights, however, differences in work and personal characteristics may be at 
least partially responsible for the observed lesbian premium. In this section, we present an 
analysis of the lesbian earnings premium in a similar framework to previous studies. 
Specifically, we test for the presence of such a premium in each of the three samples when 
controlling for observable individual characteristics, but ignoring forward-looking 
expectations of labour-market separation due to child-bearing and contextual factors which 
may affect income. 
3.3.1. Base Analysis 
In order to examine the lesbian pay gap, we perform comparative earnings analyses between 
lesbians and heterosexual women. Jepsen (2007) and Daneshvary et al. (2009) argue that 
confining the analysis to partnered lesbians and cohabiting heterosexuals leads to greater 
comparability due to the similarities between the two groups. That is, the women are of 
similar legal status, as well as having a domestic partner that can contribute to household 
tasks and share child-rearing responsibilities. However, the descriptive statistics in the 
previous section cast doubt on the assertion that cohabiting heterosexual women represent a 
better comparison group than married heterosexuals. Moreover, developments in the rights of 
same-sex couples, including legalisation of same-sex marriage in some states, have led to 
enhanced comparability between lesbians and married heterosexuals. As a result, we 
concurrently analyse the lesbian premium relative to cohabiting as well as married 
heterosexual women. To examine the effect of sexual orientation on earnings, we estimate 
earnings regressions of the following form: 
ln 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝒁𝑖
′𝜙 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖  (𝐴) 
where i indexes the observation, ln 𝑅  is the natural log of real annual wage and salary 
income, and the vector 𝑿 consists of work characteristics, including usual hours worked per 
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week and five indicator variables for weeks worked in the previous year. 𝒁 is a vector of 
variables controlling for personal characteristics, region of residency, occupation and 
industry, the inclusion of which depends on the model to be estimated. More detail is 
provided below regarding the specification of individual regression equations. Lesbian is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the individual is a female cohabiting with a same-sex 
partner, and zero otherwise. We assume the error term, 𝜀, is heteroskedastic but otherwise 
well-behaved. 
It is important to note that the regressors contained in 𝒁, such as education, residential 
location and the presence of children are, to varying degrees, endogenous. As previously 
discussed, incrementally adding progressively more endogenous covariates to the regression 
models and presenting a range of premium estimates allows us to reduce concerns associated 
with the 'over-controlling' problem. Model (A1) represents the base regression model which 
includes the vector 𝑿 of work characteristics and the lesbian indicator dummy.38 Specification
(A2) further controls for potential experience (defined as age - years of education - 5) and its 
square, an indicator for being of Hispanic origin, four dummies for race, as well as indicators 
for being proficient in English, a U.S. citizen, or disabled.39 Model (A3) includes five
additional indicators for highest educational attainment, while (A4) further adds three 
indicators for region of residency and a dummy variable for residing in a metropolitan area. 
Specification (A5) adds a control for the number of children under eighteen residing in the 
household and (A6), which represents the full-control model, includes four indicators for 
occupation and twelve for industry. As in subsequent analyses, we estimate each model 
separately with cohabiting and married heterosexual women as the comparison group, for 
each sample, and account for heteroskedasticity by computing robust standard errors in all 
regression models. 
3.3.2. Robustness Checks 
An important issue that must be addressed is that of comparability with previous studies. As is 
evident from Table A.1 and the discussion in Section 2, previous studies estimating the 
sexual-orientation pay gap have generally used a different dependent variable to that used 
38 For both pooled ACS samples, we also include two year dummies in all regression models throughout this 
thesis to account for year fixed-effects. For ease of exposition, these are excluded from the written equation 
specifications.  
39 As previously noted, the definitions of all discussed variables are provided in Appendix D, Table D.1. 
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herein. For example, past analyses of U.S. Census data have commonly analysed sexual-
orientation differences in hourly wages, while GSS studies focus on the annual income gap 
among full-time employed women, but do not control for hours or weeks of work. To ensure 
that any estimated lesbian earnings advantage is not a by-product of the chosen specification, 
we re-estimate the above models with minor changes for two separate cases. In the first 
robustness check, we drop the vector of work characteristics and use the log of real hourly 
wages as the dependent variable.40 This entails estimating regressions of the following form:
ln 𝑊𝑖 = 𝒁𝑖
′𝜙 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖  (𝐵)
where ln 𝑊  is the natural log of the real hourly wage and 𝒁 is as previously specified in 
each model. As a second robustness check, we drop the vector of work characteristics and 
restrict the analysis to women working full-time.41 This can be written as:
ln 𝑅𝑖 = 𝒁𝑖
′𝜙 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖  (𝐶)
where all variables are as previously defined and only full-time workers are included. 
Consideration must also be given to the possibility of sample-selection bias due to 
wage and salary income being unobservable for unemployed individuals. Specifically, if 
unobservable characteristics affect both the likelihood of employment and subsequent 
compensation rates, then the zero-conditional-mean assumption will not hold and OLS will 
produce inconsistent estimates. As we are interested in assessing the partial effect of sexual 
orientation on earnings at the population level, the use of a non-random sample, in which we 
only observe the earnings of employed individuals, may result in inaccurate inference. Table 
3.2 provides suggestive evidence that selectivity may be an important factor in driving 
apparent earnings differentials, with employment rates among lesbians exceeding those of 
cohabiting and married heterosexual women by four to six percentage points, and sixteen to 
seventeen percentage points, respectively.42 To account for this possibility, we implement the
Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979). In the first step, the probability of engaging 
in employment in the previous year is modelled using probit estimation, and the Inverse Mills 
40 This, however, precludes use of the 2008-2010 sample due to unavailability of a continuous measure of weeks 
worked. 
41 To minimise unobservable heterogeneity, we define full-time workers as individuals working at least thirty-
four hours per week for a minimum of forty weeks in the previous year. 
42 Rates are calculated from Table A.2. Sample sizes in column (5) represent women eligible to participate in the 
labour force, while column (6) represents women employed at some stage in the previous year. The ratio of the 
two provides a measure of the employment rate for each subsample. 
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Ratio (IMR) is generated.43 Generally, the factors included in the selection equation include
those from the earnings equation, plus additional identifying variables, or exclusion 
restrictions, which do not appear in the earnings equation. In the second step, the IMR is 
included as an additional explanatory variable in the earnings equation.  
Table 3.2. Proportion of women employed by sample and household type 
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS 
Lesbians 0.8535 0.8421 0.8405 
Cohabiting heterosexuals 0.8135 0.7984 0.7796 
Married heterosexuals 0.6840 0.6820 0.6808 
Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
Although the Heckman procedure controls for sample-selectivity, it can result in 
severe multicollinearity if sufficient exclusion restrictions are not defined. To mitigate this 
problem, the selection equation contains appropriate variables from the earnings regressions, 
as well as two identifying variables: 
 The real income of the female's partner, to account for the reduction in labour supply 
associated with the income effect. 
 An indicator for the presence of children under six in the household. Although number 
of children should capture the erosion of human capital due to prior labour-market 
absences, the presence of children under six may matter more in determining ability to 
seek employment. 
The probability of employment is thus modelled as a function of the characteristics in 𝒁 
included in the earnings equation, the lesbian indicator dummy, partner income and the 
presence of young children.44 Each model from the base regressions defined in Equation A is
therefore re-estimated in a two-step fashion as discussed above, which we specify as: 
ln 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝒁𝑖
′𝜙 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝜂 + 𝜀𝑖  (𝐷) 
where all variables are as previously defined and the IMR is calculated from an auxiliary 
regression, as specified above. 
43 The IMR is given by the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative distribution function of a 
distribution and is also known as the hazard rate. 
44 Work characteristics in 𝐗 are, for obvious reasons, not included in the selection equation. In model (A6), we 
also exclude occupation and industry controls from the selection equation. 
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3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Base Results 
Table A.3 reports the results of the earnings comparison between lesbians and cohabiting 
heterosexual women based on the 2000 Census. Although we are primarily interested in the 
coefficient on the lesbian indicator variable, two other features of the results warrant 
discussion. Firstly, the goodness-of-fit measure, R2, shows that even the most sparse model is
able to explain over half of the variation in logged annual income. Including additional 
covariates significantly improves the explanatory power of the model, with the full-control 
model explaining more than sixty-three percent of the variation in logged real income. 
Second, the estimated coefficients on almost all covariates are both statistically significant 
and of the expected sign. Importantly, potential experience is estimated to have a positive but 
diminishing effect on income, representative of the commonly observed arc-shaped earnings 
profile. Residing in a metropolitan area, being Asian, a U.S. citizen, and fluent in English are 
all associated with higher income. Interestingly, being of Hispanic origin or black does not 
adversely affect compensation in the majority of models, while being classified as "other 
race" or "mixed race" does. As expected, higher educational attainment leads to progressively 
greater income in all reported models. Finally, having a disability or additional children exerts 
a negative influence on wage and salary income, all else held constant.45
Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, lesbians are predicted to earn 
significantly higher incomes than cohabiting heterosexual women, a finding that is robust to 
the inclusion of a range of observable characteristics. Holding only work characteristics 
constant, for example, lesbians earn a logged real income difference of 0.3006 over 
cohabiting heterosexuals, representing a premium of 35.07 percent.46 Controlling further for
potential experience, ethnicity, race, English proficiency, U.S. citizenship and disability status 
reduces the premium to 28.93 percent. The results from Model (A3) demonstrate the critical 
importance of controlling for education in earnings comparisons, with the addition of the 
educational-attainment dummies decreasing the estimated earnings advantage to 8.20 
45 Although not reported, the estimated effects of work characteristics conform to prior expectations and are 
highly significant. 
46 From the specification in Column 1: ln 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛽 +  Lesbian 𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 , the lesbian premium is estimated as
exp(𝛾) − 1, or in this case exp(0.3006 ) − 1 = 35.07 percent. This conversion is used extensively throughout the
discussion. 
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percent.47 The sequential addition of further controls results in progressively smaller estimates
of the lesbian pay gap, with the full-control model suggesting a lesbian premium of 5.55 
percent relative to cohabiting heterosexual women. 
Table A.4 similarly presents the findings from the 2000 Census earnings comparison 
between lesbians and married women. Evidently, the results are highly consistent with the 
cohabiting heterosexuals analysis, with the most noticeable difference (other than differences 
in the estimated premium) being in the estimated effects of ethnicity and race. Specifically, 
being Hispanic is now consistently associated with lower earnings, while being black is 
estimated to have a positive earnings effect in most specifications. Although this contradicts 
the well-known racial earnings gap, it is likely that selection into marriage causes this 
seemingly counter-intuitive result. A crucial similarity between the results, however, is that 
lesbians are once again estimated to earn a premium over otherwise-similar heterosexual 
women. Model (A1) produces a lesbian premium estimate of 14.43 percent over married 
women. In contrast to the previous analysis, differences in potential experience, ethnicity, 
race, English proficiency, U.S. citizenship and disability status exert minimal influence on the 
income gap, with the premium rising to 14.95 percent upon their inclusion. Holding 
educational attainment constant again significantly reduces the premium, resulting in an 
estimated 6.48 percent lesbian advantage. Unlike the cohabiting heterosexuals comparison, 
the estimated lesbian premium is lowest in (A5), at 1.32 percent, including all controls except 
industry and occupation. The full-control model suggests occupation and industry 
asymmetries tend to favour married women, with the lesbian advantage rising to 2.21 percent 
upon their inclusion. 
Finally, we present summarised results for all three samples in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.48
Given that the focus of this section is on estimating the magnitude of the lesbian pay gap, we 
omit a detailed discussion of all variables except the lesbian indicator, noting that the 
important coefficients are significant and of the appropriate sign in almost every case. 
Examining Table 3.3 reveals a similar pattern across all three samples. Model (A1), which 
47 As previously discussed, educational attainment is, to an extent, endogenous. Including it in the regression 
may thus under-estimate the sexual-orientation earnings effect. In the remainder of this paper we favour over-
controlling to generate conservative estimates of the lesbian premium as opposed to omitting key variables and 
reporting upward-biased estimates. 
48 Detailed regression results for the 2005-2007 and 2008-2010 ACS samples are provided in Appendix A, 
Tables A.5-A.8. Due to the large number of regressions estimated, brevity considerations allow only the 
coefficients of interest to be reported in much of this thesis. As this is not ideal, we provide an expanded set of 
coefficient estimates when it is deemed reasonable to do so. 
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controls only for sexual orientation and work characteristics, produces a lesbian premium of 
40.44 and 38.58 percent in the 2005-2007 and 2008-2010 samples, respectively. These 
estimates are comparable to the 35.07 percent advantage estimated from the 2000 Census. 
Moreover, the systematic addition of further controls results in a similar reduction in the 
premium across all three samples. Considering the values from the full-control model (A6), 
we obtain estimates of the lesbian premium over otherwise-similar cohabiting heterosexuals 
of 5.55, 6.79 and 6.43 percent in the three respective samples. 
Table 3.3. Summary of lesbian premium estimates relative to cohabiting heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) 
Lesbian 0.3006*** 0.2541*** 0.0788*** 0.0637*** 0.0590*** 0.0540*** 
2000 (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0062) 
Census Observations 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 
R2 0.5352 0.5530 0.6097 0.6175 0.6181 0.6363 
Lesbian 0.3396*** 0.2725*** 0.0856*** 0.0728*** 0.0706*** 0.0657*** 
2005-2007 (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0070) 
ACS Observations 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 
R2 0.5644 0.5864 0.6448 0.6523 0.6525 0.6734 
Lesbian 0.3263*** 0.2566*** 0.0777*** 0.0672*** 0.0657*** 0.0623*** 
2008-2010 (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
ACS Observations 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 
R2 0.5740 0.5963 0.6584 0.6659 0.6660 0.6868 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but only the coefficient on the 
lesbian indicator is reported. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a one-tailed test. Sources: 2000 
Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
Table 3.4 reveals comparable cross-sample consistency in the sexual-orientation pay 
gap estimates relative to married women. For instance, the magnitude of the lesbian premium 
differs by no more than two percentage points across samples for each of Models (A3)-(A6). 
As in the 2000 Census analysis, controlling for personal characteristics other than education 
and number of children does little to lessen the earnings disparity in the ACS samples. 
Differences in educational attainment again appear to be one of the primary drivers of the raw 
compensation gap. Comparing the output for each full-control model yields lesbian-married 
women adjusted earnings differentials of 2.21, 3.51 and 3.86 percent, respectively. These 
estimates are all statistically significant and, although they are not the smallest estimates of all 
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specifications, represent conservative estimates of the premium due to the inclusion of 
partially endogenous variables in the equation specification.49
Table 3.4. Summary of lesbian premium estimates relative to married heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) 
Lesbian 0.1348*** 0.1393*** 0.0628*** 0.0273*** 0.0131** 0.0219*** 
2000 (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062) 
Census Observations 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 
R2 0.5343 0.5461 0.6015 0.6103 0.6106 0.6306 
Lesbian 0.1267*** 0.1226*** 0.0601*** 0.0287*** 0.0212*** 0.0345*** 
2005-2007 (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0070) 
ACS Observations 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 
R2 0.5439 0.5591 0.6170 0.6251 0.6252 0.6499 
Lesbian 0.1002*** 0.0984*** 0.0518*** 0.0234*** 0.0225*** 0.0379*** 
2008-2010 (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0066) 
ACS Observations 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 
R2 0.5583 0.5737 0.6294 0.6373 0.6373 0.6634 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but only the coefficient on the 
lesbian indicator is reported. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a one-tailed test. Sources: 2000 
Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
3.4.2. Results of Robustness Tests 
The previous analysis provides consistent evidence of a lesbian earnings advantage, with a 
significant premium estimated across a variety of samples and specifications. Ensuring the 
robustness of this result to the choice of alternative dependent variables will substantially 
enhance the validity of the findings. Table A.9, Panels A and B, report the results of the 
comparative real wage analyses with cohabiting and married heterosexuals as the comparison 
groups, respectively. Although the estimates reported are slightly larger than those from the 
base specifications, the observed change in the premium as more covariates are added is 
highly similar for both groups. Model (B6) suggests that lesbians receive 5.92 to 7.62 percent 
higher real wages than cohabiting heterosexual women, while analogous estimates relative to 
married women imply a real wage premium of 3.08 to 4.74 percent. Comparing the estimates 
obtained from Models (A6) and (B6) reveals only minor differences, with the premium 
49 As noted later, differences in unobservable human capital likely augment the premium considerably. Our 
premium estimates from the full-control model are therefore conservative relative to alternative specifications, 
but may not be conservative when accounting for differences in human capital accumulation.  
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estimates being within 1.50 percentage points in all cases. Moreover, the values obtained for 
all samples are similar in magnitude to findings in prior 2000 Census studies.50
Table A.10 presents analogous results for the lesbian income gap among full-time 
employed women, with no work-characteristic controls. As expected, the failure to control for 
variation in hours and weeks worked among women results in much larger estimates of the 
lesbian premium, despite restricting the sample to full-time workers. This specification yields 
a lesbian advantage over otherwise-similar cohabiting heterosexuals of between 7.93 and 
10.25 percent in Models (C5) and (C6), exceeding even the largest comparable estimate from 
the baseline specification. Examining the lesbian pay gap over married women reveals a 
similar result. Despite these results being consistent with previous studies that rely on a 
comparable model specification, such as Baumle and Poston (2011) and Jepsen (2007), they 
further emphasise that failing to control for hours and weeks of work generates upward-biased 
estimates of the lesbian premium. 
Finally, the results from the Heckman two-stage estimator are provided in Table 
A.11.51 For all samples, the inclusion of the selection-correction dramatically reduces the
estimated premium relative to cohabiting heterosexual women in Models (D1) and (D2). In all 
models controlling for educational attainment, however, there is almost no discrepancy 
between the OLS and two-step estimates. Considering the full-control model, the correction 
for sample-selectivity appears to have made little difference, with the premium estimate in 
each sample being within 0.50 percentage points of that implied by OLS.52 In contrast, the
Heckman two-step procedure generates significantly different estimates of the lesbian 
advantage over married heterosexuals. Notably, the estimates are at least twice as large as 
those produced by OLS in most cases, including in the full-control model. Taking these 
results at face value, the estimated lesbian premium relative to married heterosexual women 
in the respective samples is 7.77, 10.03 and 11.26 percent. This result is in stark contrast to 
the previous analyses, which persistently display a smaller lesbian advantage over married 
women, as opposed to cohabiting heterosexuals.   
50 See, for example, Daneshvary et al. (2008, 2009), Gates (2009) and Klawitter (2011) in Table A.1. 
51 As no analogous goodness-of-fit measure is available for the Heckman procedure, such as pseudo-R2, we do 
not report on the goodness-of-fit of these models. 
52 Although the selection term appears to have only a minimal effect on the lesbian premium, the selection term 
is statistically significant in all regressions.  
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Regardless of the exact estimation method and specification chosen, there is 
substantial evidence of a lesbian premium in all three samples. For the remainder of the paper, 
in which we analyse one potential source of the observed premium, we focus primarily on 
models closely resembling the original specification. We do this for a number of reasons. 
First, the lack of a continuous weeks-worked variable in the 2008-2010 ACS sample renders 
the use of hourly wages impracticable.53 Second, use of hourly wages arguably imposes more
constraints on the effect of hours and weeks worked than does including them as controls in 
the annual income regressions. Third, as previously discussed, the use of logged annual 
income with no hours or weeks worked controls generates upward biased estimates due to 
variation in labour-force commitment, even among full-time workers. Finally, despite the 
Heckman two-step method being able to address sample-selectivity issues, we disregard its 
use as the primary estimation technique due to concerns surrounding model robustness. 
Specifically, volatility in the reported estimates and cross-sample inconsistency, potentially 
due to insufficient or inappropriate exclusion restrictions, may pose problems in assessing 
possible explanations of the lesbian premium. In unreported regressions, we show that the 
Heckman Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimator generates results mirroring those 
obtained via OLS, providing further justification for the primary use of OLS throughout the 
remainder of the analysis.  
4. Maternity Risk and the Premium
4.1. Child-Bearing and Labour-Force Attachment 
The results from the previous section strongly suggest the existence of an economically and 
statistically significant lesbian premium, even when controlling for a wide range of 
observable characteristics. Specifically, we have shown that lesbians earn approximately 60-
70 percent and 30-40 percent more than cohabiting heterosexual women and married women, 
respectively, not holding other factors constant. When controlling for work and personal 
characteristics, region of residence, and occupation and industry, we obtain respective lesbian 
premium estimates of 6-7 percent and 2-4 percent. Considerable effort has been devoted to 
explaining the adjusted lesbian pay gap in previous studies, but a consensus view on its cause 
is yet to be reached. For the remainder of this paper we focus on one plausible factor which 
53 It is possible to construct a continuous measure of weeks worked by assigning each individual the value 
corresponding to the mid-point of their weeks worked category. This method was utilised for comparative 
purposes in Table 3.1, but its use in generating hourly wages may result in biased estimates. 
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may contribute to the observed earnings differential. Specifically, we argue that differences in 
maternity risk, or the likelihood of a woman temporarily leaving the labour market to give 
birth to a child, may be partially responsible for this differential.  
Petit (2007) makes the compelling case that employers may selectively hire employees 
to reduce the expected costs of maternity leave.54 That is, holding other factors constant,
employers attempt to minimise pecuniary maternity benefits, as well as interruption and 
replacement costs associated with females leaving the workforce to give birth to or care for 
children. This reluctance to employ women with greater maternity risk thus results in a 
compensatory wage reduction to induce the employer to bear the higher associated costs. 
Moreover, if training and replacement costs are an increasing function of a position's salary, 
then maternity risk may also manifest itself in discriminatory promotion practices. As lesbians 
exhibit lower maternity risk than heterosexual women, a sexual-orientation earnings gap may 
result, even among women with identical levels of human capital.    
We are not the first to hypothesise that differential fertility rates among women may 
exacerbate the lesbian premium. Badgett (2001), for example, argues that lesbians may be 
perceived as being similar to heterosexual men with respect to labour-force commitment and 
reluctance to leave their job to have children. Baumle and Poston (2011) and Elmslie and 
Tebaldi (2007) similarly argue that employers' perceptions regarding sexual-orientation 
differences in labour-force attachment may be a contributing factor to the observed lesbian 
premium. A number of other studies also point to differences between lesbians and 
heterosexuals in terms of labour-force commitment, although these studies are less explicit 
and tend to focus on differences in human capital accumulation resulting from past labour-
market separation. 
Despite several authors noting the importance of fertility in wage and salary 
determination, current research assessing the validity of the maternity-risk hypothesis is 
severely limited. To our knowledge, all previous empirical studies examining the effects of 
fertility on earnings and the lesbian pay gap have centred around the earnings effect of 
existing children, thereby neglecting the consideration of forward-looking child-bearing 
expectations. As a result, such studies fail to incorporate a vital component of the sexual-
54 Following a similar method to Petit (2007), Baert (2013) assesses whether sexual-orientation hiring 
discrimination in Belgium is consistent with differential fertility. He finds weakly significant evidence of higher 
call-back rates among young lesbians relative to their heterosexual counterparts, consistent with the maternity-
risk hypothesis. 
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orientation maternity differential. For example, a common method used in an attempt to 
assess whether differences in labour-market commitment affect the lesbian premium is to 
stratify the analysis by the presence of children.
55
 It is argued that independence from family-
related career interruptions should result in an appreciably smaller lesbian premium among 
childless women compared to that among women with children. This method has been used 
by Jepsen (2007), Blandford (2003) and Ahmed et al. (2013b), among others. In each study, 
the authors estimate a premium similar in magnitude for both subsamples, providing minimal 
support for their hypothesis. 
The failure to obtain convincing support for this hypothesis is not surprising. Even 
among women who have not had children, we would expect to see differences in career 
progression due to discrimination on the basis of perceived maternity risk. This would result 
in the emergence of an earnings differential among women with otherwise-identical 
characteristics, despite their never having left the labour force on maternity leave. To further 
substantiate this claim, we provide results from re-estimating Model (A6) in Table A.12, 
stratifying the analysis by the presence or absence of children. The results from these 
supplementary models are mixed. Considering only the lesbian comparison with cohabiting 
heterosexuals, we observe a substantial decrease in the premium upon restricting the analysis 
to women without children in all samples, a result consistent with both theories. The 
comparison with married heterosexuals, however, shows a decidedly larger premium among 
the subsample of women with no children in two of the samples, contradicting Jepsen's and 
others' hypothesis. This result is, however, still consistent with discriminatory promotion 
policy on the basis of perceived maternity risk.  
4.2. Forward-Looking Expectations and the Maternity-Risk Hypothesis 
This thesis departs from previous studies by assessing whether forward-looking expectations 
of labour-market separation due to child-birth adversely affect earnings and thus the lesbian 
premium. As proposed by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973), the existence of incomplete 
information results in employers using perceived group characteristics in assessing the value 
of potential or current employees, with respect to their expected productivity and costs. As 
55
Other methods include interacting number of children with potential experience (Black et al., 2003), 
interacting the lesbian indicator dummy with potential experience (Badgett, 1995; Daneshvary, 2008) and 
allowing the effects of children to differ by sexual orientation (Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2007). A detailed 
assessment of these methods is beyond the scope of this paper; however, one commonality is their focus on 
backward-looking effects of motherhood on earnings. 
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maternity incidence is considerably higher among heterosexual women than lesbians, it is 
conceivable that employers form their expectations of maternity risk, and thus maternity-leave 
costs, explicitly taking sexual orientation into consideration. Lesbian women are, to a large 
extent, thus able to avoid the negative earnings effect of child-birth expectations, giving rise 
to the observed lesbian premium. To test the validity of this theory, we use within-sample 
maternity incidence as a measure of employers' perceived maternity risk. Including this 
perceived risk in earnings regressions will allow a direct assessment of the so-called 
maternity-risk hypothesis.  
4.2.1 Allocated Maternity Risks and Applicability
The data for this section once again consists of the three samples from the 2000 Census, 
2005-2007 ACS and 2008-2010 ACS, following an identical sample-selection procedure. Due 
to the way in which maternity risk is inferred in the present study, the initial analysis 
necessitates a further restriction of the sample to householders.56 As the choice of which
partner identifies as the householder is likely correlated with income, Table A.13 presents 
summary statistics for the householder subsamples in each dataset. Evidently, restricting the 
sample to householders produces a similar pattern to including all householders and 
residents.57 This mitigates concerns that the subsequent analysis is not representative of all
coupled females. In what follows, a woman is categorised as having had a child in the last 
year if she is the householder and at least one child under the age of one, within the 
household, is identified as her "natural born son/daughter".58 As date of birth is removed for
confidentiality purposes, we assume the woman's current age to be the age at which she gave 
birth to the child.  
In order to assign maternity rates, each household type is split into seven age 
categories, resulting in a total of twenty-one groups. Within each group, actual maternity 
incidence in the relevant sample period is used as a measure of maternity risk. Table 4.1 
presents the maternity risk for each sample and subgroup based on this allocation procedure. 
Comparing the assigned values suggests that they appropriately capture differential maternity 
56 The ACS data permit an alternative method to identify fertility which can be applied to householders and 
residents. As a robustness check, we present an analysis of the maternity-risk hypothesis using this identification 
method to ensure the results are robust to both the inclusion of residents and alternative employer perceptions.  
57 In Table A.14, we re-estimate Model (A6) for householders only. We find very similar estimates of the 
premium, with the largest divergence in any of the six comparisons being smaller than 0.60 percentage points. 
58 Adoption may also be important to the extent that women take time off work to care for adopted children. We 
also repeat the analysis including adopted children and obtain highly similar results.  
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risk across age groups and household types. Maternity risk declines with age, being negligible 
for women above the age of forty-five in all samples. In addition, married women exhibit the 
greatest degree of maternity risk, followed by cohabiting heterosexuals and then lesbians. 
Although the relative magnitude of maternity risk across age groups and household types 
conforms to expectations, the critical importance of the allocated rates to the analysis 
necessitates further discussion of their applicability.59
Table 4.1. Allocated maternity risks: by sample and sexual orientation 
Sample Age Group Lesbians 
Cohabiting 
Heterosexuals 
Married 
Heterosexuals 
18-24 0.0828 0.1434 0.1996 
25-31 0.0374 0.0760 0.1267 
2000 
Census 
32-38 0.0261 0.0393 0.0781 
39-45 0.0086 0.0121 0.0158 
46-52 0.0000 0.0005 0.0011 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0369 0.1437 0.2011 
25-31 0.0285 0.0874 0.1611 
2005-2007 
ACS 
32-38 0.0345 0.0537 0.0908 
39-45 0.0199 0.0147 0.0177 
46-52 0.0048 0.0007 0.0007 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0251 0.1489 0.2029 
25-31 0.0254 0.0901 0.1612 
2008-2010 
ACS 
32-38 0.0194 0.0632 0.0944 
39-45 0.0122 0.0135 0.0171 
46-52 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Values represent number of births per woman. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community 
Surveys PUMS. 
59 Although the values discussed here reflect the one-year likelihood of maternity incidence, employers likely 
base their decisions on maternity costs over the expected lifetime of employment. To the extent that one-year 
maternity rates reflect relative levels of maternity risk over a longer time horizon, this difference should not pose 
problems. In unreported robustness checks, we assign maternity risk over three and five-year periods. As these 
assigned rates approximate linear multiples of one-year maternity risk, it is not surprising that the estimated 
effect of controlling for maternity risk on the lesbian premium is robust to this choice. As we would expect, the 
estimated effect of three and five-year maternity risk on earnings is commensurately smaller. For ease of 
exposition and due to uncertainty regarding the prior relationship and partnership status of individuals, we use 
one-year rates in the analysis that follows, noting that our control captures the essential elements of near-term 
(one-to-five year) maternity risk. 
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The use of an age-fixed-effect maternity risk variable, separated by household type, is 
motivated by the assumption that employers infer maternity risk based on broad age 
categories. That is, when assessing an employee's risk of requiring maternity leave, employers 
form their expectations based only on the individual's age group and perceived household 
type. This assumption may appear restrictive in that observed maternity rates likely differ by 
race, marital history and number of pre-existing children, among other factors. However, if 
information costs are high, it is plausible that employers base their maternity-leave 
expectations on a limited range of critical determinants, notably sexual orientation, marital 
status and age group. Moreover, the additional precision gained via further disaggregation 
may be more than offset by a reduction in accuracy brought about by a decrease in the group 
sizes from which the estimates are obtained. To reduce concerns that the results generated are 
heavily conditional upon the allocation procedure implemented, we consider alternative 
methods in Section 4.3. 
Inferring maternity risk from the sample offers several potential advantages over the 
use of publicly available birth data. Importantly, the present method permits a disaggregation 
of maternity risk by household type. Published maternity rates do not allow such 
disaggregation due to the unavailability of information regarding the sexuality of a child's 
birth mother. Thus, the current method facilitates a direct analysis of the maternity-risk 
hypothesis that would otherwise be impracticable. Further, absent this issue, inference from 
the sample provides a more accurate estimate of the maternity risk applicable to women 
within the research population. Population-level maternity statistics are contaminated by 
individuals outside of the research population, such as non-partnered individuals and those 
less likely to be perceived as lesbians. Consequently, the magnitude and age-structure of 
maternity risk may differ between the two groups. Using sample rates circumvents these 
issues, enhancing the accuracy of the empirical analysis.
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Despite theoretical appeal, several important caveats apply to the use of sample 
maternity rates. Due to the pooled cross-sectional nature of the data, maternity-related entry 
and exit from the workforce cannot be captured by the maternity-risk allocation procedure. If 
60
 Cross-sample variation in maternity risk among lesbians may lead to concern regarding which rates most 
accurately represent employers' forward-looking expectations. Given the differences in Census Bureau 
procedures implemented across samples, the groups are not directly comparable and the perceived likelihood of 
being a lesbian likely differs between samples. Provided employers take into consideration the perceived 
likelihood of an employee being a lesbian, rates disaggregated by sample are the most appropriate. In unreported 
regressions we pool all ACS years and re-run the allocation and estimation procedures. The results do not appear 
to be heavily dependent on the current methodology. 
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lesbians are more likely to return to work within a year of giving birth, then the assigned 
values will understate true differences in maternity risk among employed females. Another 
problem concerns employers' beliefs surrounding the transition of women between groups. 
The current allocation procedure assumes employers adopt the naive view that women will 
not transit between household types in the near-term. However, if employers apply non-zero 
probability beliefs, perceived maternity risk will differ from actual maternity incidence. In 
such a case, use of the allocated rates will lead to biased estimates of the earnings effect of 
maternity risk and its corresponding impact on the lesbian premium. Finally, if employers' 
perceptions of sexual orientation and partnership status are wildly incorrect, then the analysis 
herein may be highly inaccurate. The sample restrictions implemented should mitigate these 
concerns by excluding those individuals whose sexual orientation is unlikely to be accurately 
assessed by an employer. However, similarly to previous studies on the sexual-orientation pay 
gap, the following analysis is still heavily dependent on the assumption that employers can 
accurately perceive sexual orientation and partnership status of individuals in the sample. 
4.3. Method 
4.3.1. Base Analysis 
In order to assess the maternity-risk hypothesis, we perform regression analyses of a similar 
form to Model (A6).61 At this point, however, we note a significant concern regarding the
analysis of Section 3 that poses difficulties in all comparative wage analyses. Specifically, 
fewer career interruptions and more life-time hours worked result in lesbians having greater 
levels of on-the-job experience than heterosexual women for any given level of potential 
experience. As a result, returns to potential experience should be higher among lesbians. 
Failing to account for such differences may then lead to a spurious finding whereby lesbians 
are estimated to earn a premium over heterosexual women, which actually reflects 
unobservable differences in human capital accumulation.62 As previously noted, employer
61 Problems in estimating the pooled-model coefficients for the generalised Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
(caused by unobservable heterogeneity) preclude the use of such decompositions in our analysis. We also reject 
the use of group-specific coefficients or a weighted matrix as the non-discriminatory earnings structure due to 
the (unreported) results being relatively sensitive to the chosen weights. A set of decompositions using 
heterosexual weights is, however, estimated later in the paper for the interested reader to examine. 
62 The same argument can also be applied regarding estimates of the gender pay gap. 
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perceptions of maternity risk likely result in discriminatory promotion practices, which could 
further exacerbate the greater return to potential experience received by lesbians.63
Failing to consider these differences can result in severe omitted-variables bias when 
attempting to ascertain the effect of maternity risk on earnings.64 Specifically, positive bias in
the estimated effect of potential experience on heterosexuals' earnings will generate an 
upward bias in the estimated effect of maternity risk.65 Conversely, allowing the maternity-
risk effect to differ by sexual orientation will generate a large downward bias on the 
interaction term. In this respect, negative bias in the estimated effect of potential experience 
on the earnings of lesbians will be captured by lower maternity risk, with large earnings 
increases being incorrectly attributed to small decreases in maternity risk. In order to obtain 
unbiased coefficient estimates, one must therefore attempt to account for unobservable 
differences in human capital accumulation. 
A common method for accounting for differences in unobservable human capital is to 
allow observable human capital to have a differential effect by sexual orientation. However, 
this results in difficulties in interpretation, which is evident when observing the contrasting 
treatment of such interaction terms in previous studies. Badgett (1995) includes an interaction 
term between sexual orientation and the potential experience variable in her regressions. 
When interpreting the lesbian indicator dummy, she ignores the interaction term, essentially 
making the assumption that the slope of the interaction term purely captures differences in 
unobservable productivity. Jepsen (2007), who also includes interactions between educational 
attainment and the lesbian indicator, follows a similar approach. In contrast, Black et al. 
(2003) replicate Badgett's (1995) results and evaluate the interaction term at the mean of 
potential experience, assuming that the interaction term captures other unobservable factors as 
opposed to differences in human capital. Daneshvary et al. (2008) include interactions 
between the lesbian indicator and potential experience, its square, and education. They follow 
a similar approach to Black et al. (2003), extensively incorporating the coefficients of the 
63 If discriminatory promotion practices due to perceived maternity risk do in fact contribute to the greater 
returns to potential experience for lesbians, then this alone would provide sufficient evidence in favour of the 
maternity-risk hypothesis. This assertion is, unfortunately, not testable with the current data.  
64 As the prior effect of maternity risk is negatively correlated with current, forward-looking maternity risk, 
failing to control for the prior effect produces upward bias in the estimated maternity risk coefficient. The 
analysis provided within this section thus captures only the near-term, forward-looking effect of maternity risk 
on earnings. 
65 This bias will be larger when the bias in the potential experience coefficients is most severe and when 
heterosexual women comprise a larger proportion of the sample. We thus expect greater bias in the maternity 
risk coefficient when comparing the earnings of lesbians and married heterosexual women. 
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interaction terms into their analysis. Evidently, the interpretation of interaction terms is 
dependent on the effects they truly capture. 
As unbiased estimation necessitates the inclusion of several interaction terms, the 
majority of the analysis in this section focuses on accurately estimating the effect of maternity 
risk on earnings. Assessing the corresponding effect on the lesbian premium is primarily done 
on a qualitative basis due to difficulties in interpretation, as explained above, although we 
initially attempt to make a direct assessment. In what follows, we estimate earnings 
regressions of the following form: 
ln 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝒁𝑖
′𝜙 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝑯𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖  (𝐴)
where i indexes the observation, ln 𝑅  is the natural log of real annual wage and salary 
income, and the vector 𝑿 consists of work characteristics, including usual hours worked per 
week and five indicator variables for weeks worked in the previous year. 𝒁 is a vector of 
variables controlling for personal characteristics, region of residency, occupation and 
industry, as described above, with two changes: first, potential experience and its square are 
centred about their mean values, in line with the method used by Black et al. (2003); second, 
the full-control model is implemented in all regressions. Although this results in the inclusion 
of partially endogenous variables, and thus the potential for over-controlling, omitted-
variables bias poses a far more serious problem in assessing the maternity-risk hypothesis. In 
the next section, we relax this constraint to ensure that the results are robust to alterations in 
the model specification. Lesbian is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual is a 
female cohabiting with a same-sex partner, and zero otherwise. Finally, 𝑯 is a vector of 
variables whose inclusion depends on the model to be estimated and contains Maternity Risk 
as well as interactions between the lesbian indicator and the maternity risk variable, potential 
experience and its square.66
To demonstrate the need to include the human capital interaction terms, we run 
preliminary regressions with the 2000 Census data, noting that the results are broadly 
representative of all three samples. Model (A1p) represents the base regression which 
includes the vectors 𝑿 and 𝒁, as well as the lesbian indicator. Model (A2p) adds Maternity
Risk to the previous specification, while Model (A3p) relaxes the assumption that the effect of 
66 As previously noted, for both ACS samples, we also include two year dummies in all regression models to 
account for year fixed-effects. 
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maternity risk is the same across household types by introducing an interaction term, 
Maternity Risk × Lesbian. As in previous analyses, all models are estimated separately with 
cohabiting and married heterosexual women as the comparison group. For comparative 
purposes, we then estimate Model (A2p), excluding the lesbian indicator, for each of the three 
household types. These serve to provide evidence that Maternity Risk may be picking up the 
effects of unobservable human capital accumulation or maternity-risk promotion effects in the 
comparative earnings analyses. Specifically, if the coefficient on Maternity Risk is negative in 
each regression and lesbians receive greater returns to potential experience than heterosexual 
women, any positive Maternity Risk coefficients in the comparative earnings analyses likely 
arise due to omitted-variables bias. 
As a precursor to the results, the above regressions display strong evidence of omitted-
variables bias, reaffirming the need to adequately control for human capital differences. The 
following specifications seek to address this deficiency. Model (A1) is identical to Model 
(A2p), which includes the vectors 𝑿 and 𝒁, in addition to Lesbian and Maternity Risk. 
Specification (A2) adds Potential Experience × Lesbian, while (A3) further includes 
Potential Experience Squared × Lesbian. These specifications allow us to examine whether 
maternity risk negatively influences earnings, but they do not permit an assessment of how 
the inclusion of Maternity Risk affects the lesbian premium. As such, Models (A1) to (A3) are 
re-estimated, dropping Maternity Risk so as to obtain an estimate of the premium both before 
and after its inclusion.67
4.3.2. Robustness Tests: Alternative Specifications 
In conducting robustness tests, Model (A3) is taken as the base model as it limits concerns 
regarding unobservable human capital accumulation influencing the results. To ensure that the 
findings are not reliant on the choice of dependent variable, we re-estimate Model (A3) 
restricting the analysis to full-time workers and excluding controls for hours and weeks of 
work. In addition, we re-run the regression with hourly wages as the dependent variable. As 
Section 3 highlighted, selection into paid employment may be of importance in obtaining 
unbiased estimates. We therefore estimate a Heckman two-step model, where the selection 
67 The inclusion of education interaction terms to further control for human capital, and Maternity Risk × 
Lesbian to allow maternity risk to have a differential effect across household types, was also assessed. On the 
basis of F-tests and the Akaike Information Criterion, these specifications were deemed inferior to those 
included above. The inclusion of education interaction terms is thus relegated to its use in robustness tests, while 
Appendix E contains a note on the inclusion of a Maternity Risk × Lesbian interaction term. 
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equation includes the vectors 𝒁 and 𝑯, but omits occupation and industry controls. To 
identify the system, the selection equation also includes an indicator for the presence of 
children under the age of six and partner's real income. In unreported regressions, we also 
estimated models using functional form to identify the selection equation, which produced 
results similar to those reported.     
Following Jepsen (2007), we further control for differences in human capital 
accumulation by including the lesbian indicator interacted with educational-attainment 
dummies. As a further robustness test, we then include interactions between Lesbian and each 
of the controls in 𝒁. Provided the original estimates were only biased due to unobservable 
differences in human capital, the additional interactions should have a minimal effect on the 
coefficient estimates. As discrimination on the basis of maternity risk may affect occupational 
sorting, there is a concern that the previous models mask some of the maternity-risk effect due 
to an over-controlling problem. The next specification addresses this possibility, dropping 
occupation and industry controls from the base regression. It is also plausible that any 
observed disadvantage attributed to maternity risk may actually capture the adjustment period 
associated with new mothers re-entering the workforce, as identified by Anderson et al. 
(2003). To offset such concerns and isolate the effect of employer perceptions, we re-estimate 
the base model, excluding all women who gave birth during the previous year. If the 
maternity-risk disadvantage remains following this restriction, it will provide strong evidence 
in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis.     
Next, to assess whether the effects of maternity risk differ by employment status, we 
restrict the sample to full-time workers, which also reduces unobservable heterogeneity. If 
maternity benefits and replacement costs are more than proportionately higher among full-
time workers, we would expect to see a larger negative coefficient on Maternity Risk among 
the sample of full-time employed females.68 Finally, we assess whether maternity risk has a
differential effect on earnings at different points on the income distribution. If maternity costs 
are largely variable, for example if they are primarily comprised of maternity benefits and 
training costs, one might expect maternity risk to exert a stronger negative influence at higher 
68 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 applies only to employees meeting certain criteria, including 
having worked at least 1,250 hours over a twelve month period for a qualified employer (U.S. Department of 
Labor, n.d.). As many part-time workers in the sample do not meet this criterion, it is reasonable to expect that 
employers bear greater maternity-leave costs for full-time workers relative to part-time workers. 
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points on the income distribution.69 We therefore estimate quantile regressions to examine the
effect of maternity risk at different points on the income distribution (10th, 50th, and 90th 
percentiles).   
4.3.3. Robustness Tests: Full Re-estimation 
As a final set of robustness checks available for all three samples, we restrict the sample, re-
allocate maternity rates, and estimate the base regression model for two separate sub-groups. 
First, to reduce unobservable heterogeneity and minimise concern regarding differences in 
racial composition across the twenty-one groups, we re-run the analysis while restricting the 
sample to white women. Next, we re-estimate Model (A3) having restricted the sample to 
never-married or currently married individuals.70 These analyses serve to assess whether
disaggregating the maternity-risk allocation process heavily affects the findings. Moreover, 
women within these subsamples may be more alike with respect to their marital status, extent 
of family-formation completion, and perceived sexual orientation, enhancing the accuracy of 
the analysis. 
Two additional variables are available in the ACS PUMS which enable further 
robustness checks to be carried out on the ACS samples. The first indicates if the respondent 
lived at their current residence twelve months prior to the survey being conducted,71 while the
second captures whether or not a woman gave birth to a child in the previous year. Use of the 
mobility variable serves to moderate concerns surrounding whether a child born in the 
previous year was conceived while the women was with her current partner, as well as to 
restrict the sample to those individuals whose relationship status and sexual orientation are 
likely to be correctly ascertained by their employers. For example, children born to lesbian 
couples in the past year may be a result of a previous heterosexual relationship.72 If neither
partner has moved in the prior twelve months, however, then this increases the likelihood that 
69 To further motivate this analysis, we follow Ahmed et al. (2013b) and compute the percentage difference in 
compensation between lesbians and heterosexual women at each percentile of both the earnings and wage 
distributions. The resulting figures, which are not reported, display evidence of a larger (raw) premium among 
higher earning women. 
70 Lack of a suitably large sample precludes similar analyses for non-whites and previously married individuals. 
A stratification by educational attainment is omitted due to similar concerns. 
71 The 2000 Census also contained a mobility question, however mobility was measured on a five-year basis, 
rendering it unusable for the current analysis. 
72 Moore and Stambolis-Ruhstorfer (2013), among others, note the importance of prior unions on lesbian child-
rearing. Our use of one-year maternity incidence, as opposed to three or five-year incidence, should significantly 
reduce the possibility that the assigned rates include children from prior unions. The robustness check we 
implement next serves to further mitigate such concerns. 
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the child was conceived by the lesbian couple and likely enhances the probability of 
employers correctly inferring sexual orientation. The fertility variable circumvents the issue 
of lesbian householders identifying their partner's child as an "own child", resulting in a false 
positive in the previous analysis.73 In addition, the previous techniques can be applied to both
householders and residents given the availability of fertility information for all women in the 
sample, thereby enhancing the applicability of results to the coupled-female population. 
As a further test of method robustness, we therefore exclude both partners' 
observations if either partner moved in the last twelve months, and reassign maternity risk 
across the twenty-one groups. Model (A3) is then re-estimated for each sample relative to 
both comparison groups. Similarly to the previous analysis, we then drop all females who 
actually gave birth in the past year and re-run the regressions. Finally, we follow an identical 
procedure on the full sample, using the fertility variable contained within the PUMS files to 
assign maternity rates. The results from this analysis also allow us to assess whether the 
results generalise to both householders and residents.74
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Base Analysis 
Table A.15 displays the preliminary regression results for the 2000 Census. In the absence of 
a control for maternity risk, the earnings differential between lesbian and cohabiting 
heterosexual householders is estimated to be 5.56 percent. When controlling for maternity 
risk, this estimate drops to 5.16 percent, reducing the lesbian premium by approximately 
seven percent. The estimates also suggest that a one percentage point increase in maternity 
risk reduces income by approximately 0.25 percent. These findings are consistent with the 
notion that maternity risk has a significant adverse effect on income and thus on the lesbian 
premium. Model (A3p), which relaxes the assumption that the effect of maternity risk is the 
same across household types, suggests that an increase in maternity risk by one percentage 
point reduces the earnings of cohabiting heterosexuals and lesbians by 0.51 and 2.65 percent, 
respectively. This result makes little intuitive sense and suggests Maternity Risk and its 
73 Comparing inferred fertility for householders using the two allocation methods (not reported) suggests both 
false positives and false negatives occur in the base analysis. However, the resulting errors in inferred maternity 
risk are relatively small and should not significantly bias the base results. 
74 In unreported robustness checks we also assess the effects of stratifying the results by sector and implementing 
minimum and maximum income restrictions. The results from these specifications were highly similar to those 
reported. 
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interaction with Lesbian may be picking up the effects of unobservable human capital 
accumulation, as expected.75
Similar estimates relative to married heterosexuals display more persuasive evidence 
to this end, with the lesbian premium rising from 2.29 to 4.27 percent upon the inclusion of 
Maternity Risk. This outcome is a direct consequence of the estimated positive and 
statistically significant earnings effect of maternity risk, indicating 0.49 percent higher 
earnings for each one percentage point increase in maternity risk. Including the interaction 
term generates wildly different results, with a one percentage point increase in maternity risk 
implying a reduction in the earnings of married heterosexual and lesbian women by 0.14 and 
2.96 percent, respectively. None of these estimates is representative of the coefficients from 
the individual earnings regressions, suggesting that unobservable heterogeneity and 
multicollinearity problems may be hampering the accuracy of the analysis.76 Further
reinforcing this possibility is that the estimated effect of potential experience is highly 
sensitive to the inclusion of Maternity Risk and its interaction with the lesbian indicator. 
Although it is likely that the estimated effect of potential experience implicitly captures some 
of the maternity-risk effect prior to its explicit inclusion, the significant changes in the 
coefficients are suggestive of the partial attribution of unobservable effects to maternity risk. 
Bias in the simple equation specification thus poses potentially severe problems. 
Table 4.2 displays the coefficient estimates on Maternity Risk in Models (A1) to (A3) 
across all three samples. As expected, the simple model specification, (A1), does not provide 
support for the maternity-risk hypothesis. Relative to cohabiting heterosexuals, only the 2000 
Census estimate is both statistically significant and of the correct sign. Considering the 
lesbians versus married heterosexuals comparison yields positive and significant estimates of 
the earnings effect of maternity risk, in strict disagreement with the maternity-risk hypothesis. 
75 This result is also consistent with age-varying accuracy in employers' inferring the sexual orientation of 
employees. The magnitude of the effect, however, suggests the interaction term is likely capturing differences in 
unobservable human capital. For a more detailed discussion regarding the inclusion of the interaction term, see 
Appendix E. 
76 The reader may be concerned by two other features of Table A.15. First, including Maternity Risk only 
marginally improves goodness of fit. Tables A.3-A.8 show that this improvement in R2 is in line with, or even 
larger than, the resulting improvement upon controlling for number of children, reducing concern. Second, the 
coefficient estimates from the individual regressions are much larger among women with lower maternity risk, 
suggesting the grouped allocation procedure may lead to Maternity Risk capturing misspecification in potential 
experience. In unreported regressions, we alternatively estimate maternity risk by sexual orientation, based on a 
probit model with a fifth order polynomial in age, to allow a flexible relationship between age and maternity 
risk. The estimated effect of maternity risk is larger in each case, but the qualitative results are unaffected. We 
also assess whether including a quartic in potential experience affects the findings. Our results suggest that the 
comparability of the estimates is enhanced in these specifications, further assuaging concerns.   
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Specifically, across the three samples, an increase in maternity risk by one percentage point is 
associated with a 0.47 to 0.51 percent increase in earnings based on this specification. As 
discussed earlier, differences in human capital and discriminatory promotion practices on the 
basis of perceived maternity risk likely result in steeper earnings profiles for lesbians. The 
individual regressions in Table A.15 support this notion. As such, these differences must be 
accounted for when estimating the forward-looking effects of maternity risk.  
Model (A2), which includes the interaction between the lesbian indicator and potential 
experience, demonstrates the importance of such controls, with the coefficient on Maternity
Risk being of the correct sign in all comparative analyses. Specifically, in the cohabiting 
heterosexuals comparisons, a one percentage point increase in maternity risk is estimated to 
reduce earnings by between 0.28 and 0.48 percent. Similar estimates relative to married 
heterosexuals are statistically insignificant at conventional levels, but also suggest an earnings 
disadvantage among individuals with higher perceived maternity risk. Finally, the third 
specification allows unobservable sexual-orientation heterogeneity to be a non-linear function 
of potential experience. As hypothesised, the results from this specification present significant 
evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis, with all coefficient estimates being of the 
appropriate sign and statistically significant. In the case of the cohabiting heterosexuals 
comparison, the effect of a one percentage point increase in maternity risk is estimated to 
reduce income by between 0.45 and 0.60 percent. Comparable estimates relative to married 
women suggest an effect of 0.28 to 0.52 percent. This indicates that either the penalty 
Sample: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A1) (A2) (A3)
2000 -0.2494** -0.4777*** -0.6043*** 0.4889*** -0.2227 -0.5211***
Census (0.1376) (0.1448) (0.1462) (0.1603) (0.2075) (0.2152)
2005-2007 -0.0021 -0.3594** -0.5411*** 0.4721*** -0.0454 -0.2752**
ACS (0.1644) (0.1864) (0.1936) (0.1168) (0.1452) (0.1534)
2008-2010 0.1461 -0.2826** -0.4492*** 0.5076*** -0.0881 -0.3667***
ACS (0.1377) (0.1560) (0.1606) (0.1061) (0.1325) (0.1406)
Table 4.2. Assessing the maternity-risk hypothesis - coefficient on Maternity Risk
Lesbians vs. Cohabs Lesbians vs. Marrieds
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the
coefficient on the maternity risk variable. ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, in a one-tailed 
test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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associated with an increase in maternity risk is greater among women with a relatively lower 
level of risk, or that employers do not distinguish between married and cohabiting 
heterosexuals to the extent implied by our allocation procedure.77 Regardless, allowing
observable human capital to have a differential effect on lesbians appears to permit a more 
accurate assessment of the partial effect of maternity risk on earnings. 
An important consideration regarding the estimates in Table 4.2 is how the lesbian 
premium is affected by the inclusion of Maternity Risk. Table 4.3, therefore, presents the 
lesbian premium estimates from Models (A1) to (A3) both including and excluding Maternity
Risk to enable such an assessment. As previously discussed, the results from Model (A1) do 
not provide support for the maternity-risk hypothesis. In four of the six comparisons, the 
lesbian premium rises upon the inclusion of Maternity Risk, while the change in the premium 
relative to married heterosexuals represents more than a 50% increase. These observations are 
counter-intuitive and reflect the positive estimated effect of maternity risk, further 
demonstrating the importance of including sufficient human capital controls.  
Conversely, considering Model (A2) reveals a reduction in the lesbian premium across 
all six specifications when evaluating the premium at the mean level of potential experience.78
In the case of cohabiting heterosexuals, the lesbian pay gap drops from 4.48 to 3.43 percent in 
the 2000 Census sample, upon controlling for maternity risk. This represents a reduction of 
more than twenty-three percent at the mean level of potential experience. Analogous estimates 
for the 2005-2007 and 2008-2010 ACS samples imply a reduction in the pay gap of 
approximately seventeen and twenty-three percent, respectively. The comparison with 
married women reveals a similar pattern, with the lesbian premium falling from 4.51 to 3.90 
percent in the 2000 Census sample, upon the inclusion of Maternity Risk. This represents a 
premium reduction of more than thirteen percent. Comparable estimates from the ACS 
samples display a reduction in the earnings gap of approximately two and four percent, 
respectively. 
77 Another possible explanation for this finding is that employers incorporate in perceived maternity risk the 
possibility of transition between categories. Alternatively, the difference may merely reflect statistical 
imprecision. 
78 This warrants a cautionary note. As previously explained, the literature is divided regarding how to interpret 
results when including sexual-orientation interaction terms. The discussion herein exclusively evaluates the 
results at the mean, primarily because this is a traditional convention applied in regression interpretation. This, 
however, may cause the change in the premium to be of the opposite sign to the maternity risk effect, especially 
if multicollinearity problems cause significant changes in the interaction term coefficients. Moreover, as much of 
the observed premium can likely be attributed to real differences, the estimated percentage change in the 
premium may be biased downwards. 
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Finally, the third specification yields similar results, with all six comparisons displaying a 
reduction in the lesbian pay gap. First considering the cohabiting heterosexuals comparison 
for the 2000 Census, we observe a reduction in the premium from 6.67 to 5.72 percent upon 
controlling for maternity risk. This decrease is economically significant, representing a fall in 
the pay gap by approximately fourteen percent. As before, similar estimates from the ACS 
samples imply premium reductions from 7.51 to 6.64 and 7.23 to 5.95 percent, respectively. 
These specifications suggest that controlling for near-term maternity risk reduces the lesbian 
pay gap by approximately one percentage point. When considering that real differences in 
human capital likely augment the estimated premium considerably, these represent 
economically significant changes in the pay gap. 
Despite the earnings effect of maternity risk in Model (A3) being estimated as highly 
negative and statistically significant in all married heterosexual comparisons (see Table 4.2), 
the change in the premium provides conflicting evidence regarding its effect on the lesbian 
premium. Specifically, across the three samples the lesbian premium falls by between one and 
eleven percent. Thus, despite maternity risk negatively affecting earnings, including 
Maternity Risk does not appear to produce an economically significant reduction in the 
lesbian premium relative to cohabiting heterosexuals in all samples, when evaluated at the 
mean of potential experience. Although these findings may appear contradictory, two possible 
Sample: Specification: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A1) (A2) (A3)
Excluding maternity risk 0.0541*** 0.0438*** 0.0646*** 0.0226*** 0.0441*** 0.0772***
2000 (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0127)
Census Including maternity risk 0.0503*** 0.0337*** 0.0556*** 0.0418*** 0.0383*** 0.0690***
(0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0131)
Excluding maternity risk 0.0698*** 0.0579*** 0.0724*** 0.0396*** 0.0625*** 0.0912***
2005-2007
ACS
(0.0099) (0.0103) (0.0127) (0.0100) (0.0107) (0.0129)
Including maternity risk 0.0697*** 0.0482*** 0.0643*** 0.0575*** 0.0615*** 0.0905***
(0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0129) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0129)
Excluding maternity risk 0.0657*** 0.0471*** 0.0698*** 0.0436*** 0.0663*** 0.1076***
2008-2010
ACS
(0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0118) (0.0095) (0.0100) (0.0124)
Including maternity risk 0.0691*** 0.0365*** 0.0578*** 0.0649*** 0.0639*** 0.1050***
(0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0125) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0124)
Table 4.3. Assessing the maternity-risk hypothesis - effect on the lesbian premium
Lesbians vs. Cohabs Lesbians vs. Marrieds
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the
coefficient on the lesbian indicator. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a one-tailed test. Sources: 2000 
Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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explanations are offered. First, evaluating the premium at the mean of potential experience 
leaves the results susceptible to changes in the interaction-term coefficients; results are thus 
not indicative of an analogous change at all levels of potential experience. Second, it may not 
be overly surprising that the premium changes only marginally with the inclusion of 
Maternity Risk when allowing the effect of potential experience to vary non-linearly by sexual 
orientation. As maternity incidence is a non-linear, negative function of age, potential 
experience is likely implicitly controlling for the effect of maternity risk on the lesbian 
premium. Therefore, when explicitly accounting for differential maternity risk, Maternity Risk
is observed to have a statistically significant negative earnings effect, but such an effect may 
have already been partialled out from the premium due to bias in the estimated effect of 
potential experience. The true effect of maternity risk on the lesbian premium is therefore 
difficult to ascertain, even in the absence of the other aforementioned issues, and is likely 
much larger than the discussion here suggests. Moreover, when omitting a control for 
maternity risk, the compensation effect of potential experience is biased upward due to the 
reinforcing effect of maternity risk.  
4.4.2. Results from Alternative Specifications 
Table 4.4 presents the results from assessing the maternity-risk hypothesis with alternative 
model specifications in the three datasets. The coefficient on Maternity Risk is reported for 
each regression, while the effect of maternity risk on the premium is analysed on a qualitative 
basis due to previously discussed difficulties. Considering only full-time workers but omitting 
work-characteristic controls significantly increases the estimated effect of maternity risk on 
earnings. In the lesbian versus cohabiting heterosexuals comparisons, a one percentage point 
increase in maternity risk is now associated with an earnings penalty of approximately 0.68 to 
1.00 percent, while similar estimates when comparing lesbians with married women indicate a 
maternity-risk disadvantage of between 0.49 and 0.65 percent. In contrast, use of hourly 
wages as the dependent variable does not significantly affect the results, with the magnitude 
of the Maternity Risk coefficient increasing slightly in the 2000 Census sample, but falling in 
the 2005-2007 ACS sample. The level of statistical significance is, however, reduced in the 
ACS sample. Controlling for selection into paid employment via the Heckman two-step 
method appears to exert a slightly more pronounced effect on the findings. Within the two 
earlier samples, cross-cohort consistency in the estimates is significantly enhanced, with the 
Maternity Risk coefficients in the comparative earnings regressions becoming much more 
Table 4.4. Coefficient on Maternity Risk  - alternative specifications
Cohabs Married Cohabs Married Cohabs Married
Base results (Specification A3) -0.6043***-0.5211*** -0.5411*** -0.2752** -0.4492***-0.3667***
(0.1462) (0.2152) (0.1936) (0.1534) (0.1606) (0.1406)
Full-time, no work characteristic -1.0001***-0.6471*** -0.7204***-0.4852*** -0.6799***-0.6457***
controls (0.1369) (0.2007) (0.1814) (0.1427) (0.1591) (0.1392)
Log(hourly wages) -0.6671***-0.5719*** -0.4148** -0.2171*
(0.1419) (0.2033) (0.1829) (0.1441)
Heckman two-step method -0.5689***-0.5911*** -0.4876***-0.3769*** -0.1492 -0.4842***
(0.1467) (0.2143) (0.1948) (0.1538) (0.1676) (0.1415)
Including education interactions -0.5870*** -0.4222** -0.4763*** -0.2081* -0.4280***-0.3405***
(0.1474) (0.2177) (0.1965) (0.1551) (0.1631) (0.1424)
Full interaction model -0.5880*** -0.4257** -0.4773*** -0.2027* -0.4263***-0.3405***
(0.1474) (0.2178) (0.1966) (0.1552) (0.1631) (0.1424)
Dropping occupation and -0.7629***-0.7398*** -0.6661***-0.4276*** -0.7312***-0.4602***
industry controls (0.1490) (0.2167) (0.1985) (0.1580) (0.1650) (0.1449)
Excluding women who gave birth in -0.5757*** -0.4152** -0.5708*** -0.3083** -0.3762** -0.3664***
the previous year (0.1507) (0.2194) (0.1998) (0.1566) (0.1649) (0.1445)
Restricting to full-time employed -0.9826***-0.6971*** -0.7476***-0.5551*** -0.8068***-0.6481***
(0.1370) (0.2009) (0.1845) (0.1463) (0.1618) (0.1419)
Quantile regression (10th percentile) -0.6922*** 0.1427 -0.5918** 0.0485 -0.5848** -0.0850
(0.2659) (0.3391) (0.3470) (0.2582) (0.3127) (0.2743)
Quantile regression (50th percentile) -0.4334*** -0.4191** -0.3167** -0.0469 -0.3690** -0.4147***
(0.1294) (0.1945) (0.1760) (0.1453) (0.1620) (0.1329)
Quantile regression (90th percentile) -0.7020*** -0.6046** -0.3378* -0.6723*** -0.4865** -0.6784***
(0.2148) (0.2614) (0.2399) (0.1914) (0.2342) (0.1875)
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the
coefficient on the maternity risk variable. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in
a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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alike. However, cross-sample consistency is reduced, with the estimated effect of maternity 
risk shrinking and becoming statistically insignificant in the 2008-2010 cohabiting 
heterosexuals comparison.    
The addition of the educational-attainment interaction terms marginally reduces the 
estimated effect of maternity risk across all six regressions. As expected, the inclusion of 
additional interaction terms with the lesbian indicator has almost no effect on the results. This 
supports the notion that the bias in the original estimates was due to model misspecification in 
the form of inadequate human capital controls. Considering the estimates without occupation 
and industry controls reveals the expected result, with the coefficient on Maternity Risk rising 
in all cases. It appears that women at a greater risk of child-birth may sort into jobs where the 
penalty associated with temporary labour-market separation is lower. Finally, the results from 
excluding women who gave birth during the previous year are able to assuage concerns that 
new mothers returning to the workforce may cause the observed maternity-risk penalty. In all 
cases, the maternity-risk disadvantage remains statistically significant and the estimated effect 
is not heavily affected in any of the regression models. 
As we would expect, maternity risk is estimated to have a larger adverse effect in each 
of the six comparative earnings regressions in the full-time employed sample relative to the 
full sample. Among full-time employed females, a one percentage point increase in maternity 
risk is associated with a reduction in earnings of between 0.75 and 0.98 percent, when 
comparing the earnings of lesbians and cohabiting heterosexuals. Analogous estimates 
relative to married heterosexuals suggest a maternity-risk penalty of approximately 0.56 to 
0.70 percent. The increased magnitude of the estimated effects also suggests that perceived 
maternity rates among full-time employed workers are not grossly over-stated based on the 
current allocation method, as one would expect the coefficients to diminish in such a case.79
Finally, the results from the quantile regressions show mixed evidence that employers' 
maternity costs increase more than proportionately as employees' compensation rises. 
Considering the cohabiting heterosexuals comparison, maternity risk appears to have the 
largest relative effect at the bottom of the income distribution, and the smallest effect for 
those at the median income level. In stark contrast, the married women comparisons suggest 
79 If maternity incidence is lower among full-time employed females, the coefficient on Maternity Risk could still 
increase if maternity-related costs are sufficiently large for full-time workers. This, however, seems unlikely to 
be the case given that the dependent variable is in log form and the quantile regressions only show slight 
evidence that maternity costs increase more than proportionately with income.  
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that maternity risk has no statistically significant effect at the 10th percentile of the income 
distribution, while the largest effect is exerted at the 90th percentile. Evidently, cross-cohort 
inconsistency at the 10th percentile of the income distribution is a slight cause for concern, 
but estimates at other points of the income distribution and cross-sample comparisons display 
far greater similarity, offsetting this concern to some extent.     
4.4.3. Results from Full Re-estimation 
Table A.16 presents the allocated maternity risk for each dataset and subgroup following the 
sample restriction to white women. A comparison with Table 4.1 reveals that this induces a 
fall in maternity incidence among young lesbians and cohabiting heterosexuals across all 
samples. For example, among all races, 8.28 percent of 18-24 year old lesbians in the 2000 
Census gave birth to a child in the previous year, compared to only 6.25 percent of white 
women. Table 4.5 contains the results from Model (A3) being re-estimated following the 
restriction to white women. Evidently, this restriction has varying effects across samples. In 
the 2000 Census sample, the coefficient on Maternity Risk is diminished, resulting in a 
reduction in statistical significance when comparing lesbians with married women. In 
contrast, the coefficient on Maternity Risk in the 2008-2010 ACS sample increases in absolute 
value, with the estimated effect becoming almost identical across the two regressions. The 
2005-2007 ACS yields slightly volatile estimates, suggesting between a 0.31 and 0.90 percent 
reduction in earnings for every one percentage point increase in maternity risk.80 Overall
however, the qualitative findings are similar to those from the full sample, with an increase in 
maternity risk exerting a negative effect on earnings, holding other factors constant. 
Table A.17 similarly displays the inferred maternity rates for the sample of never-
married and currently married women. No significant differences emerge between the full and 
current samples, although young never-married women appear to have slightly lower rates of 
child-birth relative to all women, while the converse applies to never-married women over the 
age of thirty-one. Table 4.5 presents the results from re-estimating Model (A3) on this 
restricted sample. Once again, minor changes in the allocated maternity rates, in conjunction 
with an additional sample restriction, produce significantly different coefficient estimates 
among the lesbian and cohabiting heterosexuals regressions. Within these regressions, a one 
percentage point increase in maternity risk is predicted to reduce earnings by 0.75 to 0.94 
80 It is difficult to determine the exact cause of this asymmetric change, but arbitrarily defining maternity risk 
across the subgroups reveals the results are relatively sensitive to the age-structure of inferred maternity risk. 
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percent across the three samples. The lesbians versus married heterosexuals regressions 
display much smaller changes in the estimates from the base results, suggesting an earnings 
disadvantage of 0.24 to 0.56 percent for every one percentage point increase in perceived 
maternity risk. Despite the estimated effect of maternity risk differing based on the choice of 
heterosexual comparison group, the findings from the subsamples provide significant 
evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis.  
Due to the potential importance of geographic mobility in employers' assessment of 
sexual orientation, partnership status, and thus maternity risk, Table A.18 displays the 
proportion of individuals within each subsample where neither the individual nor their partner 
moved residence in the past twelve months. As we might expect, married heterosexuals are 
the least geographically mobile of all partnered women, followed by lesbians and cohabiting 
heterosexuals. The proportion of non-movers is also dramatically higher among older women, 
who are more likely to be in stable long-term relationships and settling into permanent 
residences. Considering the large proportion of young women that have either moved or 
begun their cohabiting relationship in the past year, it is plausible that inferred sexual 
orientation and partnership status may be less accurate among these women. Retaining only 
non-movers thus has the potential to significantly improve the analysis by confining the 
sample to those individuals whose relationship status is more accurately perceived by 
employers. 
Table A.19 displays the allocated maternity rates after restricting the sample to non-
movers. Once again, maternity incidence among married women is relatively unaffected by 
Table 4.5. Coefficient on Maternity Risk  - complete subsample re-estimation
Cohabs Married Cohabs Married Cohabs Married
Initial analysis -0.6043*** -0.5211*** -0.5411*** -0.2752** -0.4492*** -0.3667***
(0.1462) (0.2152) (0.1936) (0.1534) (0.1606) (0.1406)
Including only white women -0.5844*** -0.4127* -0.9040*** -0.3095** -0.4992*** -0.4899***
(0.1808) (0.2528) (0.2272) (0.1671) (0.1881) (0.1515)
Including only never-married or
currently married individuals
-0.8078*** -0.5551*** -0.9421*** -0.2357* -0.7547*** -0.3802***
(0.1683) (0.2161) (0.2233) (0.1535) (0.1832) (0.1412)
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the
coefficient on the maternity risk variable. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a 
one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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this change, while rates of child-birth increase among eighteen to thirty-one year old lesbians 
and cohabiting heterosexual women. Given that we have retained those women likely to be in 
a longer-term committed relationship, this finding conforms to expectations. Applying these 
maternity rates and re-estimating Model (A3) yields the estimates contained in the first panel 
of Table 4.6. Again, the results from the restricted sample are broadly consistent with those 
from the full sample, with maternity risk estimated to have a statistically significant adverse 
effect on earnings in all cases. Dropping women who gave birth in the last twelve months 
slightly affects the results, rendering one of the coefficient estimates statistically insignificant. 
Across the eight specifications, a one percentage point increase in maternity risk is associated 
with a 0.17 to 0.60 percent reduction in income, holding other factors constant. Interestingly, 
the effect of maternity risk is no longer primarily larger among the cohabiting heterosexuals 
comparisons, as was the case in the majority of prior analyses. 
Finally, Table A.20 presents assigned maternity risks for both householders and 
residents using the fertility variable contained within the ACS PUMS files. To improve the 
accuracy of the analysis, the sample is again restricted to non-movers, although unreported 
regressions reveal that the results are not sensitive to this choice. Examining observed 
maternity incidence from the ACS fertility variable reveals that the age-distribution of 
maternity risk is skewed much more towards the lower end when considering both 
householders and residents. This pattern can likely be attributed to younger women only being 
deemed the householder if they are the primary income-earner in the household, which will 
generally not be the case if they have recently given birth. Table 4.6 provides the estimated 
coefficients on Maternity Risk for this allocation method and sample. Importantly, the general 
findings from the previous analyses appear to carry over to use of the ACS fertility variable 
and the inclusion of residents as well as householders. Moreover, both cross-sample and 
cross-group consistency is enhanced, with the estimated effect of Maternity Risk being 
contained within a narrow, 0.20 percentage point range. Excluding individuals that gave birth 
in the past year only marginally affects the results, but reduces the level of statistical 
significance in the 2008-2010 cohabiting heterosexuals comparison. Over the eight 
regressions that include both householders and residents, a one percentage point increase in 
maternity risk is estimated to decrease earnings by 0.22 to 0.46 percent, ceteris paribus, 
consistent with prior findings.  
Evidently, the finding of a negative earnings effect of maternity risk is robust to 
various model specifications, a restriction to white women, and restricting the sample to 
Householders and residents
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never-married or currently married women. Furthermore, considering only couples where 
neither partner moved residence in the past twelve months does not appear to affect the 
conclusions. Neither does excluding women who actually gave birth in the last year. Finally, 
use of the ACS fertility variable to assign maternity risk to both householders and residents, if 
anything, improves the consistency and applicability of the findings to the population of all 
partnered females.  
Given the consistent evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis, the pertinent 
question regarding how the lesbian premium is affected by the inclusion of Maternity Risk re-
emerges. Although the results are not reported, the overwhelming majority of specifications 
display an economically significant reduction in the lesbian premium upon the inclusion of 
Maternity Risk. As previously discussed, however, the magnitude of the decrease is dependent 
on the centring of the potential experience interaction terms, as well as the extent to which 
bias in the potential experience coefficients already implicitly partials out the maternity-risk 
effect from the lesbian premium. Simple quantitative reasoning can, however, aide in 
understanding the effects of controlling for near-term maternity risk on the lesbian pay gap. 
Due to the age-patterning of married and cohabiting heterosexual women, cohabiting 
heterosexual women exhibit the largest average maternity risk, at approximately six percent 
Table 4.6. Coefficient on Maternity Risk  - ACS-specific robustness tests
Cohabs Married Cohabs Married
-0.2678* -0.4796***-0.3648**
Householders only
Dropping both partners' observations if moved in the -0.5800***
last twelve months (0.2223) (0.1616) (0.1927) (0.1491)
-0.1731 -0.4412***Dropping from above regressions those who gave
birth in last twelve months
-0.6013*** -0.3889***
(0.2283) (0.1649) (0.1982) (0.1532)
-0.2802** -0.4031***Repeating entire analysis with ACS fertility variable -0.4638*** -0.3584***
and dropping if moved in last twelve months (0.1641) (0.0834) (0.1330) (0.0793)
-0.2181* -0.3988***Dropping from above regressions those who gave
birth in last twelve months
-0.4608*** -0.4115***
(0.1692) (0.0860) (0.1367) (0.0822)
2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the
coefficient on the maternity risk variable. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a 
one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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across the three samples, while married women average five percent. As maternity incidence 
across lesbians within the sample is approximately 1.5 percent, a maternity gap of 3.5 to 4.5 
percentage points emerges. Assuming a true coefficient on Maternity Risk of -0.50, this 
suggests controlling for near-term maternity risk can eliminate approximately 1.75 to 2.25 
percentage points of the raw lesbian premium.81 This adverse earnings effect of maternity risk 
thus has important ramifications, as maternity-leave policy is likely to have a significant 
effect on both earnings and the lesbian pay gap. 
5. Indirect Tests of the Maternity-Risk Hypothesis
As is evident from the previous section, the ability to directly detect discrimination on the 
basis of maternity risk is hindered by unobservable heterogeneity amongst females and 
multicollinearity problems. In order to overcome these problems, we utilise cross-state 
variation in the lesbian pay gap to further test the maternity-risk hypothesis.82 Specifically, we 
assess whether state-level proxies which may affect the perceived maternity-risk gap between 
lesbians and heterosexual women exert the expected influence on the lesbian premium. For 
example, state laws granting greater partnership rights to same-sex couples are likely to 
increase the incidence of child-bearing among lesbian couples; we should thus expect a 
decrease in the lesbian premium in these states relative to states where no such law is in 
effect. 
5.1. Data Sources and Sample 
This section also relies on PUMS data from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census (5% sample) and 
2005 to 2010 American Community Surveys. An identical sample-selection procedure is 
implemented, although the controls used in the analysis necessitate an additional restriction. 
This restriction is a consequence of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Voting 
Records' only being available for the fifty U.S. states. As the state-level ideology measures 
created by Berry et al. (1998) are computed from ADA scores, their use in the analysis entails 
81 It is important to note, however, that this is not the same as the omitted-variables bias in the adjusted premium 
resulting from excluding Maternity Risk, which was shown earlier to be approximately 0.80 to 1.20 percentage 
points. A similar conclusion can be obtained via Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. A detailed discussion of these 
decompositions is outside the scope of this paper, but we refer the interested reader to Table F.1 for the results 
from such decompositions, which we provide for comparative purposes only. 
82 As prior effects of maternity risk no longer need to be partialled out, using proxies also allows us to assess the 
accumulated effects of maternity risk, whereas the analysis in the previous section only permits an assessment of 
near-term, forward-looking effects. Moreover, we no longer require the assumption that age, sexual orientation 
and partnership status are the only factors affecting perceived maternity risk. 
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the exclusion of the District of Columbia from the sample. The use of these controls thus 
comes at the cost of a reduction in the sample size by approximately 0.17 percent in each 
sample and the loss of the District of Columbia from the research population.  
Several proxies are used in the analysis that follows in an attempt to overcome validity 
problems that may be associated with any particular proxy. The four proxies used are an 
indicator variable for states with laws mandating insurance coverage of infertility treatment, 
an indicator variable for states with laws allowing same-sex domestic partnerships or granting 
more extensive partnership rights to same-sex couples, an indicator variable for states with 
state-wide bans on same-sex marriage, and a standardised variable representing the size of the 
lesbian population as a percentage of the female adult population within each state.
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 Table
5.1 displays the summarised proxy values for each sample. Values for the Same-Sex 
Percentage proxy are displayed prior to standardisation. Between 2000 and 2005, several 
states enacted laws mandating insurance coverage of infertility treatment or imposed state-
wide bans on same-sex marriage. Over time a number of states have also extended 
partnership, civil union, or marriage rights to same-sex couples. Finally, the data suggests 
lesbian prevalence increased in the 2005-2007 sample and subsequently dropped; however, 
differences in questionnaires and procedures followed by the Census Bureau across years 
likely account for the observed pattern. 
As the proxies may be correlated with attitudes towards lesbians and labour-market 
conditions, unbiased estimation necessitates the inclusion of controls for other state-level 
factors. In addition to the Berry et al. (1998) citizen and government ideology measures, we 
include various other controls in an attempt to partial out the effect of maternity risk. These 
include the percentage of Gross State Product (GSP) from manufacturing, the presence of a 
state-wide Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) covering sexual orientation, an 
indicator for whether the state-level sodomy law was repealed prior to the federal repeal in 
2003, and a 2013 same-sex legal equality score. An explanation of each measure and its 
corresponding source is provided in Appendix D, Table D.2, while a detailed discussion of 
their use is provided in the following section. 
83
 Appendix D, Table D.2 contains a description of each proxy and its corresponding source, while Tables A.21-
A.24 provide a detailed list of proxy values by state and year. Finally, Table F.2 provides a brief summary of 
control values by sample, but we omit a detailed list of values by state and year due to brevity considerations. 
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Table 5.1. Summary of proxy values by sample period 
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS 
Percentage of states with laws mandating insurance 
22.00 30.00 30.00 
coverage of infertility treatment (%) 
Percentage of states with laws allowing same-sex 
2.00 14.67 27.33 
domestic partnerships or greater rights (%) 
Percentage of states with state-wide bans on 
68.00 85.33 83.33 
same-sex marriage (%) 
Percentage of the adult female population 
1.06 1.20 0.98 
comprised of coupled lesbians (%) 
Sources: A list of sources for each proxy is provided in Table D.2. 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Base Analysis 
Our indirect tests of the maternity-risk hypothesis focus on the effects of each proxy on the 
lesbian premium. For this purpose, in each regression, the level proxy variable is included in 
case it is correlated with income, as well as an interaction term with the lesbian indicator to 
allow for a differential effect across household types. Assessing the maternity-risk hypothesis 
thus entails examining the sign of the lesbian-proxy interaction coefficient estimate.
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 This
method overcomes the bias problem created by unobservable human capital as inference is 
based on the marginal change in the lesbian premium associated with a particular proxy. It 
also allows us to capture longer-term effects of maternity risk than in the prior analysis. 
Despite controlling for ideology, factors affecting state-level income, and the rights of 
homosexuals, the level proxy terms may pick up other minor state-level effects, reducing the 
informational content of their associated coefficients. However, the interaction terms should 
84
 An ideal test of proxy validity would assess whether employers' forward-looking expectations of the maternity 
gap is affected in the expected manner by the proxy. This test is, for obvious reasons, impracticable. 
Alternatively, we could assess whether the proxies can explain state-by-state variation in maternity incidence. 
Due to substantial heterogeneity among women across states, a probit model would be required. Several 
difficulties plague such an analysis, including specification error, which may bias the coefficients. Some proxies 
also represent newly formed laws and their effects on maternity rates are likely delayed due to family-formation 
considerations at the household level. Moreover, uncertainty regarding the continual expansion, or the potential 
reversal of rights granted to same-sex couples may exacerbate the lag in the maternity-risk effect. As a result, we 
use alternative techniques to assess proxy validity, as discussed below. 
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not be heavily affected, given that such unobserved factors are less likely to have a 
differential effect by household type. 
Similarly to the previous analysis, we estimate earnings regressions of the following 
form to indirectly test the maternity-risk hypothesis: 
ln 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝒁𝑖
′𝜙 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝑷𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖  (𝐴)
where ln 𝑅  is the natural log of real annual wage and salary income, and all other variables 
excluding 𝑷 are as defined in Section 4.3. 𝑷 is a vector of variables whose inclusion is 
dependent on the model to be estimated. It contains the relevant proxy for differential 
maternity risk, as well as the citizen and government ideology controls, percentage of GSP 
from manufacturing and an indicator for the presence of an ENDA covering sexual 
orientation. Appropriate interaction terms with sexual orientation are also included.85 To 
account for the correlation between the error terms of individuals residing in the same state, 
we estimate cluster-robust standard errors in all models. 
In order to assess the effects the proxies exert on the lesbian premium, we adopt a 
similar step-wise technique to that implemented in Section 3. Specification (A1) adds only the 
relevant proxy and its interaction with Lesbian to the model controlling for work, personal 
and other characteristics. Model (A2) adds the citizen ideology measure and its interaction 
with sexual orientation. Specification (A3) further includes Government Ideology and its 
interaction with the lesbian indicator dummy, while (A4) controls for the percentage of GSP 
from manufacturing and its interaction with Lesbian. Finally, (A5) adds an indicator for 
whether the state in which the individual resides has a state-wide ENDA covering sexual 
orientation, in addition to its interaction with the lesbian indicator. As these controls may be 
correlated with cross-state differences in maternity risk, their sequential addition enables the 
assessment of the proxy effect when controlling for, or alternatively not controlling for, 
various other state-level factors.86 The concurrent analysis of the three non-overlapping 
samples again allows us to assess whether the results are robust to the choice of sample 
period. 
85 As in our prior analyses of ACS data, we also include year dummies in all regression models to account for 
year fixed-effects. 
86 We also centre all state-level controls and interactions about their means to aide in interpretation. 
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5.2.2. Tests of Robustness
As with previous analyses, we take the full-control model (Model (A5)) as the base model 
from which to conduct tests of robustness due to concerns about omitted-variables bias. As 
before, we re-estimate (A5) with hourly wages as the dependent variable, as well as restricting 
the analysis to full-time workers and excluding controls for hours and weeks of work. We also 
estimate a Heckman two-step model, where the selection equation takes a similar form to 
those estimated previously. Specifically, the selection equation includes all factors from the 
earnings equation, excluding work characteristics, and occupation and industry controls. The 
identifying variables include an indicator for the presence of children under the age of six and 
partner's real income.  
Although the presence of an ENDA captures, to some extent, the legal standing of 
same-sex couples, it is possible that other state laws may also affect the lesbian premium. To 
account for this possibility, we consider two additional state-level controls in further tests of 
robustness. The first model adds an indicator variable for whether the state-level sodomy law 
was repealed prior to the federal repeal in 2003 to the base specification. The second further 
includes a 2013 measure of same-sex legal equality in each state. An important characteristic 
of these measures is that they are time invariant. They therefore serve the purpose of 
controlling for underlying levels of gay-friendliness in each state as well as potentially 
capturing the forward-looking expectations of employers regarding the rights of same-sex 
couples in the future. Provided the 2013 measure of same-sex equality does not significantly 
capture differential maternity risk in any particular year, these proxies aide in partialling out 
the maternity-risk effects associated with each proxy. 
In a similar vein to the direct analysis, there is a possibility that the proxies may 
capture cross-state differences in unobservable human capital accumulation. To address this 
possibility, we estimate additional models in which we interact observable measures of 
human capital with the lesbian indicator dummy. The first such model interacts sexual 
orientation with potential experience and its square, while the second further adds indicators 
of educational attainment interacted with Lesbian. The inclusion of these controls should limit 
the extent to which the proxies capture cross-state variation in the sexual-orientation human 
capital gap, enhancing the validity of the analysis.  
Having tested several supplementary specifications and dependent variable 
formulations, we then assess whether the results recur when restricting the analysis to specific 
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subsamples. First, we restrict the sample to full-time employed women. If maternity risk has a 
more negative effect among full-time employed workers, as the direct analysis suggests, we 
should expect a larger negative coefficient on the lesbian-proxy interaction term when 
implementing this restriction. To ensure the results are not contingent upon state-level racial 
composition and to further reduce unobservable heterogeneity, we also re-estimate the base 
model including only white women. Sample-size considerations preclude an analogous 
restriction to non-whites. Finally, we re-estimate the base model, stratifying the analysis by 
age, first including only women aged 40 years or under, and then restricting the sample to 
women over 40 years of age. If the proxy is truly capturing the effect on the lesbian premium 
due to marginal changes in the maternity-risk differential, then we would expect the earnings 
effect to be largest among younger women, where maternity risk is likely to be most 
significantly affected.87 The set of estimates these robustness checks produce is thus of crucial 
importance in assessing the validity of the proxies used.  
Another potential concern is whether using OLS with cluster-robust standard errors 
adequately accounts for the hierarchical nature of the data. In this respect, the data can be 
thought of as being multilevel, with individuals constituting the first level, and the states they 
reside in constituting the second level. As previously discussed, only two prior studies 
analysing the lesbian pay gap implement multilevel estimation techniques, notably Baumle 
and Poston (2011) and Klawitter (2011). As is evident from these studies, one major 
disadvantage of such models is that they have difficulty converging when fitting complex 
models or when the sample size is large. Primo et al. (2007) similarly argue that estimating 
clustered standard errors is a more practical approach, particularly with large datasets or when 
including many cross-level interactions. However, to address remaining concerns surrounding 
the use of OLS, we take a 10% random sample of cohabiting and married heterosexual 
women, and re-estimate Specification (A5), fitting a multilevel model to the data. We estimate 
an unstructured variance-covariance matrix in each case to avoid imposing unnecessary 
restrictions on the covariance between the random slope and random intercept terms.88 Model 
87 It is important to note, however, that this expectation is not uniform across all proxies. In the case of factors 
that have likely persisted over time, such as bans on same-sex marriage, or the percentage of the adult female 
population comprised of same-sex couples, the proxy should also differentially affect older lesbians due to 
effects on promotion in prior years. We could thus observe a marginal effect on the lesbian premium that is 
similar in magnitude for both younger and older women. The implications of these age-stratified regressions are 
discussed in greater detail when considering the results for each proxy. 
88 A detailed discussion of multilevel methods is beyond the scope of this paper. For further information on 
multilevel models see Hox (2010), or Klawitter (2011) for an applied example. We also estimated models with 
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(A5) is also re-estimated with the smaller sample to enable a more accurate comparison of the 
two methods.
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5.2.3. Comparison with Gay Males 
As discussed, despite controlling for several state-level variables, the maternity-risk proxies 
may still capture cross-state variation in liberalism, hostility towards homosexuals and labour-
market prospects. Another potentially confounding factor is that lesbians may be willing to 
accept lower income in order to reside in states granting greater rights to same-sex couples. 
The proxies may then capture selective location effects in addition to the effects of maternity 
risk. One potential way to address these issues is to re-estimate the models for gay males and 
examine the estimated proxy-effect on the gay-male pay gap. Assuming that the effects of 
unobservable factors such as gay sentiment, labour-market prospects, and residency choices 
are similar for gay males and lesbians, the difference between the effect of the proxy in the 
male and female regressions can be taken as the partial effect of the proxy on earnings due to 
its effect on maternity risk.
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 As a final test of the maternity-risk hypothesis, we therefore re-
estimate (A5) for males, paying close attention to the difference in the estimated effect of the 
proxy in the male and female regressions.
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5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Mandated Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatment 
Table 5.2 provides the base results from the 2000 Census sample for the Mandated Coverage 
proxy, which equals one whenever the individual resides within a state mandating insurance 
coverage of infertility treatment, and zero otherwise. Within Table 5.2 we display the 
no region of residency controls as region arguably constitutes a third data level. These specifications produced 
qualitatively identical results. 
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 Similarly to Klawitter (2011), we also estimate several other models for each proxy to assess the sensitivity of 
the results to the specifics of the analysis. The (unreported) results suggest that the findings are moderately 
sensitive to the sequential exclusion of the largest states from the sample (California, Texas, New York and 
Florida), but insensitive to the use of a principal component for state-level ideology, choice of controls, income 
restrictions, and stratification by race. As these robustness checks are considered of secondary importance 
relative to those included, a detailed analysis of the results is omitted due to brevity considerations. 
90
 Family formation among gay males may also increase, for example through adoption, when greater rights are 
conferred on them, or even when they have improved access to support groups. Although it is not strictly 
necessary, these parental-leave effects, which are common to both gay males and lesbians, are assumed to be 
minor in comparison to the direct effects of the proxy on female maternity incidence. 
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 To obtain the male sample, we follow an identical sample-selection procedure to that outlined in Section 3.1 
and again use cohabitation to identify different household types. Several other specifications were re-estimated 
for the male sample, producing similar results to those obtained from the base regressions included here. 
Table 5.2. Effect of laws mandating insurance coverage of infertility treatment on the lesbian premium - 2000 Census
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Lesbian 0.0400*** 0.0396*** 0.0390*** 0.0379*** 0.0415*** 0.0168** 0.0102 0.0103 0.0078 0.0099
(0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0084)
Mandated coverage 0.0381* 0.0060 0.0051 0.0040 -0.0011 0.0412 0.0076 0.0084 0.0065 0.0033
(0.0224) (0.0215) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0114) (0.0287) (0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0194) (0.0111)
Mandated coverage 0.0332** 0.0396** 0.0367** 0.0342** 0.0230* 0.0313* 0.0378** 0.0329** 0.0309** 0.0153
   x lesbian (0.0197) (0.0211) (0.0179) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0188) (0.0213) (0.0169) (0.0148) (0.0130)
Citizen ideology 0.0370*** 0.0334*** 0.0307*** 0.0240*** 0.0426*** 0.0381*** 0.0352*** 0.0278***
(0.0070) (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0067)
Citizen ideology -0.0091 -0.0103 -0.0140 -0.0152 -0.0129 -0.0138 -0.0180* -0.0195*
   x lesbian (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0105)
Government ideology 0.0039 0.0043 0.0001 0.0047 0.0053 0.0019
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0027)
Government ideology 0.0017 0.0024 0.0003 0.0014 0.0020 -0.0018
   x lesbian (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0026)
% GSP manufacturing -0.1811 -0.1836* -0.2009* -0.1928*
(0.1202) (0.1057) (0.1061) (0.1046)
% GSP manufacturing -0.2652** -0.2634* -0.2881** -0.2952**
   x lesbian (0.1306) (0.1339) (0.1320) (0.1328)
State ENDA 0.0792*** 0.0760***
(0.0136) (0.0166)
State ENDA 0.0196 0.0366**
 x lesbian (0.0198) (0.0164)
Observations 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185
R2 0.6354 0.6368 0.6369 0.6370 0.6379 0.6294 0.6312 0.6314 0.6315 0.6322
Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals Lesbians versus married heterosexuals
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the coefficients on the state-level variables and cross-level
interactions. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The coefficients of interest (Lesbian and Mandated Coverage × Lesbian ) are tested on
a one-tailed basis. Source: 2000 Decennial Census PUMS. 
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coefficient estimates of the other state-level variables to convey the effects they exert upon 
earnings and the lesbian premium. The reported coefficient on the lesbian indicator represents 
the premium evaluated at the mean of the state-level controls. Returns to individual-level 
characteristics, such as potential experience and education, are omitted due to brevity 
considerations. Furthermore, their estimated effects are relatively stable upon the inclusion of 
state-level controls, and thus the results are qualitatively similar to those discussed in Section 
3.4. Definitions of infertility in U.S. state laws generally entail the individual being unable to 
conceive or sustain a successful pregnancy after one to two years of unprotected 
(heterosexual) sexual intercourse. In some cases, the legal definition also requires the 
individual to be married. Owing to these definitions, mandated insurance coverage of 
infertility treatment should increase the maternity risk of cohabiting and married heterosexual 
females relative to lesbians. Thus, if the maternity-risk hypothesis is correct, the lesbian 
premium should be higher relative to cohabiting and married heterosexuals in states with 
mandated coverage.  
The preceding predictions are borne out by the base results from the 2000 Census, 
providing evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis. The comparison with 
cohabiting heterosexuals reveals the estimated lesbian premium across the five specifications 
to be between 2.43 and 4.20 percentage points larger in states with mandated insurance 
coverage of infertility treatment than in states without, when evaluated at the means of other 
state-level variables.92 Evidently, controlling for the presence of an ENDA covering sexual 
orientation is important, resulting in a substantial reduction in the estimated effect of 
Mandated Coverage on the lesbian premium. The results also indicate a significant increase in 
the lesbian premium over married women in states with mandated coverage. In such states, 
the premium is estimated to be some 1.56 to 3.89 percentage points larger than in those absent 
mandated coverage. Excluding the final married women comparison, these estimates are both 
statistically and economically significant. Holding other factors at their respective means, the 
estimates represent an increase in the lesbian earnings premium of more than fifty percent vis-
à-vis cohabiting heterosexuals and married women. It is questionable whether mandated 
insurance coverage of infertility treatment could drive this large an earnings differential, given 
that the total number of children born through infertility treatment worldwide in the past 
92 For the specification: ln 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝒁𝑖
′𝜙 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 × 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝛿1 + ⋯ + 𝜀𝑖  , 
the change in the premium in percentage points is calculated as exp(𝛾+𝛿1) − exp(𝛾), or in the case of (A1), 
exp(0.0400+0.0332 ) − exp(0.0400 ) = 3.51 percentage points. This convention is used throughout the discussion of 
the proxies.  
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thirteen years is approximately equal to the annual number of U.S. births (Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention (U.S.), 2013; Innes, 2013). 
Analysing the coefficients on the controls reveals some interesting results. Citizen 
ideology appears to be strongly positively correlated with income, with a positive and highly 
significant coefficient in each case, as might be expected. In all cases, higher citizen ideology 
results in a smaller lesbian premium, ceteris paribus, but this effect is only statistically 
significant in two regressions. Including Government Ideology adds little explanatory power 
to the model, with the coefficient on both the level variable and its interaction with Lesbian 
being small in magnitude and statistically insignificant in all regressions. As expected, 
individuals residing in states with a high percentage of GSP from manufacturing, on average, 
receive significantly lower incomes, ceteris paribus. The lesbian premium is also reduced in 
such states. Finally, as identified by Klawitter (2011) and Gates (2009), states with higher 
average incomes appear to selectively implement ENDA's covering sexual orientation, as 
evidenced by the statistically significant positive coefficient on the ENDA indicator. Similarly 
to Gates (2009), we find evidence that labour-market discrimination may have an adverse 
effect on the earnings of lesbians, with the presence of an ENDA offsetting this to some 
extent. For the remainder of this section, we focus our attention on the lesbian-proxy 
interactions, noting that the results discussed here carry over to the other samples and proxies. 
Summarised results from the 2000 Census, as well as results for the ACS samples, are 
provided in Table A.25. The latter results demonstrate the importance of using multiple 
sample periods in assessing explanations of the lesbian premium. Notably, the 2008 to 2010 
sample provides evidence consistent with that from the 2000 Census, with lesbians earning a 
larger premium over both cohabiting and married heterosexual women in states mandating 
insurance coverage of infertility treatment. The magnitude of this marginal change is also in 
line with the results from the 2000 Census. However, the results from the 2005 to 2007 ACS 
sample provide limited support for the maternity-risk hypothesis. Lesbians are estimated to 
receive a larger premium over cohabiting heterosexuals of between 1.73 and 2.47 percentage 
points in states with mandated coverage, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant 
across all specifications. More troubling, however, is that Mandated Coverage is estimated to 
have no effect on the lesbian premium relative to married women. Although it is plausible that 
the increase in the premium is greater relative to cohabiting heterosexuals, based on the 
results from the direct analysis, the finding of no marginal change in the premium relative to 
married heterosexuals is inconsistent with the maternity-risk hypothesis. 
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Table A.26 contains the results from the robustness checks for the Mandated 
Coverage proxy. For ease of exposition, within the table we display the percentage point 
change in the lesbian pay gap associated with the proxy moving from a value of zero to one, 
when evaluated at the means of all other variables.
93
 Evidently, the estimated effect of
Mandated Coverage on the pay gap is significantly affected by dropping work characteristics 
and restricting the sample to full-time workers. Specifically, the proxy is now associated with 
an economically and statistically significant increase in the lesbian premium in the 2005-2007 
ACS sample, but the magnitude and significance of the 2008-2010 estimates are reduced. In 
contrast, using hourly wages as the dependent variable or the Heckman two-step method 
produces results almost identical to the base specification. The inclusion of additional state-
level controls only minimally changes the estimated effect of the proxy, as does the 
introduction of human capital variables interacted with the lesbian indicator. In contrast, 
considering only full-time workers dramatically alters the results for the ACS samples. 
Despite the interaction term being insignificant in the base regression for the 2005-2007 
sample, the restriction to full-time employed reveals a significant increase in the lesbian 
premium relative to both cohabiting (5.14 percentage points) and married heterosexual 
women (3.98 percentage points) in states mandating coverage. Moreover, the previously 
significant estimates for the 2008-2010 sample are much smaller and no longer statistically 
significant. Considering the re-estimation for white women reveals slightly larger estimates of 
the effect of Mandated Coverage on the lesbian premium, resulting in statistical significance 
in four of the six regressions.  
As laws mandating insurance coverage of infertility treatment have generally been 
implemented in recent years, one would expect a larger increase in the lesbian premium 
among younger women in states with such laws.
94
 This expectation is borne out in both the
2000 and 2008-2010 samples, but the results from the 2005-2007 ACS provide conflicting 
evidence, with older lesbians receiving a larger increase in the premium than younger 
lesbians. Analysing the reduced sample produces results similar to the full sample, although 
the 2005-2007 estimates are now both of the incorrect sign. Somewhat surprisingly, 
multilevel analysis produces results noticeably different to those generated by OLS, with only 
93
 The level of statistical significance provided refers to the coefficient on the lesbian-proxy interaction term. In 
Tables F.3-F.6 we provide supplementary regression results which we use to produce the summary tables in 
Appendix A. 
94
 Although infertility treatments are also available for women over forty years of age, success and uptake rates 
are significantly lower among this cohort (Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies, n.d.). 
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one estimate being both statistically significant and of the appropriate sign. More troubling is 
that the proxy is now associated with a significant and negative change in the lesbian 
premium relative to married heterosexuals in the 2005-2007 sample. Finally, the results from 
the male sample suggest that gay males benefit significantly from living in states mandating 
insurance coverage for infertility treatment. Calculating the difference between the estimated 
effects in the male and female regressions reveals sizable negative estimates in all cases. 
Taking this gap as representing the marginal change in the premium attributable to maternity 
risk yields a result in stark contrast to prior expectations. A plausible explanation of this 
phenomenon is that states with less fertile women selectively adopt laws enhancing maternity 
rates. As such, all else held constant, the sexual-orientation maternity gap may actually be 
lower in states which have implemented such laws.95 Absent an accurate method to assess this 
hypothesis, the results from the Mandated Coverage proxy must be deemed inconclusive. 
5.3.2. Same-Sex Partnership Laws
Table A.27 contains the base estimates from the ACS samples for the Legal Partnership
proxy, which equals one whenever the individual resides in a state allowing same-sex partners 
to enter into a domestic partnership or conferring greater partnership status on same-sex 
couples, and zero otherwise. In 1999, only Hawaii allowed same-sex domestic partnerships, 
resulting in minimal variation in the proxy, thus precluding an analysis of the 2000 Census 
sample. Given that greater legal rights are likely to increase lesbians' willingness to start a 
family, laws allowing same-sex domestic partnerships are expected to increase future 
maternity incidence among lesbians. Holding all other factors constant, this should reduce the 
sexual-orientation maternity-risk gap, exerting a negative effect on the lesbian premium 
relative to cohabiting and married heterosexual women. 
The results in Table A.27 suggest that the lesbian premium is reduced in states 
allowing same-sex domestic partnerships, consistent with the expectations of the maternity-
risk hypothesis. Relative to cohabiting heterosexuals in the 2005-2007 sample, the lesbian 
premium is lower in these states by between 1.56 and 2.77 percentage points when evaluated 
at the mean of other state-level variables, although none of the estimates are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Similar estimates obtained via a comparative analysis with 
95 Comparing unadjusted fertility rates across states suggests that Mandated Coverage exerts the expected effect 
on maternity risk. If the same is true for adjusted fertility rates, selective adoption of laws cannot explain the 
observed results. In such a case, it is likely that inadequate controls have been included in the models to account 
for cross-state heterogeneity, and the proxy is capturing non-maternity-risk related factors.  
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married women indicate a smaller premium of between 2.04 and 3.75 percentage points. 
Analysing the 2008-2010 sample yields a similar estimated effect in the full-control model 
relative to cohabiting heterosexuals (2.64 percentage point reduction), although the estimates 
diverge considerably across the other specifications. In addition, there exists cross-sample 
differences in results relative to married women, with the 2008-2010 sample suggesting that 
partnership laws have no effect on the lesbian premium. Despite this, the base results appear 
to be broadly consistent with the maternity-risk hypothesis, with all full-control models 
estimating a negative, albeit sometimes statistically insignificant, effect of Legal Partnership 
on the premium.  
Table A.28 presents the robustness checks that serve to further assess the maternity-
risk hypothesis in the context of same-sex domestic partnership laws. In contrast to the 
Mandated Coverage proxy, the choice of dependent variable does not substantially alter the 
findings, although all estimates shrink when restricting to full-time employed females and 
dropping work characteristics. Use of the Heckman two-step procedure yields similar 
estimates to the base results in the 2005-2007 sample, and increases the magnitude of the 
estimated proxy-effect relative to cohabiting heterosexuals in the 2008-2010 period. The base 
results from both samples emphasise the importance of controlling for cross-state 
heterogeneity in estimating the partial effect of maternity risk on the premium. Sequentially 
adding the sodomy law repeal dummy and the same-sex legal equality score only minimally 
changes the estimated effect of Legal Partnership on the pay gap, suggesting that the 
presence of an ENDA adequately captures the non-partnership-related legal environment 
faced by same-sex couples. However, including interactions between observable human 
capital and the lesbian indicator markedly affects the results. That is, the proxy is now 
associated with a significant reduction in the premium across all specifications in each 
sample, providing support for the maternity-risk hypothesis. Restricting the sample to full-
time employed females reduces the estimated effect of partnership laws, eliminating statistical 
significance in the 2008-2010 cohabiting heterosexuals comparison. Considering only white 
women does not appear to significantly affect the results, with the estimates remaining 
relatively stable across all four regressions. 
State laws allowing same-sex domestic partnerships or granting more extensive 
partnership rights to same-sex couples are a relatively new phenomenon in the U.S. If the 
maternity-risk hypothesis is correct, we would thus expect partnership laws to result in a 
greater reduction in the lesbian premium among the younger cohort. Unfortunately, the age-
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stratified analysis provides conflicting evidence regarding the maternity-risk hypothesis. The 
2005-2007 results conform to expectations, with an estimated reduction in the lesbian 
premium of 4.07 to 4.34 percentage points among women forty years of age or under, while 
smaller and statistically insignificant effects are observed for women over forty. In contrast, 
the 2008-2010 sample suggests older lesbians are at a greater disadvantage than younger 
lesbians when living in states allowing same-sex domestic partnerships, civil unions, or 
marriages. This is slightly concerning given that we would expect a larger effect among 
younger women if the proxy truly captures marginal changes in the premium due to the effect 
on the maternity-risk differential. The multilevel results from the reduced sample reveal that 
the effect of Legal Partnership on the premium is affected by the choice of estimation 
method, with large discrepancies between the multilevel and OLS results in the 2005-2007 
sample. However, the estimates are of the correct sign in each case, so the qualitative 
conclusions remain unaffected. Finally, the results from the male sample provide further 
evidence regarding proxy validity, with the gay-male pay gap being largely unaffected by 
same-sex partnership laws. Differencing the estimated effects in the male and female 
regressions produces negative values, although this does vary widely across samples. The 
Legal Partnership proxy thus provides relatively strong support for the maternity-risk 
hypothesis, given the consistent results generated across a variety of robustness tests. 
However, the results must be interpreted with caution due to the mixed evidence regarding 
proxy validity obtained via age-stratified regressions.  
5.3.3. Same-Sex Marriage Bans
The third proxy used in assessing the maternity-risk hypothesis is Marriage Bans, which 
equals one whenever the individual lives in a state with a law or Constitutional Amendment 
banning same-sex marriage, and zero otherwise. In the reverse manner to laws allowing same-
sex domestic partnerships, bans on same-sex marriage are likely to inhibit family formation 
among lesbian couples, increasing the maternity divide between heterosexual and lesbian 
women. As a result, the lesbian premium should be greater in states with such bans in place, 
ceteris paribus. 
The estimates from the initial analysis, presented in Table A.29, display supportive 
evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis. Relative to cohabiting and married 
heterosexual women, the lesbian premium is 1.63 to 3.93 percentage points larger in states 
banning same-sex marriage, according to the 2000 Census sample. Similar estimates obtained 
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using the 2005-2007 ACS sample suggest an increased premium of 2.93 to 6.05 percentage 
points, with the majority of estimates being statistically significant.96 Finally, compared to 
cohabiting heterosexual women, the 2008-2010 sample suggests a statistically insignificant 
disadvantage for lesbians living in states banning same-sex marriage, and approximately no 
effect relative to married heterosexual women. Once again, controlling for other state-level 
factors appears to be of critical importance in examining the maternity-risk hypothesis, with 
the coefficients often varying noticeably across specifications.       
Results from the Marriage Bans robustness checks are reported in Table A.30. 
Similarly to previous proxies, the choice of estimation method influences the findings to some 
extent, but the qualitative conclusions remain unchanged. Use of hourly wages, for example, 
substantially increases the cross-sample consistency of the results, although the estimates in 
the 2005-2007 sample become statistically insignificant. The results also appear to be 
relatively invariant to the use of the Heckman two-step procedure, restricting the sample to 
white women, and the inclusion of additional state and individual-level controls, thus 
emphasising the robustness of the findings. Restricting the sample to full-time employed 
females, regardless of whether or not we retain work-characteristic controls, generates large 
and statistically significant estimates for the proxy-interaction coefficient in the 2000 Census 
sample, while the ACS sample estimates remain relatively unaffected.  
As many of the laws and Constitutional Amendments ruling out same-sex marriage 
were implemented in the mid-to-late nineties, we would expect to see greater increases in the 
lesbian premium in states with bans among younger women in the 2000 Census sample. In the 
later samples, the effects of maternity risk are likely to have filtered through to the premium 
among older women due to discriminatory promotion practices, substantially weakening the 
prior expectation regarding the relative age-stratified effects. Examining the results suggests 
further evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis, with the effect of Marriage Bans 
on the lesbian premium being greater among the younger cohort in the 2000 Census sample. 
Moreover, the estimated effect among women aged forty or under is within three-quarters of a 
percentage point across five of the six specifications. Despite having no strong prior 
expectation regarding the relative effects across age cohorts in the ACS samples, the 2005-
2007 results are slightly concerning, displaying a premium increase twice as large among the 
older cohort relative to the younger cohort, while the 2008-2010 results are all statistically 
96 Interestingly, holding other state-level factors at their respective means, the 2005-2007 ACS results reveal that 
there is no statistically significant lesbian premium in states without bans on same-sex marriage. 
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insignificant. In contrast to the previous proxies, multilevel estimation generates estimates 
almost identical to those produced by OLS, assuaging concerns about the choice of estimation 
technique. Again, the results from the gay-male comparison support the maternity-risk 
hypothesis, with the estimated effect of the proxy on the gay-male pay gap being statistically 
insignificant in all cases. More importantly, differencing the male and female proxy effects 
produces positive and relatively stable figures across all comparative analyses. Considering 
the results as a whole, the Marriage Bans proxy thus provides substantial support for the 
maternity-risk hypothesis.97 
5.3.4. Prevalence of Same-Sex Couples
The final proxy used in the indirect analysis of the maternity-risk hypothesis is Same-Sex
Percentage, which is a standardised variable with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one, capturing the size of the lesbian population as a percentage of the adult female 
population within each state. We believe this proxy to be appropriate for two reasons. First, if 
relationship status is imperfectly observable but sexual orientation is known, a greater 
percentage of lesbians within a state results in a higher probability of partnership, enhancing 
perceived maternity risk. Second, even if relationship status is observable, we posit that a 
higher concentration of lesbians will lead to enhanced child-bearing rates due to the presence 
of support groups and greater social acceptance towards lesbian couples raising children. On 
this basis, it is expected that the lesbian premium will be lower in states characterised by 
greater prevalence of lesbians as a proportion of the female population. 
Table A.31 presents the initial results from the Same-Sex Percentage proxy, which 
display a number of noteworthy features. First, the inclusion of state-level controls 
significantly influences the results for the 2000 Census sample, with no significant effect of 
the proxy-interaction term estimated in Specifications (A1) to (A3), and a statistically 
significant negative effect in three of the four remaining regressions. In contrast, the results 
from the ACS samples are relatively invariant to the sequential addition of state-level 
controls. Another important point concerns the magnitude of the effect across samples. 
Considering the full-control model, results from the 2000 Census suggest that a one standard 
deviation increase in the lesbian prevalence rate from the mean is associated with a 2.55 and 
3.64 percentage point reduction in the lesbian premium relative to cohabiting and married 
97 Importantly, the age-stratified and gay-male regressions provide relatively consistent support for proxy 
validity. 
80 
heterosexual women, respectively.98 Analogous estimates from the ACS samples suggest a 
smaller effect of between 1.56 and 2.28 percentage points.  
Despite being of the correct sign and highly significant, it is unlikely that these 
estimates solely reflect marginal changes in the premium due to maternity risk, as the results 
imply an earnings discount for lesbians in states with a high proportion of same-sex couples.99 
This result is not sensible in that it is unlikely that higher probabilities of partnership, the 
presence of support groups, or greater social acceptance of lesbian family formation would 
completely offset the maternity-risk differential present between lesbians and heterosexual 
women. Thus, unless substantial discrimination exists against lesbians, one would not expect 
an increase in maternity risk to result in a lesbian earnings disadvantage relative to cohabiting 
and married heterosexual women. It is therefore likely that other factors, such as 
discrimination, are augmenting the maternity-risk effect. As previously discussed, lesbians 
may also be willing to accept lower compensation in order to reside in states with greater 
support networks and tolerance towards lesbians. However, results from the age-stratified 
analysis and gay-male comparison suggest that both this and the discrimination argument are 
unlikely to be driving the large negative estimates in the female samples.   
Results from the robustness checks for the Same-Sex Percentage proxy are provided in 
Table A.32. Evidently, the sign and statistical significance of the estimates are unaffected in 
the majority of the supplementary regressions. Using hourly wages as the dependent variable 
or implementing the Heckman two-step procedure has minimal influence on the results. As 
with the Legal Partnership proxy, restricting the sample to full-time workers and dropping 
work-characteristic controls does not significantly affect the results. Similarly to the Marriage
Bans proxy, the robustness of the findings is highlighted by the minimal change in the 
estimates when restricting the sample to white women, interacting human capital measures 
with the lesbian indicator, or including further state-level controls. Considering only full-time 
employed women yields smaller estimated effects in most cases, although the differences are 
relatively minor. 
98 Throughout this section, we evaluate the effects of the Same-Sex Percentage proxy by considering a one 
standard deviation increase from the mean, holding all other factors at their respective means. The effects of 
larger increases or decreases can be evaluated in an analogous manner. 
99 For example, holding other factors at their respective means, lesbians are predicted to be at an earnings 
disadvantage relative to married heterosexual women in all samples when residing in states where lesbian 
prevalence is two standard deviations above the mean. In the 2000 Census sample, lesbians are also at an 
earnings disadvantage relative to cohabiting heterosexuals when they reside in a state where lesbian prevalence 
exceeds the state-level mean by 2.2 standard deviations. 
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Provided the relative concentration of lesbians across states has remained fairly 
constant over time, there is no obvious prior expectation regarding the age-stratified results.100 
Inspecting the table reveals that in two of the three samples, lesbians aged forty years or under 
experience the greatest premium reduction when residing in states with a high concentration 
of same-sex couples. Moreover, the estimates for older women are statistically insignificant in 
all four comparisons. Considering these results in conjunction with the reverse finding in the 
2008-2010 sample suggests that a simple discrimination argument for the proxy's influence is 
unlikely to suffice, lending strength to the maternity-risk hypothesis. Turning to the estimates 
corresponding to the reduced sample, the use of multilevel estimation in this case attenuates 
the estimated effect of maternity risk, but the conclusions remain unaltered.101 Finally, the 
results from the gay-male comparison provide further evidence in favour of the maternity-risk 
hypothesis. The Same-Sex Percentage × Gay Male coefficient is positive in all cases, 
suggesting that discrimination and compensation differences due to choice of state-residence 
are inadequate explanations of the female results. Differencing the male and female 
coefficients produces negative figures, although these vary widely between the 2000 Census 
and ACS samples. Given the reservations regarding proxy validity, we take the results as 
providing tentative support for the maternity-risk hypothesis, noting that the estimated effect 
is likely augmented by unobservable factors. 
6. Discussion
6.1. Summary of Findings 
This study examines three non-overlapping samples from the 2000 U.S. Census, 2005-2007 
ACS and 2008-2010 ACS to assess whether perceived differences in labour-force attachment 
contribute to the observed lesbian earnings advantage. No previous empirical studies have 
analysed the sexual-orientation pay gap using ACS data. As such, in a similar framework to 
prior studies, Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the lesbian premium for each of the three 
samples, ignoring both forward-looking expectations of child-bearing and contextual factors 
that may affect earnings.  
100 The between-sample correlation in state-level lesbian prevalence is approximately 0.85 when using within-
sample averages, suggesting that relative lesbian prevalence has remained fairly constant.  
101 The use of a random subsample also appears to affect the conclusions to some extent, although this is not 
surprising given the significant difference in sample sizes. 
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Using logged real annual income as the dependent variable, and controlling for hours 
and weeks of work, we uncover an economically and statistically significant lesbian earnings 
premium of thirty-five to forty percent relative to cohabiting heterosexual women. Similar 
estimates compared to married women imply a premium of ten to fifteen percent. The 
systematic addition of progressively more endogenous controls reduces the premium relative 
to both comparison groups, although a lesbian pay gap still remains in all three samples. 
Controlling for work and personal characteristics, region of residence, and occupation and 
industry, our estimates suggest the premium to be approximately three and six percent relative 
to married and cohabiting heterosexual women, respectively.  
To ensure that the presence of a lesbian pay gap is not conditional upon the dependent 
variable specification or estimation method, we conduct several robustness tests. Dropping 
the vector of work characteristics and using the log of real hourly wages as the dependent 
variable reveals marginally larger estimates of the lesbian premium, with the results being 
highly similar to previous studies using 2000 Census data. As we would expect, restricting the 
analysis to full-time employed females and dropping work-characteristic controls generates 
much larger estimates of the lesbian earnings advantage, due to sexual-orientation differences 
in annual hours worked among full-time employed females. Finally, use of the Heckman two-
step procedure to address sample-selectivity concerns generates similar premium estimates 
relative to cohabiting heterosexuals, but significantly increases the estimated premium 
compared to married heterosexuals.   
Independent of the chosen specification and estimation technique, we find extensive 
evidence of an economically and statistically significant lesbian premium. In the remainder of 
the paper, we examine whether at least some of this premium can be attributed to sexual-
orientation differences in maternity risk. To minimise concern associated with omitted-
variables bias, all subsequent regression models include the full vector of controls for 
personal characteristics, region of residence, and occupation and industry. Furthermore, OLS 
is used as the primary estimation technique due to volatility in the Heckman two-step 
estimates and difficulties in identifying appropriate exclusion restrictions. 
Section 4 presents a direct analysis of the maternity-risk hypothesis. Using intra-
household relationships to infer fertility among householders, we allocate maternity rates by 
sexual orientation and age group using within-sample maternity incidence as an estimate of 
employers' forward-looking maternity-leave expectations. Preliminary regressions that 
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include allocated maternity risk as an additional regressor display mixed evidence regarding 
the effect of maternity risk on earnings, and thus the lesbian premium. We argue that prior 
effects of maternity risk on career progression and unobservable differences in human capital 
accumulation lead to bias in the relevant coefficient estimates, necessitating the inclusion of 
additional controls. 
To account for sexual-orientation differences in returns to observable human capital 
that may result, we interact potential experience and its square with the lesbian indicator, and 
sequentially include them as additional regressors. Results from these specifications provide 
robust evidence that maternity risk negatively affects earnings, with estimates suggesting a 
0.28 to 0.60 percent reduction in earnings for every one percentage point increase in maternity 
risk. In addition, the penalty appears to be slightly larger when comparing lesbians with 
cohabiting heterosexual women, indicating that the penalty associated with an increase in 
maternity risk may be diminishing in the level of maternity risk.  
Considering models with some form of potential experience interaction provides 
consistent evidence that the lesbian premium falls upon controlling for maternity risk. Across 
the three samples and two comparison groups, these specifications imply that accounting for 
near-term maternity risk reduces the premium by one to twenty-three percent when evaluated 
at the mean level of potential experience. As the majority of estimates are clustered within a 
small range, our best estimates suggest that controlling for the near-term likelihood of labour-
market separation to bear children reduces the lesbian pay gap by ten to fifteen percent. These 
estimates are, however, subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty. Specifically, the 
estimated change is conditional upon the base premium estimate and the extent to which bias 
in the effect of potential experience implicitly accounts for differential maternity risk. An 
important implication is that omitting a control for maternity risk generates upward bias in the 
estimated earnings effect of potential experience. 
In robustness tests, where all models include both potential experience interactions to 
mitigate the problems associated with unobservable human capital, we again assess 
alternative specifications and implement the Heckman two-step procedure. Although the level 
of statistical significance is reduced in three regressions, the general findings remain 
qualitatively similar across specifications. Further robustness checks, such as including 
additional sexual-orientation interaction terms, dropping occupation and industry controls, 
and excluding from the regressions women who gave birth in the previous year, provide 
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robust evidence that maternity risk adversely affects earnings. In particular, the latter result 
assuages concerns that the maternity-risk earnings disadvantage merely reflects the 
adjustment period associated with new mothers re-entering the workforce. Restricting to full-
time employed females reveals a larger adverse effect of maternity risk. The results from 
quantile regressions, however, provide mixed evidence that the maternity-risk disadvantage is 
relatively larger at the upper end of the earnings spectrum. 
Repeating the maternity-risk allocation procedure and re-estimating the preferred 
specification for white women produces qualitatively consistent results, with a one percentage 
point increase in maternity risk reducing earnings by 0.31 to 0.90 percent. An analogous 
restriction to never-married or currently married women yields similar results. These results 
suggest the findings are relatively robust to further disaggregation of the maternity-risk 
allocation process, however sample-size limitations preclude greater disaggregation within the 
full sample.    
Dropping both partners' observations if either partner moved in the last twelve months, 
as well as repeating the analysis for householders and residents using the ACS fertility 
variable, generates results consistent with the maternity-risk hypothesis. The finding of an 
adverse earnings effect of maternity risk is thus highly robust to various model specifications 
and sample restrictions. Unreported results again show the reduction in the lesbian premium 
across the robustness tests to be approximately ten to fifteen percent upon controlling for 
near-term maternity risk. Using quantitative reasoning (and Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions), 
we demonstrate that the true maternity-risk effect accounts for approximately 1.75 to 2.25 
percentage points of the raw lesbian premium.       
In Section 5, we use cross-state variation in the lesbian pay gap to indirectly examine 
the maternity-risk hypothesis. Specifically, we assess whether proxies that are likely to affect 
the sexual-orientation maternity gap exert the expected influence on the lesbian premium. The 
four proxies used are an indicator variable for states with laws mandating insurance coverage 
of infertility treatment, an indicator variable for states with laws allowing same-sex domestic 
partnerships or granting more extensive partnership rights to same-sex couples, an indicator 
variable for states with state-wide bans on same-sex marriage, and a standardised variable 
representing the size of the lesbian population as a percentage of the female adult population 
within each state. 
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Considering each of the four proxies in turn, we estimate regressions in which the 
proxy and its interaction with the lesbian indicator are added to a base model controlling for 
work and personal characteristics, region of residency, and occupation and industry. The 
sequential addition of state-level controls and their interactions with the lesbian indicator then 
enables an assessment of the proxy-effect when controlling for, or alternatively not controlling 
for, various other state-level factors. We also run a number of robustness checks, including 
alternative dependent variable and model specifications, use of multilevel estimation, and 
restricting the sample to full-time employed and white women. For purposes of evaluating 
proxy validity, we present an age-stratified analysis and assess the proxy's effect on the gay-
male penalty.  
Estimates from the Mandated Coverage proxy generally suggest an increase in the 
lesbian premium in states mandating insurance coverage of infertility treatment, as we would 
expect based on the maternity-risk hypothesis. This finding is relatively robust to choice of 
dependent variable and the inclusion of additional controls. Moreover, state ideology, the 
percentage of GSP from manufacturing and the presence of an ENDA covering sexual 
orientation have the expected effect on income and the lesbian pay gap, implying the model is 
not grossly misspecified. The gay-male comparison, however, casts doubt on the causal 
relationship between mandated insurance coverage for infertility treatment, maternity risk, 
and earnings, as the gay-male disadvantage is significantly reduced in states with such laws in 
effect. Lacking an accurate method to assess the effect of the proxy on the fertility gap, we 
deem the results from this proxy inconclusive. 
Analogous estimates for the Legal Partnership proxy provide significant evidence in 
favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis. Holding other state-level factors at their respective 
means, the majority of results suggest that the lesbian premium is at least twenty-five percent 
lower in states granting partnership rights to same-sex couples. This result also appears to be 
robust to several model formulations and the use of alternative estimation techniques. 
Importantly, the results from the male sample reveal the gay-male pay gap is largely 
unaffected by same-sex partnership laws, suggesting that Legal Partnership captures the 
effect on the lesbian premium due to marginal changes in maternity risk. The age-stratified 
analysis, however, provides mixed evidence across samples regarding proxy validity. 
The results from Marriage Bans offer further evidence that differences in maternity 
risk partially explain the observed lesbian pay gap. Although the estimates vary across 
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samples and comparison groups, the coefficient on the lesbian-proxy interaction term is 
positive in the majority of regressions, with no estimate being statistically significant and of 
the incorrect sign. Results from the age-stratified analysis are also broadly consistent with 
prior expectations. Moreover, differencing the male and female coefficients produces positive 
and relatively stable estimates across all comparative analyses. Considering the results as a 
whole suggests that bans on same-sex marriage contribute significantly to the lesbian 
premium, consistent with the maternity-risk hypothesis. 
Finally, we argue that a higher probability of partnership, greater social acceptance 
towards lesbian child-bearing, and the presence of support networks result in a causal link 
between higher lesbian prevalence and enhanced perceived maternity risk. Use of the Same-
Sex Percentage proxy suggests the lesbian premium is negatively affected by greater lesbian 
prevalence, consistent with this theory. Moreover, results from age-stratified analyses and the 
gay-male comparison suggest that discrimination or compensation effects associated with 
residential choice are unlikely to be driving this result. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the 
estimates suggests that variation in the proxy can more than eliminate the lesbian premium 
when evaluated at the means of other state-level variables. This result cannot be entirely 
attributed to maternity-risk effects. We therefore take the estimates as providing tentative 
evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis. Further research on the effect of lesbian 
prevalence on earnings is required to disentangle the maternity-risk effect from unobserved, 
reinforcing factors.  
Overall, the indirect tests of the maternity-risk hypothesis further support the findings 
from the direct analysis: maternity risk appears to negatively affect income, thereby 
significantly contributing to the observed lesbian premium. Although there is considerable 
uncertainty surrounding the estimates, taking the results at face value suggests that longer-
term maternity-risk effects may conservatively account for more than twenty-five percent of 
the remaining lesbian premium over otherwise-similar heterosexual women. These results 
should be interpreted with caution due to cross-sample inconsistency and our inability to 
directly assess proxy validity.  
6.2. Implications for the Male-Female Pay Gap 
Given the importance of maternity risk in determining earnings and thus the lesbian premium, 
the analysis presented in this study may suggest a hitherto unexplored explanation of the 
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gender pay gap. Specifically, if differential labour-market treatment occurs on the basis of 
perceived labour-force attachment, then we should expect not only a lesbian premium, but 
also a general female earnings disadvantage. As such, controlling for differential maternity 
risk may reduce the estimated male-female earnings disparity.  
To assess this possibility, we estimate comparative earnings regressions analogous to 
Model (A3) from Chapter 4, comparing the earnings of males and females. In particular, the 
specification controls for work and personal characteristics, region of residency, occupation 
and industry. Whereas the prior analysis included a sexual-orientation dummy and its 
interaction with potential experience and its square, the current analysis replaces all sexual-
orientation terms with a female indicator to examine differences in income by gender. In order 
to minimise unobservable heterogeneity and allow for a marriage premium,102 we run separate 
regressions for cohabiting heterosexuals and married heterosexuals.103 The model is estimated 
both prior to and following the inclusion of Maternity Risk, to enable an assessment of the 
change in the female earnings penalty. 
It is important to note that the analysis in this section is subject to greater uncertainty 
than the direct analysis of the sexual-orientation pay gap due to substantial cross-gender 
heterogeneity. Moreover, the change in the earnings gap is again dependent on the centring of 
the potential experience interaction terms and the extent to which bias in the potential 
experience coefficients implicitly accounts for the effects of maternity risk. Care should 
therefore be taken when interpreting the results and their inclusion serves only to provide 
tentative evidence of a potential source of the male-female earnings gap. 
Table A.33 displays the results from comparing the earnings of cohabiting 
heterosexual males and females. In the 2000 Census sample, the female disadvantage is 
estimated to be 17.88 percent prior to controlling for maternity risk. Including Maternity Risk 
reduces this penalty to 13.85 percent, representing a decrease of approximately twenty-three 
percent. Similar estimates from the ACS samples display a reduction in the female earnings 
penalty of roughly nineteen to twenty-five percent. On this basis, controlling for maternity 
risk appears to significantly reduce the male-female earnings disparity, as hypothesised.  
102 Plug and Berkhout (2004) also note the importance of controlling for sexual orientation and marital status in 
male-female analyses. However, we argue that including dummy variables for sexual orientation and marital 
status imposes unnecessary restrictions on the coefficient estimates, which may bias the results. 
103 A comparison between gay males and lesbians reveals similar results, although the base pay gap is much 
smaller. These results are omitted as the included sub-groups predominantly determine the overall gender pay 
gap. 
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Results from the gender comparison among married heterosexuals (Table A.34) 
suggest that controlling for maternity risk has a much smaller effect on the gender pay gap, 
reducing the female disadvantage from 28.11 percent to 25.49 percent in the 2000 Census 
sample. Analogous estimates from the ACS sample display a reduction in the female 
disadvantage of 2.45 and 3.61 percent. This represents less than a one percentage point 
change in both cases. As maternity risk is predicted to significantly decrease earnings in each 
sample, bias in the potential experience coefficients likely inhibits an accurate analysis of the 
true maternity-risk effect. Examining the potential experience interaction terms in both 
comparisons reveals substantial volatility across specifications. Moreover, particularly in the 
married heterosexuals comparison, explanatory power is only marginally improved upon the 
inclusion of Maternity Risk. In conjunction with the coefficient estimate being highly 
statistically significant, this suggests strong confounding with potential experience. 
These findings suggest that the inability to adequately control for maternity risk in 
earnings regressions likely results in upward bias in the adjusted gender pay gap. Moreover, 
the recurring finding of an adverse maternity-risk earnings effect may be of importance to 
maternity-leave policy considerations. Specifically, if policymakers can ease the maternity-
leave burden borne by employers, employment and promotion prospects among female 
workers will likely improve, enhancing labour-market equality.     
6.3. Improvements and Ideas for Future Research 
Although every attempt has been made to ensure the validity and applicability of the findings, 
future research may facilitate more accurate inference by addressing some of the deficiencies 
of this study. Alternative datasets with information on actual work experience, for example, 
could significantly reduce problems associated with human capital accumulation in direct 
tests of the maternity-risk hypothesis, by reducing unobservable heterogeneity. Moreover, 
greater returns to actual experience for lesbians would provide evidence of discriminatory 
promotion practices on the basis of perceived maternity risk, a theory that is not testable with 
the current data. Obtaining information on job tenure may also be of importance to the extent 
that employer learning enables a more accurate assessment of partnership status and sexual 
orientation, and thus maternity risk. Incorporating these factors into the direct analysis would 
represent a significant improvement on the current methodology. 
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Another potential improvement on the current analysis may entail a direct assessment 
of prior maternity-risk effects. Specifically, if differences in unobservable human capital and 
previous effects of maternity risk can be disentangled (perhaps by examining the difference 
between the lifetime likelihood and forward-looking expectations of maternity leave), we 
would have an additional method through which to assess the maternity-risk hypothesis. The 
ability to explicitly account for prior maternity effects may also enable the maternity-risk 
allocation process to be disaggregated across a number of additional variables. This would 
also eliminate the bias in potential experience and maternity risk that lack of such controls 
generates. Allocating maternity risk differentially by number of pre-existing children or years 
since last child may capture differences in family-formation completion, while disaggregation 
by educational attainment could capture delays in child-bearing associated with higher 
educational attainment.
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 Data limitations, such as the inability to accurately estimate
lifetime maternity incidence, unfortunately preclude such an analysis with the current data. 
We therefore acknowledge that the current method is limited, but provides useful insight into 
the potential labour-market effects of maternity risk.    
With respect to indirect tests of the maternity-risk hypothesis, several potential 
improvements are apparent. First, the U.S. GSS contains questions on tolerance and attitudes 
towards homosexual individuals. Access to confidential GSS files would therefore enable the 
construction of time-varying measures of state-level hostility towards gays. These could then 
be included in our analysis to further isolate the effect of maternity risk on the lesbian pay 
gap. This is particularly important, for example, in isolating the causal maternity-risk effect 
when using the Same-Sex Percentage proxy. Second, one major concern regarding the current 
proxies is that we cannot readily assess their validity in capturing differential maternity risk. 
Despite having strong prior expectations as to the direction of the proxies' affect on future 
maternity incidence, many of the laws underlying the proxies have only recently been 
implemented. It is thus likely that insufficient time has passed for their full fertility and 
earnings effects to transpire. Similarly to Gates (2009), an extension to the analysis could 
examine whether time since implementation of relevant state laws is an important factor in 
determining the magnitude of the proxy-interaction effect.
105
 If a longer period since
104
 Due to sample-size considerations, such an allocation process would require a probit model (or similar) to be 
estimated, to predict fertility based on age and additional factors. 
105
 As previously noted, several difficulties prevent us from directly assessing proxy validity. An extension to the 
analysis could therefore focus on using alternative methods to directly assess the proxies' effects on the lesbian-
heterosexual maternity gap.  
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implementation is associated with greater confidence that the law will not be over-turned, and 
a correspondingly larger pass-through to maternity incidence, then one would expect to 
observe smaller effects among states that have recently passed such laws. This hypothesis is 
not examined herein as developments in U.S. legislation regarding the rights of same-sex 
couples is a recent phenomenon, thus precluding a more thorough analysis of the maternity-
risk effect on the lesbian premium. 
As discussed, the use of several proxies can moderate validity concerns associated 
with any particular proxy.106 Consideration should therefore be given to alternative proxies 
which may capture cross-state differences in the sexual-orientation maternity-risk differential. 
One potentially viable proxy could be based on whether or not state law permits same-sex 
couples to jointly petition to adopt a child. Although individual homosexuals may petition to 
adopt in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, joint adoption provides both partners 
with similar rights and is therefore likely to significantly affect adoption by same-sex couples. 
Given that adoption, especially of young children, may entail time out of the workforce, 
same-sex adoption laws can be used to assess the maternity-risk hypothesis. We do not 
attempt such an analysis due to inconsistencies across sources regarding state-level adoption 
laws. 
Two final proposed proxies, average state-level childcare costs and state extensions to 
federal maternity-benefit requirements, can be applied in both the lesbian-heterosexual 
women context and in male-female comparisons. In states with higher average childcare 
costs, new mothers are more likely to postpone returning to the workforce as the opportunity 
cost of doing so is greater. In such states, maternity leave is likely to be more costly for 
employers, resulting in a stronger aversion to maternity risk and a commensurately higher 
lesbian (or male) earnings premium.107 Some states, such as California, have also enacted 
laws which confer greater maternity benefits on women. Benefits include paid maternity 
leave, additional breaks, and flexible use of sick leave. Holding other factors constant, the 
sexual-orientation and gender pay gaps should therefore be higher in these states. Despite the 
availability of current information on childcare costs and maternity benefits at the state-level, 
106 For example, the analysis in Section 5 suggests that Mandated Coverage may not be an appropriate proxy, 
while the estimated effect of Same-Sex Percentage appears to be augmented by unobserved factors. 
107 Higher childcare costs may also reduce maternity incidence, resulting in the reverse effect. Further research 
into the relative magnitude of these effects would be required prior to using average childcare costs as a proxy. 
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time-series measures spanning the length of the three samples are extremely difficult to 
obtain. As such, an analysis using these proxies is left for future research. 
Future research may also focus on the effects of maternity risk on other labour-market 
outcomes, particularly employment and promotion. Results from the Heckman selection-
correction models estimated in Sections 4 and 5 provide evidence that maternity risk 
adversely affects employment outcomes. Data limitations, however, preclude an assessment 
of whether the results represent discriminatory hiring practices or if differential employment 
rates reflect women voluntarily exiting the labour force due to family-formation 
considerations. Similarly to Frank (2006), use of an alternative dataset may allow us to 
examine the effect of maternity risk on occupational rank. Finally, it is possible to directly 
detect hiring discrimination by conducting an audit study similar to Baert (2013), as opposed 
to using regression analysis. A detailed discussion of the method is outside the scope of this 
paper, but future research could extend Baert's method by obtaining informal wage offers as 
in Drydakis (2011). This would provide information on both hiring and wage discrimination. 
Such an analysis would offer immediate evidence regarding the validity of the maternity-risk 
hypothesis and could largely avoid the difficulties encountered in our analysis. 
6.4. Conclusion 
Prior research from the U.S. and abroad reveals a sizable lesbian earnings advantage over 
otherwise-similar heterosexual women. Using data from the 2000 U.S. Census and 2005-2010 
American Community Surveys, we estimate traditional earnings equations and find robust 
evidence of a lesbian premium, corroborating the findings of previous studies. We then 
examine the earnings effect of maternity risk to determine whether the perceived likelihood of 
an employee requiring maternity leave contributes to the observed lesbian premium. The 
results from numerous direct tests provide considerable evidence that maternity risk 
negatively affects income. As lesbians exhibit a comparatively smaller degree of maternity 
risk than their cohabiting and married heterosexual counterparts, our findings indicate that 
part of the observed premium can be attributed to differences in maternity risk. Although bias 
in the estimated effect of potential experience and differences in unobservable human capital 
accumulation prohibit a conclusive assessment, our estimates imply that controlling for near-
term maternity risk reduces the lesbian premium by approximately ten to fifteen percent. 
Further evidence from indirect analyses using several proxy variables suggests that 
cumulative maternity-risk effects may conservatively explain over twenty-five percent of the 
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lesbian pay gap. As such, the persistent finding of a lesbian premium in previous studies can 
be attributed, at least in part, to employers' aversion to maternity risk and its associated costs. 
These findings are also of critical importance to the general labour-market 
discrimination literature. Given the adverse earnings effect of maternity risk, our analysis 
suggests that estimates of the well-established gender earnings disparity are likely to be 
considerably smaller when incorporating maternity risk into the analysis. Absent the ability to 
adequately control for maternity risk, strict attention should be paid to potential upward bias 
in estimated earnings differentials. Moreover, policymakers should consider the broader 
implications of maternity-leave policy on the labour-market outcomes of females. In this 
respect, maternity-leave policy will likely influence the hiring and promotion decisions of 
employers, thereby indirectly affecting sexual-orientation and gender equality in the labour 
market. However, further research in this area is still required, given the limitations inherent 
in the direct and indirect analyses. We hope this study will serve to provide the necessary 
impetus for further empirical work on the maternity-risk hypothesis and its consequential 
effect on labour-market inequality. 
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Appendix A: Key Tables 
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Table A.1. Summary of previous studies examining the earnings differential between lesbians and heterosexual women 
Study 
Data sources1 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation 
definition 
Estimation technique
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
        Ahmed, 
Andersson & 
Hammarstedt 
(2013b) 
2007 LISA 
(Sweden) 
604,242 
females 
(1,067 
lesbians) 
Individuals living 
in a civil union are 
classified as 
lesbians  
OLS and quantile regressions 
with a lesbian indicator 
dummy. Separate analyses for 
private and public sector, as 
well as for childless 
individuals. 
Log(annual 
earnings) and 
Log(full-time 
monthly 
earnings) 
No and yes, 
respectively 
4% lower to 3% higher than married 
heterosexual women, based on OLS and full-
time monthly earnings (mostly significant).2 
Full results also show that the lesbian 
premium is larger when comparing annual 
earnings, as well as in the public sector and at 
the upper end of the earnings distribution. 
        Ahmed & 
Hammarstedt 
(2010) 
2003 LOUISE 
(Sweden) 
2,015 
females (925 
lesbians) 
Individuals living 
in a civil union are 
classified as 
lesbians  
OLS and quantile regressions 
with a lesbian indicator 
dummy. Separate analyses for 
metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas. 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 20% lower (significant) to 8% higher than 
married heterosexual women (based on OLS - 
quantile regression estimates are similar but 
more varied). Larger lesbian penalties are 
observed in non-metropolitan areas and at the 
lower end of the income distribution. 
        Antecol, Jong 
& Steinberger 
(2008) 
2000 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
763,977 
females 
(6,205 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and DiNardo-Fortin-
Lemieux decomposition. 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 4% higher than cohabiting heterosexuals but 
no difference relative to married women, 
based on Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. 1% 
lower to 8% higher than partnered women, 
based on DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 
decomposition (at the upper and lower ends 
of the wage spectrum, respectively). 
        Arabsheibani, 
Marin & 
Wadsworth 
(2004) 
1996 Q1-2001 
Q4 LFS (UK) 
176,586 
females (297 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner if currently 
not married 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy. Separate analyses for 
London and elsewhere (by 
region), as well as by broad 
age groupings. 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 10% to 13% higher than single women and 
3% to 21% higher than partnered women 
(mostly significant). Larger premiums evident 
for older lesbians and those not living in 
London. 
        Arabsheibani, 
Marin & 
Wadsworth 
(2005) 
1996 Q1-2002 
Q4 LFS (UK) 
204,738 
females (359 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner if currently 
not married 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
with a lesbian indicator 
dummy. 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 8% higher than coupled heterosexual women 
and 9% higher than all heterosexuals (both 
highly significant). 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data sources 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation
definition 
Estimation technique 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
        Arabsheibani, 
Marin & 
Wadsworth 
(2007) 
2000 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
1,668,814 
females 
(≈21,000 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy. Separate analyses by 
level of education, job sector, 
region, age, and employment 
status. 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 3% to 12% higher than partnered women (all 
highly significant). Lesbian advantage is 
larger for older women, those employed full-
time or in the private sector, and among 
women with less education. 
       1996 Q1-2004 
Q4 LFS (UK) 
185,266 
females (527 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner if currently 
not married 
As above. Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 2% lower to 12% higher (larger premiums are 
significant). Similar pattern to the U.S., 
except the premium is greater amongst part-
time employed and in the UK public sector. 
        Badgett 
(1995) 
1989-1991 
GSS (U.S.) 
732 females 
(34 lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
At least as many 
same-sex partners 
as opposite-sex 
partners since the 
age of 18 
OLS and Heckman two-step 
procedure with lesbian 
indicator dummy and 
experience × lesbian 
interaction (imputes income 
using within occupation 
medians from CPS).  
Log(annual 
income) 
No 11% to 30% lower than unmarried 
heterosexual women and 24% lower to 15% 
higher than married women (all insignificant 
and not evaluated at the mean of potential 
experience). Estimates would be less 
negative/more positive if accounting for the 
interaction term (see Badgett (2006)).3 
        Badgett 
(2001) 
1989-1994 
GSS and 1992 
NHSLS (U.S.) 
1,988 
females (53 
lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
At least as many 
same-sex partners 
as opposite-sex 
partners since the 
age of 18 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy, using mid-points of 
income categories. 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 3% to 11% higher than currently or 
previously married heterosexuals, and 2% to 
10% higher than those who have never 
married (all insignificant). 
                Baumle 
&Poston 
(2011) 
2000 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
1,645,998 
females 
(21,797 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy, as well as HLM with 
a lesbian indicator dummy and 
its interaction with state-level 
variables (compares this to 
multilevel OLS). 
Log(annual 
income) 
Yes 4% higher than married women, based on 
OLS or HLM (holding the proportion of 
same-sex couples at zero; the premium falls 
slightly as this proportion rises). Similarly, 
8% to 9% higher than cohabiting heterosexual 
women (all results highly significant). 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data sources 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation
definition 
Estimation technique 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
        Berg & Lien 
(2002) 
1991-1996 
GSS (U.S.) 
1,310 
females (52 
lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
At least one same-
sex partner within 
the last 5 years 
Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation with a lesbian 
indicator dummy (similar to 
ordered probit but does not 
require estimation of income 
bracket thresholds. Similar 
results obtained using the 
equivalent of ordered logit). 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 13% to 47% higher than heterosexual women 
(based on the confidence interval surrounding 
the point estimate of 30%). 
        Black, Makar, 
Sanders & 
Taylor (2003) 
1989-1996 
GSS (U.S.) 
2,246 
females (53 
lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
At least as many 
same-sex partners 
as opposite-sex 
partners since the 
age of 18 
Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (interval 
regressions) with a lesbian 
indicator dummy (report that 
OLS produces similar results). 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 6% and 9% higher than unmarried and 
married heterosexual women, respectively 
(insignificant). 
      2,193 
females (49 
lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
At least one same-
sex partner within 
the last year 
As above. Log(annual 
income) 
No Similarly, 22% to 25% higher and 26% to 
28% higher than unmarried and married 
heterosexual women, respectively 
(significant). 
      1,723 
females (54 
lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
At least one same-
sex partner within 
the last 5 years 
As above. Log(annual 
income) 
No 27% to 40% higher compared to both 
unmarried and married heterosexual women 
(significant). 
        Blandford 
(2003) 
1989-1996 
GSS (U.S.)4 
2,064 
females (<51 
open 
lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
At least one same-
sex partner in last 
year (five years if 
no partners in last 
year) and not 
currently married. 
OLS and Heckman two-step 
procedure with a lesbian 
indicator dummy (imputes 
income within categorical 
ranges using median annual 
earnings for each race-gender 
sub-group from CPS). 
Separate analysis for women 
without children. 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 15% to 30% higher than unmarried 
heterosexual women and 17% to 38% higher 
than married heterosexual women (mostly 
significant). 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data sources 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation
definition 
Estimation technique 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
               Carpenter 
(2005) 
2001 CHIS 
(U.S.) 
8,912 
females (179 
lesbians) 
Self-reported 
sexual orientation 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy (reports that including 
a Heckman selection 
correction term does not alter 
the results). Also presents 
separate analyses by age. 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 6% lower to 4% higher than partnered 
heterosexual women, based on several 
specifications (never significant). 3% higher 
and 4% lower for women 35 and under, and 
over 35, respectively (insignificant). 
       1988-2000 
GSS (U.S.) 
2,855 
females (49 
lesbians) 
Exclusively same-
sex partners within 
the last 5 years 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy (imputes income 
based on categorical range 
mid-points). 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 21% to 31% higher than unmarried 
heterosexual women (depending on the period 
analysed, mostly significant).  
                Carpenter 
(2008a) 
2003-2005 
CCHS 
(Canada) 
75,457 
females (657 
lesbians) 
Self-reported 
sexual orientation 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy (quantile regressions 
also estimated but not 
reported). Separate analyses 
for partnered and non-
partnered individuals. 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 16% to 17% higher among all women and 
43% higher among partnered women (all 
highly significant), but only 1% higher when 
restricted to non-partnered women (not 
significant). 
                Carpenter 
(2008b) 
2000 ALSWH 
(Australia) 
7,143 
females (69 
lesbians) 
Self-reported 
sexual orientation 
Interval regression with a 
lesbian indicator dummy 
(similar results obtained with 
ordered logit, not reported).  
Log(weekly 
income) 
Yes 24% to 31% lower than heterosexual women 
(all significant), based on several different 
model specifications. 
                Clain & 
Leppel (2001) 
1990 Census 
1/1000 PUMS 
(U.S.) 
26,028 
female (58 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
Heckman two-step procedure 
with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and its interaction 
with various other controls 
(based on specification search 
procedure revolving around 
statistical significance). 
Log(annual 
income) 
No No premium over coupled females unless 
living in the Midwest or with dependents (in 
which case premium is at least 39%). 3% 
lower to more than 100% higher than women 
not cohabiting with a partner, depending on 
age, geographic location and presence of 
dependents. 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data sources 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation
definition 
Estimation technique 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
                Cushing-
Daniels & 
Yeung (2009) 
1988-2006 
GSS (U.S.) 
4,795 
females (109 
lesbians) 
Exclusively same-
sex partners in the 
previous year 
OLS and Heckman FIML 
procedure with a lesbian 
indicator dummy (imputes 
income based on categorical 
range mid-points). 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 12% and 9% higher than married and 
unmarried heterosexual women, respectively, 
based on OLS. Similarly, 13% lower and 7% 
higher, using Heckman FIML procedure (all 
insignificant and based on the entire sample 
period). 
      4,109 
females 
(unknown 
no. of 
lesbians) 
Exclusively same-
sex partners in the 
previous 5 years 
As above. Log(annual 
income) 
No 11% and 10% higher than married and 
unmarried heterosexual women, respectively 
(OLS). Similarly, 14% lower and 5% higher 
(Heckman) (all insignificant). 
        Daneshvary, 
Waddoups & 
Wimmer 
(2008) 
2000 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
98,683 
females 
(6,777 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and its interaction 
with education, experience, 
and experience squared. Also 
estimates Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions and includes 
separate analyses by years of 
education. 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 5% to 6% higher than other women (full 
sample), 8% to 10% higher than women with 
less than 16 years of education, and 2% 
higher than other women with 16 or more 
years of education (all significant, using 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition). Full results 
show an earnings disadvantage at low levels 
of experience and high levels of education 
and vice versa. 
        Daneshvary, 
Waddoups & 
Wimmer 
(2009) 
2000 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
178,794 
females 
(6,785 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and its interaction 
with prior marital status. Also 
estimates Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions, separate 
analyses by previous marital 
history and estimates a Tobit 
earnings model. 
Log(hourly 
wages) and 
Log(annual 
income) 
Yes 3% to 4% higher, and 2% greater, than 
cohabiting heterosexual women and single 
women, respectively (comparing previously 
married women). Respective lesbian earnings 
premiums among never-married women are 
4% to 7%, and 8%. Relative to married 
women, never-married lesbians receive a 5% 
premium, but their previously married 
counterparts obtain no significant premium 
(all other cases are significant). 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data sources 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation
definition 
Estimation technique 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
        Elmslie & 
Tebaldi 
(2007) 
2004 CPS 
(U.S.) 
28,626 
females 
(<678 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner if both are 
at least 25 years of 
age 
Heckman two-step procedure 
with a lesbian indicator 
dummy. Also includes 
interaction terms between 
sexual orientation with other 
controls, including (but not 
limited to) race and 
occupation. 
Log(hourly 
wages) and 
Log(annual 
income)5 
Yes and no, 
respectively 
3% lower to 4% higher than married 
heterosexual women and 2% to 8% higher 
(significant) than cohabiting heterosexual 
women, based on hourly wages (ignoring 
interaction terms). Regressions based on 
annual income find a premium of between 1% 
and 19%. 
        Frank (2006) 2000-2001 
AUT survey of 
employees at 
six UK 
universities 
404 females 
(49 lesbians/ 
bisexuals) 
Self-reported 
sexual orientation 
OLS on data for both genders, 
including female and female-
LGB dummy variables. 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 8% higher than heterosexual women among 
all staff and 5% to 17% higher among 
academics (all insignificant except 17% 
premium). Lower earnings gaps are observed 
when controlling for occupational rank. 
        Gates (2009) 2000 Census 
1% & 5% 
PUMS (U.S.) 
331,026 
females 
(unknown 
no. of 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and its interaction 
with state-level anti-
discrimination laws. 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 3% to 6% higher than other women in states 
without sexual-orientation anti-discrimination 
laws. Similarly, 4% to 8% higher in states 
with such laws (all highly significant).  
        Heineck 
(2009) 
1994 ISSP 
Data (U.S., 
Australia, 
Ireland, 
Poland and 
Bulgaria) 
2,220 
females (32 
lesbians) 
Exclusively same-
sex partners in the 
previous 5 years 
Heckman two-step procedure 
and Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition with a lesbian 
indicator dummy (although 
decomposition not reported for 
lesbians). 
Log(monthly 
income) 
No 11% higher than heterosexual women (but 
insignificant) in both the gender-pooled and 
women-only specifications. 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data sources 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation
definition 
Estimation technique 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
        Jepsen (2007) 2000 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
113,772 
females 
(14,528 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and its interaction 
with various controls in 
different specifications (e.g. 
education and experience). 
Log(annual 
income) 
No6 9% to 14% higher than married heterosexual 
women and 10% to 17% higher than 
cohabiting heterosexual women (all highly 
significant) based on specifications with no 
sexual-orientation interaction terms 
(interaction-term coefficients are not reported 
and hence the premium cannot be evaluated at 
the means). 
        Klawitter 
(2011) 
2000 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
33,077 
females 
(6,356 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
HLM and quantile regression 
with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and its interaction 
with state and local level 
variables, including presence 
of an anti-discrimination law. 
Separate analyses by sector, 
race and householder status. 
Log(annual 
income) and 
Log(hourly 
wages) 
No and yes, 
respectively 
3% and 7% higher (significant) than married 
and cohabiting heterosexual women, 
respectively, based on hourly earnings. 
Estimates based on annual income suggest an 
earnings advantage of at least 16% and 9% 
(and up to 88%) relative to married and 
cohabiting heterosexual women, respectively 
(except in the Government sector and for 
African Americans). 
        Klawitter & 
Flatt (1998) 
1990 Census 
5% PUMS 
(U.S.) 
17,491 
females 
(3,493 
lesbians) 
Sex of unmarried 
partner or spouse  
as indicated on the 
housing record 
OLS with a lesbian indicator 
dummy and its interaction 
with various anti-
discrimination and control 
dummies. 
Log(annual 
income) 
No 3% to 16% higher than cohabiting 
heterosexual women and 11% to 23% higher 
than married heterosexual women (mostly 
significant, depending on presence and type 
of anti-discrimination policies). These 
differences disappear when restricting the 
analysis to full-time, full-year workers. 
        Laurent & 
Mihoubi 
(2012) 
1996-2007 
Employment 
Survey 
(France) 
116,202 
females (327 
lesbians) 
Same-sex 
cohabiting 
"friends" with 
numerous 
restrictions 
OLS and Heckman two-step 
procedure with a lesbian 
indicator dummy. Separate 
analyses for private and public 
sector.7 
Log(monthly 
income) 
Yes 0% to 2% higher than unmarried heterosexual 
women (mostly insignificant). 1% to 4% 
higher than married heterosexual women 
(mostly significant). Lesbian advantage is 
greatest in the private sector. 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data sources 
(country) 
Sample size 
Sexual orientation
definition 
Estimation technique 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hours/weeks 
controls? 
Findings: earnings of lesbians relative to 
heterosexual women 
        Plug & 
Berkhout 
(2004) 
1998-2000 
Survey of 
Dutch 
Graduates 
(Netherlands) 
6,437 
females (198 
lesbians) 
Identified based on 
expressed sexual 
preferences 
OLS on data for both genders, 
including female and female-
lesbian dummy variables. 
Log(monthly 
income) and 
log(hourly 
wages) 
Yes 1% to 4% higher than heterosexual women 
(across sixteen different specifications, some 
significant). 
                Notes: 1 Sample sizes listed represent the number of females used in the main regression analysis. Where these are unavailable, sample sizes provided refer to the total number of women 
included in summary statistics tables. 
2 The discussion of significance throughout the table refers to statistical significance. 
3 Results vary only slightly when using alternative definitions. 
4 Blandford also uses 1992 NHSLS data to justify his choice of sexual orientation definition. 
5 Also estimates log(hourly compensation) regressions, the results for which are highly similar to those using log(hourly wages). 
6 Replicating the analysis with log(hourly wages) as the dependent variable did not substantially alter the results (not reported). 
7 For males, further analyses by skill-level, age and time of service are included, as well as a Blinder-Oaxaca type decomposition. 
Sources: See table. 
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Table A.2. Female sample size at each stage of the sequential restriction process 
Stage of the restriction process1 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2000 Census 
  Lesbians 32,756 32,756 29,893 28,454 14,298 12,204 
  Cohabiting heterosexuals 220,847 220,847 215,230 209,312 201,399 163,834 
  Married heterosexuals 2,821,706 423,256 365,190 355,720 355,720 243,299 
  No co-residential relationship 4,136,401 620,460 243,775 241,046 239,566 178,276 
 2005-2007 ACS 
        Lesbians 24,346 24,346 21,844 21,631 12,234 10,302 
  Cohabiting heterosexuals 142,523 142,523 137,064 136,010 134,771 107,599 
  Married heterosexuals 1,868,847 280,328 237,956 236,824 236,824 161,515 
  No co-residential relationship 2,520,799 378,119 157,180 156,502 155,589 116,422 
 2008-2010 ACS 
        Lesbians 20,296 20,296 17,620 17,196 12,674 10,653 
  Cohabiting heterosexuals 162,302 162,302 155,557 153,261 149,635 116,650 
  Married heterosexuals 1,871,770 280,765 234,861 233,279 232,950 158,587 
  No co-residential relationship 2,622,410 393,361 165,972 165,041 161,839 117,271 
        Notes: 1 (1) = All individuals, (2) = (1) + Random sampling, (3) = (2) + Age and GQ restrictions, (4) = (3) + Relationship, 
age and sex allocation restrictions, (5) = (4) + Marital status allocation restriction, (6) = (5) + Labour-force restrictions. 
Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Lesbian 0.3006*** 0.2541*** 0.0788*** 0.0637*** 0.0590*** 0.0540***
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0062) 
Potential experience 0.0283*** 0.0329*** 0.0329*** 0.0348*** 0.0320***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Potential experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Hispanic -0.0327*** 0.0363*** -0.0053 0.0021 -0.0049 
(0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0067) 
Black -0.0727*** -0.0017 -0.0134** -0.0003 0.0014 
(0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0053) 
Asian 0.2418*** 0.1373*** 0.0923*** 0.0929*** 0.0868***
(0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0113) 
Other race -0.0893*** -0.0311*** -0.0337*** -0.0251*** -0.0263***
(0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0079) 
Mixed race -0.0319*** -0.0171 -0.0372*** -0.0335*** -0.0262***
(0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0101) 
Speaks English 0.2555*** 0.1348*** 0.1394*** 0.1353*** 0.1189***
(0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0123) 
U.S. citizen 0.0210** 0.0305*** 0.0561*** 0.0555*** 0.0420***
(0.0097) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0088) 
Disabled -0.1320*** -0.0700*** -0.0695*** -0.0684*** -0.0575***
(0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
High school 0.1911*** 0.1858*** 0.1799*** 0.1405***
(0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Some college 0.3469*** 0.3256*** 0.3161*** 0.2378***
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Associate's degree 0.4799*** 0.4551*** 0.4437*** 0.3282***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0070) 
Bachelor's degree 0.7414*** 0.6941*** 0.6765*** 0.5043***
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0069) 
Postgraduate 0.9109*** 0.8595*** 0.8425*** 0.6486***
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0090) 
Metro. residence 0.1824*** 0.1800*** 0.1611***
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) 
No. of children -0.0279*** -0.0260***
(0.0018) (0.0017) 
Work characteristic 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies - - - - - -
Region dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and 
industry controls
No No No No No Yes
Observations 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038
R2 0.5352 0.5530 0.6097 0.6175 0.6181 0.6363
Table A.3. Earnings comparison: lesbians and cohabiting heterosexuals (2000 Census)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Coefficients for work characteristics, and occupation and industry are 
omitted. ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The coefficient of interest is 
tested on a one-tailed basis. Source: 2000 Decennial Census PUMS. 
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(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Lesbian 0.1348*** 0.1393*** 0.0628*** 0.0273*** 0.0131** 0.0219***
(0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062) 
Potential experience 0.0238*** 0.0227*** 0.0218*** 0.0232*** 0.0207***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Potential experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Hispanic -0.0601*** 0.0215*** -0.0204*** -0.0165*** -0.0183***
(0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0061) 
Black 0.0029 0.0551*** 0.0374*** 0.0407*** 0.0466***
(0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0052) 
Asian 0.2033*** 0.1089*** 0.0477*** 0.0490*** 0.0585***
(0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0077) 
Other race -0.0788*** -0.0003 -0.0106 -0.0071 -0.0051 
(0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0077) 
Mixed race -0.0506*** -0.0156 -0.0423*** -0.0414*** -0.0286***
(0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0108) 
Speaks English 0.2841*** 0.1357*** 0.1502*** 0.1441*** 0.1254***
(0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0097) 
U.S. citizen 0.0914*** 0.0723*** 0.1019*** 0.1020*** 0.0801***
(0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0072) 
Disabled -0.1217*** -0.0496*** -0.0481*** -0.0485*** -0.0369***
(0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) 
High school 0.1487*** 0.1428*** 0.1374*** 0.0846***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
Some college 0.2969*** 0.2765*** 0.2700*** 0.1671***
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0058) 
Associate's degree 0.4438*** 0.4200*** 0.4135*** 0.2688***
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0067) 
Bachelor's degree 0.6558*** 0.6151*** 0.6063*** 0.4143***
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0065) 
Postgraduate 0.8775*** 0.8285*** 0.8181*** 0.6045***
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0074) 
Metro. residence 0.1848*** 0.1841*** 0.1691***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
No. of children -0.0198*** -0.0195***
(0.0014) (0.0014) 
Work characteristic 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies - - - - - -
Region dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and 
industry controls
No No No No No Yes
Observations 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503
R2 0.5343 0.5461 0.6015 0.6103 0.6106 0.6306
Table A.4. Earnings comparison: lesbians and married heterosexuals (2000 Census)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Coefficients for work characteristics, and occupation and industry are
omitted. ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The coefficient of interest is
tested on a one-tailed basis. Source: 2000 Decennial Census PUMS. 
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(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Lesbian 0.3396*** 0.2725*** 0.0856*** 0.0728*** 0.0706*** 0.0657***
(0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0070) 
Potential experience 0.0314*** 0.0381*** 0.0382*** 0.0391*** 0.0351***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Potential experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Hispanic -0.0398*** 0.0322*** -0.0124 -0.0085 -0.0157**
(0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0077) 
Black -0.1033*** -0.0301*** -0.0433*** -0.0384*** -0.0315***
(0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0072) 
Asian 0.2838*** 0.1724*** 0.1159*** 0.1162*** 0.1138***
(0.0141) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0127) 
Other race -0.0748*** -0.0096 -0.0216** -0.0188** -0.0200**
(0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0092) 
Mixed race -0.0161 0.0006 -0.0225 -0.0218 -0.0096 
(0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0138) 
Speaks English 0.3756*** 0.2145*** 0.2200*** 0.2180*** 0.1720***
(0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0138) 
U.S. citizen 0.0640*** 0.0532*** 0.0740*** 0.0731*** 0.0496***
(0.0114) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0102) 
Disabled -0.2306*** -0.1719*** -0.1636*** -0.1642*** -0.1499***
(0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0086) 
High school 0.2207*** 0.2135*** 0.2104*** 0.1626***
(0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0079) 
Some college 0.3774*** 0.3544*** 0.3499*** 0.2563***
(0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) 
Associate's degree 0.5392*** 0.5152*** 0.5098*** 0.3661***
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0097) 
Bachelor's degree 0.7912*** 0.7404*** 0.7319*** 0.5281***
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0094) 
Postgraduate 1.0097*** 0.9516*** 0.9432*** 0.7006***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0113) 
Metro. residence 0.1801*** 0.1788*** 0.1572***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0044) 
No. of children -0.0151*** -0.0157***
(0.0024) (0.0023) 
Work characteristic 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and 
industry controls
No No No No No Yes
Observations 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901
R2 0.5644 0.5864 0.6448 0.6523 0.6525 0.6734
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Coefficients for work characteristics, year dummies, and occupation and
industry are omitted. ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The coefficient of
interest is tested on a one-tailed basis. Sources: 2005-2007 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
Table A.5. Earnings comparison: lesbians and cohabiting heterosexuals (05-07 ACS)
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(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Lesbian 0.1267*** 0.1226*** 0.0601*** 0.0287*** 0.0212*** 0.0345***
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0070) 
Potential experience 0.0246*** 0.0243*** 0.0236*** 0.0243*** 0.0214***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Potential experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Hispanic -0.0762*** 0.0148* -0.0317*** -0.0296*** -0.0246***
(0.0081) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0075) 
Black -0.0479*** 0.0087 -0.0101 -0.0089 0.0030 
(0.0076) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0068) 
Asian 0.2244*** 0.1205*** 0.0544*** 0.0548*** 0.0657***
(0.0094) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0085) 
Other race -0.0903*** -0.0167* -0.0285*** -0.0273*** -0.0202**
(0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0093) 
Mixed race -0.0631*** -0.0405** -0.0603*** -0.0601*** -0.0549***
(0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0162) 
Speaks English 0.4060*** 0.2178*** 0.2334*** 0.2300*** 0.1776***
(0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0115) 
U.S. citizen 0.1177*** 0.0969*** 0.1171*** 0.1174*** 0.0834***
(0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0087) 
Disabled -0.1850*** -0.1220*** -0.1124*** -0.1133*** -0.0988***
(0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0075) 
High school 0.1558*** 0.1521*** 0.1489*** 0.0848***
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0081) 
Some college 0.3082*** 0.2900*** 0.2867*** 0.1656***
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
Associate's degree 0.4724*** 0.4541*** 0.4506*** 0.2783***
(0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0093) 
Bachelor's degree 0.6735*** 0.6340*** 0.6297*** 0.3996***
(0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0091) 
Postgraduate 0.9421*** 0.8956*** 0.8905*** 0.6269***
(0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0100) 
Metro. residence 0.1892*** 0.1890*** 0.1736***
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0036) 
No. of children -0.0114*** -0.0136***
(0.0019) (0.0019) 
Work characteristic 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and 
industry controls
No No No No No Yes
Observations 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817
R2 0.5439 0.5591 0.6170 0.6251 0.6252 0.6499
Table A.6. Earnings comparison: lesbians and married heterosexuals (05-07 ACS)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Coefficients for work characteristics, year dummies, and occupation and
industry are omitted. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The
coefficient of interest is tested on a one-tailed basis. Sources: 2005-2007 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
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(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Lesbian 0.3263*** 0.2566*** 0.0777*** 0.0672*** 0.0657*** 0.0623***
(0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
Potential experience 0.0301*** 0.0377*** 0.0377*** 0.0385*** 0.0344***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Potential experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Hispanic -0.0307*** 0.0464*** 0.0004 0.0034 -0.0049 
(0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0061) 
Black -0.1166*** -0.0450*** -0.0570*** -0.0532*** -0.0437***
(0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0064) 
Asian 0.2643*** 0.1534*** 0.0954*** 0.0956*** 0.0842***
(0.0126) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0111) 
Other race -0.0914*** -0.0291*** -0.0414*** -0.0394*** -0.0376***
(0.0089) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0083) 
Mixed race 0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0235** -0.0228* -0.0251** 
(0.0128) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0114) 
Speaks English 0.3608*** 0.1943*** 0.2015*** 0.1997*** 0.1641***
(0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0128) 
U.S. citizen 0.0683*** 0.0524*** 0.0715*** 0.0703*** 0.0474***
(0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0096) 
Disabled -0.2410*** -0.1767*** -0.1678*** -0.1683*** -0.1517***
(0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0088) 
High school 0.1965*** 0.1882*** 0.1854*** 0.1418***
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Some college 0.3315*** 0.3109*** 0.3073*** 0.2223***
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) 
Associate's degree 0.5100*** 0.4875*** 0.4831*** 0.3462***
(0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Bachelor's degree 0.7586*** 0.7080*** 0.7010*** 0.4946***
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0088) 
Postgraduate 1.0016*** 0.9424*** 0.9356*** 0.6882***
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0104) 
Metro. residence 0.1620*** 0.1609*** 0.1447***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
No. of children -0.0112*** -0.0126***
(0.0021) (0.0020) 
Work characteristic 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and 
industry controls
No No No No No Yes
Observations 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303
R2 0.5740 0.5963 0.6584 0.6659 0.6660 0.6868
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Coefficients for work characteristics, year dummies, and occupation and
industry are omitted. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The
coefficient of interest is tested on a one-tailed basis. Sources: 2008-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
Table A.7. Earnings comparison: lesbians and cohabiting heterosexuals (08-10 ACS)
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(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Lesbian 0.1002*** 0.0984*** 0.0518*** 0.0234*** 0.0225*** 0.0379***
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0066) 
Potential experience 0.0248*** 0.0242*** 0.0235*** 0.0236*** 0.0211***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Potential experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Hispanic -0.0737*** 0.0129** -0.0319*** -0.0317*** -0.0261***
(0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0063) 
Black -0.0719*** -0.0236*** -0.0383*** -0.0382*** -0.0221***
(0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
Asian 0.1958*** 0.1041*** 0.0402*** 0.0402*** 0.0504***
(0.0090) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0082) 
Other race -0.1114*** -0.0255*** -0.0391*** -0.0390*** -0.0322***
(0.0100) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0092) 
Mixed race -0.0456*** -0.0235 -0.0415*** -0.0415*** -0.0290** 
(0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0141) 
Speaks English 0.4268*** 0.2198*** 0.2369*** 0.2365*** 0.1685***
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0114) 
U.S. citizen 0.1042*** 0.0877*** 0.1046*** 0.1047*** 0.0777***
(0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0086) 
Disabled -0.1856*** -0.1251*** -0.1145*** -0.1146*** -0.0991***
(0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0082) 
High school 0.1522*** 0.1468*** 0.1462*** 0.0837***
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0082) 
Some college 0.2880*** 0.2711*** 0.2706*** 0.1529***
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
Associate's degree 0.4609*** 0.4438*** 0.4432*** 0.2677***
(0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0093) 
Bachelor's degree 0.6499*** 0.6129*** 0.6123*** 0.3772***
(0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0091) 
Postgraduate 0.9117*** 0.8640*** 0.8633*** 0.5917***
(0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0098) 
Metro. residence 0.1733*** 0.1733*** 0.1599***
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) 
No. of children -0.0014 -0.0050***
(0.0018) (0.0018) 
Work characteristic 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and 
industry controls
No No No No No Yes
Observations 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240
R2 0.5583 0.5737 0.6294 0.6373 0.6373 0.6634
Table A.8. Earnings comparison: lesbians and married heterosexuals (08-10 ACS)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Coefficients for work characteristics, year dummies, and occupation and
industry are omitted. ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The coefficient of
interest is tested on a one-tailed basis. Sources: 2008-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
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Table A.9. Sexual-orientation differences in wages
Panel A: Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) 
Lesbian 0.3319*** 0.2724*** 0.0848*** 0.0696*** 0.0645*** 0.0575*** 
2000 (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
Census Observations 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 
R
2
 0.0153 0.0645 0.1960 0.2135 0.2150 0.2523 
Lesbian 0.3859*** 0.3014*** 0.0965*** 0.0835*** 0.0811*** 0.0734*** 
2005-2007 (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0067) 
ACS Observations 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 
R
2
 0.0236 0.0887 0.2415 0.2595 0.2598 0.3094 
Panel B: Lesbians versus married heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) 
Lesbian 0.1588*** 0.1637*** 0.0769*** 0.0417*** 0.0297*** 0.0303*** 
2000 (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
Census Observations 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 
R
2
 0.0024 0.0319 0.1710 0.1911 0.1916 0.2357 
Lesbian 0.1616*** 0.1550*** 0.0808*** 0.0506*** 0.0439*** 0.0463*** 
2005-2007 (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0066) 
ACS Observations 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 
R
2
 0.0029 0.0418 0.1947 0.2134 0.2135 0.2705 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but only the coefficient on 
the lesbian indicator is reported. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a one-tailed test. The dependent 
variable in each model is the log of real wages. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2007 American Community 
Surveys PUMS. 
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Table A.10. Sexual-orientation differences in income among full-time employed women
Panel A: Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) 
Lesbian 0.3536*** 0.2958*** 0.1022*** 0.0858*** 0.0806*** 0.0763*** 
2000 (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
Census Observations 120,282 120,282 120,282 120,282 120,282 120,282 
R2 0.0250 0.0919 0.2790 0.3040 0.3062 0.3611 
Lesbian 0.3915*** 0.3161*** 0.1130*** 0.0998*** 0.0976*** 0.0940*** 
2005-2007 (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0066) 
ACS Observations 79,275 79,275 79,275 79,275 79,275 79,275 
R2 0.0347 0.1084 0.3109 0.3351 0.3356 0.3999 
Lesbian 0.3877*** 0.3097*** 0.1014*** 0.0884*** 0.0861*** 0.0838*** 
2008-2010 (0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
ACS Observations 87,502 87,502 87,502 87,502 87,502 87,502 
R2 0.0315 0.1028 0.3238 0.3481 0.3487 0.4102 
Panel B: Lesbians versus married heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) 
Lesbian 0.2063*** 0.2006*** 0.1084*** 0.0681*** 0.0576*** 0.0565*** 
2000 (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
Census Observations 163,946 163,946 163,946 163,946 163,946 163,946 
R2 0.0062 0.0543 0.2387 0.2707 0.2713 0.3290 
Lesbian 0.2013*** 0.1820*** 0.1022*** 0.0659*** 0.0652*** 0.0663*** 
2005-2007 (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
ACS Observations 110,803 110,803 110,803 110,803 110,803 110,803 
R2 0.0067 0.0635 0.2628 0.2933 0.2933 0.3637 
Lesbian 0.1701*** 0.1537*** 0.0905*** 0.0548*** 0.0577*** 0.0633*** 
2008-2010 (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0064) 
ACS Observations 114,293 114,293 114,293 114,293 114,293 114,293 
R2 0.0047 0.0625 0.2605 0.2892 0.2892 0.3591 
        Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but only the coefficient on 
the lesbian indicator is reported. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a one-tailed test. The dependent 
variable in each model is the log of real annual income and the sample is limited to those working at least 34 hours per week 
for a minimum of 40 weeks in the previous year.  Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community 
Surveys PUMS.  
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Table A.11. Heckman two-step estimates of the lesbian earnings premium
Panel A: Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5) (D6) 
Lesbian 0.1834*** 0.1893*** 0.0728*** 0.0583*** 0.0581*** 0.0532*** 
2000 (0.0202) (0.0110) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0064) 
Census Censored 39,659 39,659 39,659 39,659 39,659 39,659 
Uncensored 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 176,038 
Lesbian 0.2104*** 0.2171*** 0.0794*** 0.0675*** 0.0673*** 0.0629*** 
2005-2007 (0.0232) (0.0094) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0068) 
ACS Censored 29,104 29,104 29,104 29,104 29,104 29,104 
Uncensored 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 117,901 
Lesbian 0.1557*** 0.1748*** 0.0686*** 0.0605*** 0.0601*** 0.0579*** 
2008-2010 (0.0211) (0.0093) (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0063) 
ACS Censored 35,006 35,006 35,006 35,006 35,006 35,006 
Uncensored 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 127,303 
Panel B: Lesbians versus married heterosexuals 
Regression model 
Sample: (D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5) (D6) 
Lesbian 0.0779*** 0.2029*** 0.1275*** 0.0838*** 0.0721*** 0.0748*** 
2000 (0.0125) (0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0072) 
Census Censored 114,515 114,515 114,515 114,515 114,515 114,515 
Uncensored 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 255,503 
Lesbian 0.5777*** 0.2433*** 0.1478*** 0.1093*** 0.0908*** 0.0956*** 
2005-2007 (0.0332) (0.0092) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0087) (0.0082) 
ACS Censored 77,241 77,241 77,241 77,241 77,241 77,241 
Uncensored 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 171,817 
Lesbian 0.6797*** 0.2353*** 0.1530*** 0.1163*** 0.1024*** 0.1067*** 
2008-2010 (0.0492) (0.0092) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0087) (0.0081) 
ACS Censored 76,384 76,384 76,384 76,384 76,384 76,384 
Uncensored 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 169,240 
        Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but only the coefficient on 
the lesbian indicator is reported. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a one-tailed test. The dependent 
variable in each model is the log of real annual income. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American 
Community Surveys PUMS. 
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Table A.12. Lesbian premium estimates stratified by the presence of children
Lesbians vs. Cohabs Lesbians vs. Marrieds 
Sample: 
Women with 
children 
Women with 
no children 
Women with 
children 
Women with 
no children 
Lesbian 0.0646*** 0.0501*** 0.0016 0.0438*** 
2000 (0.0142) (0.0068) (0.0143) (0.0069) 
Census Observations 64,239 111,799 131,838 123,665 
R2 0.6506 0.6051 0.6491 0.5993 
Lesbian 0.0848*** 0.0608*** 0.0288* 0.0563*** 
2005-2007 (0.0160) (0.0078) (0.0156) (0.0078) 
ACS Observations 37,989 79,912 79,524 92,293 
R2 0.7038 0.6427 0.6773 0.6199 
Lesbian 0.1048*** 0.0493*** 0.0581*** 0.0509*** 
2008-2010 (0.0148) (0.0073) (0.0143) (0.0074) 
ACS Observations 42,354 84,949 76,202 93,038 
R2 0.7076 0.6626 0.6879 0.6397 
       Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but only the coefficient on 
the lesbian indicator is reported. * and *** represent statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, 
respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
Variables Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals
Work characteristics
 Annual real income 50,808 32,207 39,284 55,493 32,661 39,979 55,293 32,713 41,024
(50,687) (32,324) (40,218) (53,671) (30,989) (39,913) (54,078) (31,640) (40,449)
 Weeks worked 47.12 45.12 45.42 47.22 44.87 45.43 47.22 45.90 46.31
(10.51) (12.47) (12.26) (10.50) (12.89) (12.26) (9.90) (11.49) (11.03)
 Hours worked per week 41.92 39.29 38.71 41.81 38.82 37.56 41.09 38.17 37.41
(10.01) (9.70) (10.68) (10.63) (10.00) (11.18) (10.56) (10.03) (11.06)
Personal characteristics
 Age 38.65 34.18 39.50 41.36 35.40 42.74 42.36 35.64 43.57
(9.95) (10.50) (10.47) (10.50) (11.56) (10.72) (11.04) (11.66) (10.77)
 Potential experience 18.99 16.00 20.69 21.30 16.91 23.56 22.24 17.01 24.28
(9.84) (10.72) (10.76) (10.39) (11.83) (11.13) (10.86) (11.99) (11.23)
 No high school 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05
(0.26) (0.34) (0.30) (0.19) (0.29) (0.23) (0.16) (0.27) (0.22)
 High school 0.15 0.30 0.24 0.14 0.28 0.24 0.13 0.25 0.21
(0.36) (0.46) (0.43) (0.35) (0.45) (0.42) (0.34) (0.43) (0.41)
 Some college 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.23
(0.42) (0.45) (0.42) (0.41) (0.45) (0.42) (0.41) (0.45) (0.42)
 Associate 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11
(0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32)
 Bachelor's 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.24
(0.43) (0.35) (0.40) (0.45) (0.39) (0.42) (0.44) (0.40) (0.43)
 Postgraduate 0.22 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.08 0.16
(0.41) (0.23) (0.34) (0.44) (0.26) (0.35) (0.44) (0.28) (0.36)
 Hispanic 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.10
(0.28) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.32) (0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.30)
 White 0.84 0.75 0.77 0.87 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.80 0.84
(0.37) (0.44) (0.42) (0.34) (0.40) (0.37) (0.32) (0.40) (0.37)
 Black 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07
(0.27) (0.35) (0.32) (0.22) (0.29) (0.26) (0.23) (0.30) (0.26)
 Asian 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19)
Table A.13. Descriptive statistics for householders by sample and sexual orientation
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Variables Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals
 Other race 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) (0.25) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19)
 Mixed race 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.12)
 Disabled 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.34) (0.37) (0.37) (0.28) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22)
 English proficient 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.96
(0.17) (0.19) (0.23) (0.13) (0.21) (0.20) (0.12) (0.21) (0.21)
 U.S. citizen 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.98
(0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
 No. own children under 18 0.34 0.77 0.96 0.30 0.66 0.90 0.32 0.69 0.91
(0.78) (1.07) (1.13) (0.71) (1.01) (1.09) (0.76) (1.03) (1.11)
U.S. residence
 Northeast 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
 Midwest 0.18 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.23
(0.38) (0.42) (0.41) (0.39) (0.43) (0.43) (0.40) (0.43) (0.42)
 South 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.36
(0.46) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
 West 0.31 0.23 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.22
(0.46) (0.42) (0.41) (0.45) (0.43) (0.41) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41)
 Metropolitan residence 0.84 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.75 0.72 0.83 0.75 0.71
(0.37) (0.44) (0.44) (0.37) (0.44) (0.45) (0.37) (0.43) (0.45)
Occupation
 Mgt. and professionals 0.51 0.30 0.43 0.56 0.34 0.47 0.55 0.35 0.49
(0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
 Service occupations 0.13 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.14
(0.34) (0.40) (0.35) (0.32) (0.41) (0.34) (0.33) (0.42) (0.34)
 Sales 0.24 0.37 0.33 0.23 0.35 0.33 0.24 0.34 0.31
(0.42) (0.48) (0.47) (0.42) (0.48) (0.47) (0.42) (0.47) (0.46)
 Construction 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.18) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07)
Table A.13 (continued)
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Variables Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals Lesbians
Cohabiting 
heterosexuals
Married 
heterosexuals
 Production and transport. 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05
(0.29) (0.32) (0.28) (0.25) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.22)
Industry
 Agriculture 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
 Construction 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
 Manufacturing 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
(0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
 Wholesale trade 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
 Retail trade 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.09
(0.29) (0.34) (0.30) (0.28) (0.34) (0.30) (0.29) (0.34) (0.29)
 Transport. and utilities 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
 Information 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14)
 Finance and insurance 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.09
(0.25) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29)
 Professional and mgt. 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09
(0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.30) (0.29) (0.32) (0.30) (0.29)
 Education and health 0.31 0.25 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.40
(0.46) (0.43) (0.47) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.49)
 Arts and entertainment 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.06
(0.27) (0.33) (0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.23) (0.25) (0.33) (0.23)
 Other services 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
 Public administration 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06
(0.25) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.23)
Number of observations 6,478 75,056 28,956 5,293 56,090 51,790 5,451 62,325 54,340
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
Table A.13 (continued)
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Table A.14. Lesbian premium estimates by householder status
Lesbians vs. Cohabs Lesbians vs. Marrieds 
Sample: 
Householders 
and residents 
Householders 
only 
Householders 
and residents 
Householders 
only 
Lesbian 0.0540*** 0.0541*** 0.0219*** 0.0226*** 
2000 (0.0062) (0.0086) (0.0062) (0.0094) 
Census Observations 176,038 81,534 255,503 35,434 
R2 0.6363 0.6181 0.6306 0.5981 
Lesbian 0.0657*** 0.0698*** 0.0345*** 0.0396*** 
2005-2007 (0.0070) (0.0099) (0.0070) (0.0100) 
ACS Observations 117,901 61,383 171,817 57,083 
R2 0.6734 0.6614 0.6499 0.6331 
Lesbian 0.0623*** 0.0657*** 0.0379*** 0.0436*** 
2008-2010 (0.0065) (0.0092) (0.0066) (0.0095) 
ACS Observations 127,303 67,776 169,240 59,791 
R2 0.6868 0.6773 0.6634 0.6540 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but only the coefficient on 
the lesbian indicator is reported. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a one-tailed test. Sources: 2000 
Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
Table A.15. Assessing the maternity-risk hypothesis - preliminary regressions from the 2000 Census
Comparative earnings regressions Individual regressions
Lesbians vs. Cohabs Lesbians vs. Marrieds Lesbians Cohabs Marrieds
(A1p) (A2p) (A3p) (A1p) (A2p) (A3p) (A2p) (A2p) (A2p)
Lesbian 0.0541*** 0.0503*** 0.0962*** 0.0226*** 0.0418*** 0.0797***
(0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0126) (0.0094) (0.0117) (0.0136)
Maternity risk -0.2494** -0.5067*** 0.4889*** -0.1387 -1.3921* -0.5686*** -0.3911**
(0.1376) (0.1434) (0.1603) (0.1929) (0.9989) (0.1490) (0.2231)
Maternity risk -2.1445*** -2.8253***
 x lesbian (0.3822) (0.4740)
Potential experience 0.0169*** 0.0156*** 0.0140*** 0.0066*** 0.0088*** 0.0052*** 0.0145*** 0.0138*** 0.0038***
(centred) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Potential experience -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0004***
 (centred) squared (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 81,534 81,534 81,534 35,434 35,434 35,434 6,478 75,056 28,956
R2 0.6181 0.6182 0.6183 0.5981 0.5982 0.5986 0.5601 0.6165 0.6017
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the coefficients most relevant to the analysis. *, **, and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The coefficients of interest (Lesbian and Maternity Risk ) are tested on a one-tailed basis. Source: 2000 Decennial Census 
PUMS. 
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Table A.16. Maternity risk by sample and sexual orientation: white women only 
Sample Age Group Lesbians 
Cohabiting 
Heterosexuals 
Married 
Heterosexuals 
18-24 0.0625 0.1255 0.1868 
25-31 0.0279 0.0639 0.1257 
2000 
Census 
32-38 0.0249 0.0340 0.0810 
39-45 0.0080 0.0110 0.0168 
46-52 0.0000 0.0004 0.0006 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0276 0.1314 0.1974 
25-31 0.0289 0.0771 0.1622 
2005-2007 
ACS 
32-38 0.0372 0.0473 0.0932 
39-45 0.0213 0.0133 0.0177 
46-52 0.0054 0.0007 0.0006 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0187 0.1390 0.2071 
25-31 0.0216 0.0825 0.1639 
2008-2010 
ACS 
32-38 0.0188 0.0588 0.0951 
39-45 0.0121 0.0128 0.0169 
46-52 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Values represent number of births per woman. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American 
Community Surveys PUMS. 
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Table A.17. Maternity risk by sample and sexual orientation: never-married or currently 
married women only 
Sample Age Group Lesbians 
Cohabiting 
Heterosexuals 
Married 
Heterosexuals 
18-24 0.0802 0.1408 0.1996 
25-31 0.0362 0.0725 0.1267 
2000 
Census 
32-38 0.0264 0.0457 0.0781 
39-45 0.0093 0.0160 0.0158 
46-52 0.0000 0.0013 0.0011 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0331 0.1397 0.2011 
25-31 0.0286 0.0840 0.1611 
2005-2007 
ACS 
32-38 0.0414 0.0584 0.0908 
39-45 0.0230 0.0235 0.0177 
46-52 0.0063 0.0011 0.0007 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0262 0.1464 0.2029 
25-31 0.0251 0.0868 0.1612 
2008-2010 
ACS 
32-38 0.0202 0.0669 0.0944 
39-45 0.0074 0.0167 0.0171 
46-52 0.0010 0.0004 0.0007 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Values represent number of births per woman. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American 
Community Surveys PUMS. 
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Table A.18. Proportion of non-movers by age, sample and sexual orientation 
Sample Age Group Lesbians 
Cohabiting 
Heterosexuals 
Married 
Heterosexuals 
18-24 0.4038 0.3871 0.5594 
25-31 0.5714 0.5696 0.7722 
2005-2007 
ACS 
32-38 0.7489 0.6888 0.8704 
39-45 0.8449 0.7620 0.9203 
46-52 0.8690 0.8106 0.9394 
53-59 0.9003 0.8564 0.9455 
60-65 0.9003 0.8867 0.9493 
18-24 0.3818 0.4096 0.5694 
25-31 0.5919 0.5951 0.7796 
2008-2010 
ACS 
32-38 0.7388 0.7051 0.8786 
39-45 0.8523 0.7713 0.9271 
46-52 0.8982 0.8208 0.9465 
53-59 0.9168 0.8715 0.9563 
60-65 0.9355 0.8954 0.9607 
Sources: 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
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Table A.19. Maternity risk by sample and sexual orientation: non-moving women only 
Sample Age Group Lesbians 
Cohabiting 
Heterosexuals 
Married 
Heterosexuals 
18-24 0.0486 0.1595 0.1978 
25-31 0.0447 0.0900 0.1653 
2005-2007 
ACS 
32-38 0.0400 0.0555 0.0903 
39-45 0.0198 0.0143 0.0175 
46-52 0.0056 0.0004 0.0007 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0294 0.1596 0.2111 
25-31 0.0321 0.0937 0.1654 
2008-2010 
ACS 
32-38 0.0227 0.0654 0.0932 
39-45 0.0108 0.0128 0.0173 
46-52 0.0008 0.0007 0.0004 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Values represent number of births per woman. Sources: 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
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Table A.20. Maternity risk by sample and sexual orientation: ACS fertility variable 
Sample Age Group Lesbians 
Cohabiting 
Heterosexuals 
Married 
Heterosexuals 
18-24 0.0647 0.1644 0.2343 
25-31 0.0311 0.1032 0.1910 
2005-2007 
ACS 
32-38 0.0251 0.0587 0.1013 
39-45 0.0122 0.0171 0.0199 
46-52 0.0009 0.0021 0.0021 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18-24 0.0480 0.1710 0.2373 
25-31 0.0237 0.1046 0.1935 
2008-2010 
ACS 
32-38 0.0288 0.0727 0.1068 
39-45 0.0094 0.0162 0.0221 
46-52 0.0012 0.0040 0.0042 
53-59 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60-65 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Values represent number of births per woman. Sources: 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS. 
Table A.21. Values of Mandated Coverage  by state and year
Year
State 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
California 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colorado 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Connecticut 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Louisiana 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maryland 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Massachusetts 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Montana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
North Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ohio 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhode Island 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Texas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
West Virginia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sources: See Table D.2.
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Table A.22. Values of Legal Partnership  by state and year
Year
State 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
California 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colorado 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Connecticut 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maine 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maryland 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Massachusetts 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
New Jersey 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vermont 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sources: See Table D.2.
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Table A.23. Values of Marriage Bans  by state and year
Year
State 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Alaska 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Arizona 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Arkansas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
California 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colorado 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Connecticut 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Delaware 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Florida 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Georgia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hawaii 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Idaho 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Illinois 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indiana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kansas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kentucky 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Louisiana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maryland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Michigan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Minnesota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mississippi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Missouri 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Montana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nebraska 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nevada 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Hampshire 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Carolina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
North Dakota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ohio 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oklahoma 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oregon 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pennsylvania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Dakota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tennessee 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Texas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Utah 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Virginia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Washington 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
West Virginia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wisconsin 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Wyoming 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: California allowed same-sex marriages between 16th June, 2008 and 4th November, 2008. Accounting for this by
alternatively coding California as a zero for 2008 does not significantly affect the findings. Sources: See Table D.2.
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Table A.24. Values of Same-Sex Percentage  by state and year - prior to standardisation
Year
State 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0.9758 0.9335 1.2589 0.8488 0.4029 0.7063 0.5519
Alaska 0.9966 1.9512 0.8157 0.6319 0.4796 1.1561 1.1211
Arizona 1.3059 1.3658 1.4699 1.5350 1.0319 1.5159 1.4978
Arkansas 0.6237 0.9664 0.7835 0.6645 0.4489 0.7657 0.6584
California 1.5388 1.5744 1.4606 1.5934 1.2932 1.2207 1.3582
Colorado 1.3264 1.2676 1.3726 1.6105 1.4147 1.4361 1.5821
Connecticut 1.2375 0.9756 1.3593 1.1917 1.1903 1.0868 1.2052
Delaware 1.1135 1.3308 1.8868 1.6393 0.9340 2.2458 0.8217
Florida 1.2363 1.4785 1.3133 1.4127 1.0534 1.1380 1.1696
Georgia 1.2710 1.3159 1.2776 1.2996 0.9576 1.1093 0.8913
Hawaii 1.3341 1.3387 1.3387 1.1693 0.7114 1.5887 1.2302
Idaho 0.6707 0.6390 0.8419 0.7934 0.8177 0.9952 0.5928
Illinois 0.8690 1.0033 1.0884 0.9216 0.8492 0.8051 0.7910
Indiana 0.8713 0.9864 1.2118 1.1223 0.9438 0.9102 0.9834
Iowa 0.6058 0.8661 0.8385 0.5571 0.5300 0.7347 0.8058
Kansas 0.8724 1.2407 1.0157 1.0675 0.5511 0.7016 0.8016
Kentucky 0.8872 1.3864 1.2527 0.9575 0.7870 0.7183 0.9601
Louisiana 1.2884 1.0591 1.0612 1.2837 0.6904 0.6217 0.8072
Maine 1.1620 1.5997 1.7009 1.1752 1.9132 1.2500 1.7076
Maryland 1.2354 1.4539 1.4501 1.4706 1.0813 1.1240 1.0955
Massachusetts 1.7080 1.9254 2.1914 2.3973 2.2413 1.8647 2.3916
Michigan 0.8359 0.8486 1.0087 1.2335 0.7581 0.7507 0.7223
Minnesota 0.8254 1.1832 1.1252 0.9821 0.6778 0.7075 0.7883
Mississippi 1.0752 0.6254 0.4966 0.8999 0.4443 0.5153 0.4475
Missouri 0.8510 1.0754 1.1435 0.9440 0.6176 0.8717 0.7126
Montana 0.7706 0.8722 0.9630 1.0357 0.7183 0.7392 0.5374
Nebraska 0.5690 0.6194 0.4831 0.6717 0.5825 0.5960 0.7375
Nevada 1.2600 1.5283 1.2031 1.0934 0.8283 1.1409 1.0967
New Hampshire 1.4910 2.3056 1.6445 1.3297 0.9904 1.4296 1.2262
New Jersey 1.0966 1.1331 1.3106 1.1902 0.8666 0.9410 1.0885
New Mexico 1.3127 2.0419 1.3517 1.8150 1.5358 1.6235 1.7914
New York 1.2795 1.4029 1.4646 1.4559 1.2433 1.1041 1.2079
North Carolina 1.0603 1.1661 1.0461 1.2587 0.9684 1.0451 1.0452
North Dakota 0.4278 0.7736 0.6479 0.6432 0.4181 0.6882 0.3425
Ohio 0.8544 1.3507 1.2204 1.2338 0.8588 0.9662 0.8450
Oklahoma 0.8038 0.9909 0.7853 0.7191 0.7422 0.8897 0.6557
Oregon 1.5001 1.4007 2.1139 1.8123 1.5413 1.7885 1.2238
Pennsylvania 0.8624 1.0268 1.1193 1.2661 0.6677 0.8718 0.7563
Rhode Island 1.4950 1.9422 1.4948 2.0597 1.3123 0.8763 2.2094
South Carolina 1.1741 1.3778 1.0404 1.1071 0.9379 0.7948 0.8468
South Dakota 0.6458 0.8600 1.3472 1.1536 0.3697 0.1208 0.3688
Tennessee 0.9964 0.9933 1.0826 0.9143 0.8208 0.8461 0.8407
Texas 1.0631 0.9909 1.1766 1.0199 0.8288 0.8994 1.1085
Utah 0.7907 0.7011 0.9743 0.8086 0.7090 0.7391 1.0189
Vermont 1.7651 1.7910 2.0202 0.8915 2.3152 2.5055 1.6937
Virginia 1.0053 1.1552 1.1567 1.1795 0.7214 0.7818 0.7500
Washington 1.4485 1.7905 1.3180 1.5750 1.4906 1.2881 1.2444
West Virginia 0.7780 0.9113 0.9441 1.0174 0.4925 0.5964 0.3814
Wisconsin 0.7610 1.3184 1.0490 0.9080 0.7918 0.7100 0.6815
Wyoming 0.8687 0.3503 1.1854 0.3419 0.1682 0.8258 0.3322
Sources: See Table D.2.
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Table A.25. Base results: Mandated Coverage
Sample: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Lesbian 0.0400*** 0.0396*** 0.0390*** 0.0379*** 0.0415*** 0.0168** 0.0102 0.0103 0.0078 0.0099
(0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0084)
2000 Mandated coverage 0.0332** 0.0396** 0.0367** 0.0342** 0.0230* 0.0313* 0.0378** 0.0329** 0.0309** 0.0153
Census  x lesbian (0.0197) (0.0211) (0.0179) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0188) (0.0213) (0.0169) (0.0148) (0.0130)
Observations 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185
R2 0.6354 0.6368 0.6369 0.6370 0.6379 0.6294 0.6312 0.6314 0.6315 0.6322
Lesbian 0.0559*** 0.0580*** 0.0572*** 0.0572*** 0.0597*** 0.0377*** 0.0328*** 0.0321*** 0.0291** 0.0327***
(0.0115) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0113)
2005 to Mandated coverage 0.0162 0.0190 0.0216 0.0231 0.0170 0.0026 0.0043 0.0066 0.0088 -0.0050
2007 ACS  x lesbian (0.0155) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0164) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0193)
Observations 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584
R2 0.6723 0.6734 0.6734 0.6741 0.6750 0.6494 0.6507 0.6507 0.6511 0.6517
Lesbian 0.0519*** 0.0511*** 0.0527*** 0.0525*** 0.0534*** 0.0389*** 0.0299*** 0.0319*** 0.0307*** 0.0305***
(0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0080)
2008 to Mandated coverage 0.0239** 0.0357*** 0.0321*** 0.0334*** 0.0289*** 0.0117 0.0245** 0.0202* 0.0213** 0.0141
2010 ACS  x lesbian (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0146) (0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0111)
Observations 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034
R2 0.6857 0.6870 0.6870 0.6875 0.6885 0.6626 0.6642 0.6643 0.6645 0.6653
Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals Lesbians versus married heterosexuals
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction
term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community
Surveys PUMS.
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Large sample
Base results 2.43* 1.56 1.82 -0.52 3.09*** 1.46
Full-time only, no hours/weeks controls 2.89** 1.83 5.15*** 4.62*** 1.37* 0.70
Log(hourly wages) 2.35* 1.46 2.06 0.30
Heckman two-step method 2.44* 1.60 1.68 0.09 2.01* 1.93**
Including sodomy law repeal 2.56* 1.61 1.94 -0.40 3.21*** 1.52*
Further including SS legal equality score 2.33* 1.25 2.15 -0.37 3.32*** 1.43
Adding potential experience interactions 2.78** 2.09* 1.96 -0.37 3.44*** 1.91*
Further including education interactions 2.73** 2.02* 1.98 -0.21 3.39*** 1.97*
Including only full-time employed 2.80** 1.97 5.14*** 3.98** 1.43 0.61
Including only white women 2.89* 1.89* 2.51 0.22 3.55*** 2.17**
Including only women aged 40 or under 3.00** 1.90 0.60 -2.32 3.01** 2.21*
Including only women over 40 years old 0.52 1.25 2.20 1.44 2.96* 1.62
Smaller sample
Base results 2.38* 2.16 -0.57 -2.15 3.22** 2.02*
Multilevel estimation 1.13 0.76 -1.23 -4.48** 2.78* 1.15
Gay-male comparison 
Female estimates 2.43* 1.56 1.82 -0.52 3.09*** 1.46
Male estimates 6.06*** 4.44*** 7.46*** 3.70** 7.39*** 2.93*
Difference (Female - Male) -3.64 -2.88 -5.64 -4.21 -4.30 -1.47
Table A.26. Mandated Coverage robustness checks
Notes: Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the percentage point change in the lesbian pay
gap as a result of the proxy moving from a value of zero to one, evaluated at the means of all other variables. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance for the lesbian-proxy interaction term at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test,
respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Table A.27. Base results: Legal Partnership
Sample: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Lesbian 0.0670*** 0.0691*** 0.0692*** 0.0697*** 0.0719*** 0.0398*** 0.0358*** 0.0359*** 0.0341*** 0.0364***
(0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0090)
2005 to Legal partnership -0.0162 -0.0158 -0.0160 -0.0147 -0.0261 -0.0255** -0.0199 -0.0201 -0.0199 -0.0368**
2007 ACS  x lesbian (0.0211) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0238) (0.0215) (0.0145) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0166) (0.0176)
Observations 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584
R2 0.6736 0.6743 0.6743 0.6749 0.6754 0.6507 0.6516 0.6516 0.6519 0.6522
Lesbian 0.0661*** 0.0670*** 0.0652*** 0.0658*** 0.0728*** 0.0426*** 0.0367*** 0.0342*** 0.0330*** 0.0381***
(0.0095) (0.0093) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0053)
2008 to Legal partnership -0.0131 -0.0045 0.0013 0.0002 -0.0249* -0.0134 0.0020 0.0095 0.0106 -0.0097
2010 ACS  x lesbian (0.0200) (0.0209) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0108)
Observations 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034
R2 0.6871 0.6878 0.6880 0.6886 0.6888 0.6637 0.6648 0.6649 0.6652 0.6654
Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals Lesbians versus married heterosexuals
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction
term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Large sample
Base results -2.77 -3.75** -2.64* -1.00
Full-time only, no hours/weeks controls -1.75 -3.32** -1.40 -0.62
Log(hourly wages) -3.36* -4.17**
Heckman two-step method -2.76 -3.68** -4.58*** -0.13
Including sodomy law repeal -2.76 -3.73** -2.61* -0.97
Further including SS legal equality score -1.93 -3.34* -2.92* -1.24
Adding potential experience interactions -3.10* -4.38*** -3.50** -2.24**
Further including education interactions -3.06* -4.54*** -3.48** -2.24**
Including only full-time employed -1.67 -3.08** -1.29 -0.59
Including only white women -2.12 -3.15** -2.91* -1.63
Including only women aged 40 or under -4.07** -4.34* -0.94 1.15
Including only women over 40 years old -1.38 -3.97 -6.52*** -4.44**
Smaller sample
Base results -5.22** -3.40* -1.56 -1.77
Multilevel estimation -8.24*** -5.77** -1.56 -1.42
Gay-male comparison 
Female estimate -2.77 -3.75** -2.64* -1.00
Male estimate 3.54 -0.32 -0.40 -0.06
Difference (Female - Male) -6.31 -3.42 -2.25 -0.94
2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Table A.28. Legal Partnership  robustness checks
Notes: Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the percentage point change in the lesbian pay
gap as a result of the proxy moving from a value of zero to one, evaluated at the means of all other variables. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance for the lesbian-proxy interaction term at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test,
respectively. Sources: 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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Table A.29. Base results: Marriage Bans
Sample: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Lesbian 0.0388** 0.0269* 0.0282** 0.0303** 0.0337** 0.0134 0.0001 0.0017 0.0030 0.0040
(0.0178) (0.0190) (0.0165) (0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0138) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0155) (0.0157)
2000 Marriage bans 0.0229 0.0375* 0.0341* 0.0284* 0.0226 0.0245 0.0333* 0.0293* 0.0229 0.0161
Census  x lesbian (0.0237) (0.0252) (0.0205) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0212) (0.0257) (0.0210) (0.0204) (0.0195)
Observations 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185
R2 0.6352 0.6368 0.6368 0.6370 0.6379 0.6293 0.6312 0.6313 0.6315 0.6322
Lesbian 0.0411** 0.0207 0.0210 0.0184 0.0230 0.0168 -0.0076 -0.0071 -0.0167 -0.0139
(0.0233) (0.0285) (0.0292) (0.0297) (0.0285) (0.0241) (0.0289) (0.0297) (0.0286) (0.0281)
2005 to Marriage bans 0.0294 0.0543** 0.0541** 0.0577** 0.0511** 0.0284 0.0498* 0.0494* 0.0579** 0.0507*
2007 ACS  x lesbian (0.0255) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0320) (0.0301) (0.0265) (0.0325) (0.0332) (0.0321) (0.0312)
Observations 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584
R2 0.6719 0.6732 0.6732 0.6739 0.6750 0.6487 0.6504 0.6504 0.6508 0.6517
Lesbian 0.0636*** 0.0814*** 0.0832*** 0.0869*** 0.0907*** 0.0224* 0.0319* 0.0352** 0.0331** 0.0363**
(0.0211) (0.0246) (0.0237) (0.0259) (0.0254) (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0184) (0.0192) (0.0182)
2008 to Marriage bans -0.0002 -0.0170 -0.0191 -0.0231 -0.0290 0.0250* 0.0101 0.0063 0.0080 -0.0002
2010 ACS  x lesbian (0.0227) (0.0263) (0.0253) (0.0271) (0.0259) (0.0176) (0.0227) (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0196)
Observations 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034
R2 0.6854 0.6866 0.6867 0.6871 0.6884 0.6625 0.6640 0.6640 0.6642 0.6651
Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals Lesbians versus married heterosexuals
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction
term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community
Surveys PUMS.
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Large sample
Base results 2.36 1.63 5.36** 5.13* -3.13 -0.02
Full-time only, no hours/weeks controls 6.12*** 6.17*** 4.63** 4.12* -1.80 -1.30
Log(hourly wages) 3.80** 3.07** 3.84 2.96
Heckman two-step method 2.37 1.66 5.41** 4.98* -3.51 0.29
Including sodomy law repeal 2.50 2.00 5.31** 5.05* -3.11 -0.03
Further including SS legal equality score 2.91 2.49* 5.17** 4.69* -3.30 -0.32
Adding potential experience interactions 2.44 1.75 5.51** 5.32** -3.89 -1.06
Further including education interactions 2.30 1.54 5.52** 5.33* -3.88 -1.15
Including only full-time employed 5.41*** 5.45*** 4.05* 4.34* -1.98 -0.70
Including only white women 2.55 1.58 6.38** 6.90** -2.68 0.11
Including only women aged 40 or under 3.37* 2.53 3.12 2.76 -0.22 3.05
Including only women over 40 years old 2.41 0.47 7.38** 6.45* -4.38 -3.58
Smaller sample
Base results 2.79 3.57* 2.85 6.12** -1.33 2.53
Multilevel estimation 2.46 3.58* 2.57 6.12** -1.97 2.09
Gay-male comparison 
Female estimates 2.36 1.63 5.36** 5.13* -3.13 -0.02
Male estimates -1.39 -1.71 3.57 2.97 -6.95 -3.83
Difference (Female - Male) 3.75 3.34 1.79 2.16 3.82 3.81
Table A.30. Marriage Bans  robustness checks
Notes: Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the percentage point change in the lesbian pay
gap as a result of the proxy moving from a value of zero to one, evaluated at the means of all other variables. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance for the lesbian-proxy interaction term at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test,
respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Table A.31. Base results: Same-Sex Percentage
Sample: (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Lesbian 0.0493*** 0.0521*** 0.0522*** 0.0523*** 0.0530*** 0.0202*** 0.0192** 0.0195** 0.0196*** 0.0184***
(0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0068)
2000 Same-sex percentage 0.0025 0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0149 -0.0245** -0.0043 -0.0016 -0.0060 -0.0231** -0.0364***
Census  x lesbian (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0104) (0.0122) (0.0117)
Observations 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 175,609 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185 255,185
R2 0.6359 0.6370 0.6370 0.6370 0.6379 0.6305 0.6317 0.6317 0.6317 0.6323
Lesbian 0.0631*** 0.0672*** 0.0672*** 0.0686*** 0.0683*** 0.0331*** 0.0330*** 0.0331*** 0.0324*** 0.0303***
(0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0071)
2005 to Same-sex percentage -0.0084 -0.0123* -0.0125* -0.0130* -0.0147** -0.0111* -0.0133** -0.0137** -0.0169*** -0.0188***
2007 ACS  x lesbian (0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0057)
Observations 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 117,600 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584 171,584
R2 0.6726 0.6735 0.6735 0.6741 0.6751 0.6496 0.6507 0.6507 0.6510 0.6518
Lesbian 0.0617*** 0.0669*** 0.0672*** 0.0676*** 0.0684*** 0.0387*** 0.0391*** 0.0395*** 0.0391*** 0.0383***
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0058)
2008 to Same-sex percentage -0.0159*** -0.0142*** -0.0150*** -0.0148*** -0.0215*** -0.0171*** -0.0129** -0.0141*** -0.0143*** -0.0214***
2010 ACS  x lesbian (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0066)
Observations 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 126,966 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034 169,034
R2 0.6858 0.6869 0.6869 0.6873 0.6884 0.6626 0.6641 0.6641 0.6643 0.6652
Lesbians versus cohabiting heterosexuals Lesbians versus married heterosexuals
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction
term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community
Surveys PUMS.
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Large sample
Base results -2.55**    -3.65*** -1.67** -1.92*** -2.28*** -2.20***
Full-time only, no hours/weeks controls -2.67** -3.82*** -1.53** -2.22*** -1.46*** -1.87***
Log(hourly wages) -2.27** -3.54*** -1.66** -2.13***
Heckman two-step method -2.61** -3.51*** -1.56** -1.84*** -2.49*** -2.09***
Including sodomy law repeal -2.64** -3.74*** -1.66** -2.10*** -2.30*** -2.23***
Further including SS legal equality score -2.75** -3.93*** -1.55** -2.09*** -2.26*** -2.15***
Adding potential experience interactions -2.72** -3.95*** -1.73*** -2.21*** -2.40*** -2.39***
Further including education interactions -2.60** -3.87*** -1.68*** -2.14*** -2.39*** -2.41***
Including only full-time employed -2.48** -3.60*** -1.38** -1.94*** -1.36*** -1.72***
Including only white women -3.19*** -4.21*** -2.00*** -2.31*** -2.48*** -2.46***
Including only women aged 40 or under -2.84*** -4.04*** -3.68*** -3.53*** -1.52** -1.17*
Including only women over 40 years old -2.09 -3.33 0.61 -0.43 -3.20*** -3.14***
Smaller sample
Base results -2.37** -4.08*** -1.53** -0.87 -2.03** -2.26***
Multilevel estimation -1.35 -2.95** -1.39 -0.75 -1.79** -1.82**
Gay-male comparison 
Female estimates -2.55** -3.65** -1.67** -1.92*** -2.28*** -2.20***
Male estimates 4.40*** 2.43** 2.76** 1.48* 2.12** 0.84
Difference (Female - Male) -6.96 -6.08 -4.32 -3.40 -4.39 -3.04
Notes: Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the percentage point change in the lesbian pay
gap as a result of the proxy moving from a value of zero to one (one standard deviation), evaluated at the means of all other
variables. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance for the lesbian-proxy interaction term at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys
PUMS.
Table A.32. Same-Sex Percentage  robustness checks
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Table A.33. Maternity risk and the gender pay gap - cohabiting heterosexuals
Excluding Including Excluding Including Excluding Including
mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk
Female -0.1970*** -0.1491*** -0.1440*** -0.1057*** -0.1382*** -0.1111***
(0.0046) (0.0073) (0.0064) (0.0101) (0.0058) (0.0091)
Maternity risk -1.1090*** -0.8640*** -0.5800***
(0.1344) (0.1770) (0.1484)
Observations 171,890 171,890 111,893 111,893 122,383 122,383
R2 0.5584 0.5586 0.6119 0.6121 0.6327 0.6329
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the
coefficient on the female indicator and maternity risk variable. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a
one-tailed test. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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Table A.34. Maternity risk and the gender pay gap - married heterosexuals
Excluding Including Excluding Including Excluding Including
mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk mat. risk
Female -0.3301*** -0.2942*** -0.2755*** -0.2641*** -0.2706*** -0.2631***
(0.0060) (0.0076) (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0054) (0.0058)
Maternity risk -1.4804*** -0.6642*** -0.5360***
(0.1883) (0.1417) (0.1307)
Observations 284,013 284,013 180,024 180,024 175,631 175,631
R2 0.4603 0.4604 0.5493 0.5494 0.5819 0.5820
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only the
coefficient on the female indicator and maternity risk variable. *** represents statistical significance at the 1% level, in a
one-tailed test. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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Appendix B: Previous Evidence Regarding the Maternity-Risk Hypothesis 
Academics use several methods to assess whether sexual-orientation differences in labour-
force attachment contribute to the observed lesbian premium. As noted, a common feature of 
these methods is their focus on backward-looking effects of child-bearing on earnings, as 
opposed to forward-looking expectations of maternity-leave requirements. The current 
literature does, however, contain results consistent with the maternity-risk hypothesis, as 
defined in this study. This note briefly highlights the available evidence in the current 
literature regarding the maternity-risk hypothesis.108 
Other than assessing the coefficient on interaction terms and the results from age-
stratified regressions, perhaps the most convincing evidence regarding the maternity-risk 
hypothesis is presented by Carpenter (2008a). Carpenter estimates a lesbian premium of 
approximately 17% among all women. Stratifying his results by partnership status, he finds 
that this premium is primarily due to a large lesbian advantage among partnered women 
(43%), while single lesbians receive a premium of only 1%. Carpenter argues that these 
results provide evidence of differential selection into partnership by sexual orientation. An 
alternative, or even complementary, explanation is that a larger sexual-orientation maternity 
gap among partnered women results in a greater lesbian premium. 
Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2010) and Ahmed et al. (2013b) also provide suggestive 
evidence in favour of the maternity-risk hypothesis. Their analyses, which compare the 
earnings of lesbians in civil unions and married heterosexual women in Sweden, reveal 
lesbians are at an earnings disadvantage in approximately half of their regressions. Given that 
Sweden is recognised as one of the most gay-friendly countries in the world (Clarke, 2013), 
we may expect a larger lesbian premium due to less labour-market discrimination. As argued 
in Section 5, however, expanded same-sex partnership rights likely enhances family 
formation among lesbian couples, thereby reducing sexual-orientation differences in 
maternity incidence.109 The finding of no consistent lesbian premium thus provides further 
evidence that employers are averse to bearing the risk of employees taking maternity leave. 
108 As discussed in the text, using an audit study, Baert (2013) finds evidence of hiring discrimination consistent 
with the maternity-risk hypothesis. 
109 Lesbian couples are also able to adopt children and have equal access to artificial reproduction technologies. 
Moreover, artificial insemination expenses are covered by the national health care (Ahmed et al., 2013b). 
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Daneshvary et al. (2009) and Plug and Berkhout (2004) also obtain results that are 
broadly consistent with the maternity-risk hypothesis, however a causal link is difficult to 
establish due to the presence of several alternative (and arguably better) explanations.110 
Evidently, the current literature contains some evidence in favour of the maternity-risk 
hypothesis, but difficulties in empirical estimation have thus far precluded a more direct 
assessment. In this study, we attempt to provide such an assessment.      
110 Daneshvary et al. (2008) note that their results are consistent with a narrowing of the sexual-orientation gap 
in labour-force attachment among women with high levels of education. Examining the data, we find no 
significant reduction in the maternity gap between lesbians and partnered heterosexual women (the comparison 
group in their study) among women with high educational attainment. This suggests that some other mechanism 
is likely driving their results. 
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Appendix C: On the Identification of Lesbians 
Research examining the sexual-orientation pay gap is limited due to both sparse 
representative data and difficulties in defining the meaning of "lesbian" or "gay". Due in part 
to the increased attention being paid to sexual-orientation discrimination, datasets allowing an 
assessment of sexual orientation are becoming increasingly available, while the methods used 
to infer sexual orientation are continually expanding. This note briefly discusses the methods 
commonly used in previous studies and outlines the advantages and potential problems 
associated with the identification procedure implemented in this study.111 
As is evident from Section 2.2, the prior literature defines sexual orientation in three 
distinct ways. Several studies, particularly those using GSS data, use sexual behaviour to 
identify lesbians. The definitions used, however, vary with respect to the time horizon over 
which sexual behaviour is classified and exclusivity of same-sex sexual behaviour. Other 
studies including Carpenter (2005, 2008a, 2008b) and Frank (2006), use self-reported sexual 
orientation. The third identification method categorises sexual orientation based on inference 
from living arrangements. Beginning with the 1990 Census, respondents were able to classify 
an individual within the household as their "unmarried partner", facilitating the identification 
of same-sex couples. This so-called cohabitation procedure has also been applied in studies 
using UK Labour Force Survey and French Employment Survey data. 
Although data availability, rather than theoretical considerations, generally determines 
which identification method is implemented, we consider the cohabitation procedure to be 
ideal for the purposes of this study. First, one of the major concerns in the literature surrounds 
the ability of the employer to accurately observe sexual orientation. As sexual orientation is 
not readily observable, like gender and race, employers must infer sexual orientation based 
on appearances and mannerisms; affiliations with lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
advocacy groups; conversations; and information obtained from social networking websites. 
The accuracy of any study analysing differences in labour-market outcomes by sexual 
orientation therefore hinges critically on accurate inference on behalf of employers. Jepsen 
(2007) notes that same-sex female couples represent the group most likely to be correctly 
identified as lesbians by employers. If two cohabiting females identify as "unmarried 
111 Badgett (2006) provides a thorough discussion of this and a number of other issues pertaining to examining 
the sexual-orientation pay gap. These issues include endogenous disclosure of sexual orientation and possible 
explanations for the contrasting findings for gay males and lesbians. 
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partners", it is likely that their sexuality will be known by the employer due to voluntary or 
involuntary disclosure. Moreover, use of the cohabitation procedure largely circumvents the 
ambiguity problem associated with sexual-behaviour based classification systems.   
Second, although the sample of cohabiting lesbians does not represent a random 
sample of all lesbians, the comparison of women in cohabiting partnerships arguably 
minimises unobservable heterogeneity by considering only those women that can share 
household responsibilities with a spouse or partner.112 Third, information pertaining to the 
respondent's partner may be useful in identifying appropriate exclusion restrictions to address 
sample-selectivity concerns. Finally, partnered women are significantly more likely than 
single women to bear children and thus require maternity leave. Given that this study focuses 
on differential maternity risk as an explanation for the lesbian premium, coupled females 
(especially those likely to be perceived as such) represent the most appropriate sample for the 
purposes of this study. 
One potential problem associated with the cohabitation procedure, as noted in 
previous studies, is that of measurement error in classifying same-sex couples. Specifically, 
in the 2000 Census and subsequent American Community Surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau 
did not allow same-sex spouse combinations to occur. As a result, whenever the household 
head identified a resident of the same sex as their "husband/wife", the Census Bureau altered 
the response to "unmarried partner", provided the sex of either partner had not previously 
been allocated (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002).113 To ensure consistency across questions, the 
Census Bureau also allocated the marital status of the partners in such a case. An unfortunate 
side-effect of this allocation procedure is that opposite-sex married couples that miscoded the 
sex of one partner are incorrectly allocated to the same-sex couples group. Given the small 
size of the lesbian population relative to married heterosexuals, minor misclassification could 
significantly contaminate the sample of lesbians.114 Similarly to Black et al. (2007) and 
Daneshvary et al. (2009), we assuage these concerns by dropping both partners' observations 
112 As partnership rates differ by sexual orientation, selection into partnership may play a role in the observed 
earnings differentials. Unfortunately, census data cannot be used to address this issue.  
113 As this represents a so-called "logical edit", the relationship status allocation flag in the PUMS files does not 
capture this change. The Census Bureau also did not allow same-sex spouse combinations to occur in the 1990 
Census, but the different allocation procedure implemented was prone to fewer problems.  
114 Incorrect coding of sex among cohabiting heterosexual couples may also contaminate the sample of lesbians, 
but as sex miscoding is rare and the sample of cohabiting heterosexual couples is relatively small, this is 
unlikely to heavily affect the results. 
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when either partner's sex, age, relationship to the householder, or marital status is allocated 
by the U.S. Census Bureau.115 
115 As discussed in Gates and Steinberger (2011), response-mode information in the ACS PUMS can be used to 
minimise miscoding of same-sex couples while retaining a larger proportion of the sample. As the 2000 Census 
PUMS files do not contain similar information, we are unable to explore this possibility while maintaining 
cross-sample consistency.    
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Appendix D: Definition of Variables
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Table D.1. Definition of individual-level variables 
Variable Description 
Log(real annual income) Continuous variable measuring the log of real annual income. Real annual income is measured in 2010 dollars for all samples 
and is calculated by adjusting nominal income using both the adjustment factor contained within the PUMS files (for ACS 
data, to account for the timing of survey completion) and accounting for inflation using the CPI. 
Source: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpirsdc.htm, accessed on 20th June, 2013. 
Work characteristics: 
  Weeks worked: (Base: Worked less than 14 weeks in the previous year) 
    Weeks1 Dummy variable, equals 1 if worked 14 to 26 weeks in the previous year, 0 otherwise 
    Weeks2 Dummy variable, equals 1 if worked 27 to 39 weeks in the previous year, 0 otherwise 
    Weeks3 Dummy variable, equals 1 if worked 40 to 47 weeks in the previous year, 0 otherwise 
    Weeks4 Dummy variable, equals 1 if worked 48 to 49 weeks in the previous year, 0 otherwise 
    Weeks5 Dummy variable, equals 1 if worked 50 to 52 weeks in the previous year, 0 otherwise 
  Hours worked Continuous variable measuring the usual hours worked per week in the previous year 
Lesbian Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual is a female cohabiting with a same-sex partner, 0 otherwise 
Potential experience Continuous variable representing potential work experience, defined as age - years of education - 5 
Potential experience2 Continuous variable representing the square of potential work experience 
Hispanic Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual is of Hispanic origin, 0 otherwise 
Race: (Base: Individual is exclusively white) 
  Black Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual is exclusively black, 0 otherwise 
  Asian Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual is exclusively Asian, 0 otherwise 
  Other race Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual belongs exclusively to some other racial category, 0 otherwise 
  Mixed race Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual belongs to more than one racial category, 0 otherwise 
Speaks English Dummy variable, equals 1 if English is the respondent's first language, or speaks English "well" or "very well", 0 otherwise 
U.S. citizen Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual is a U.S. citizen, 0 otherwise 
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Table D.1 (continued) 
Variable Description 
 
Disabled Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual has some form of disability, 0 otherwise1 
Educational attainment: (Base: Attained less than a high school diploma) 
  High school Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest educational attainment is a high school diploma or equivalent qualification, 0 otherwise 
  Some college Dummy variable, equals 1 if attended college but did not obtain any form of degree, 0 otherwise 
  Associate Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest educational attainment is an Associate's degree, 0 otherwise 
  Bachelor Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest educational attainment is a bachelor's degree, 0 otherwise 
  Postgraduate Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest educational attainment is a master's, professional, or doctoral degree, 0 otherwise 
Metropolitan residence Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual resides in a metropolitan area, 0 otherwise 
Region: (Base: Individual resides in the Northeast of the U.S.) 
  Midwest Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual resides in the Midwest of the U.S., 0 otherwise 
  South Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual resides in the South of the U.S., 0 otherwise 
  West Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual resides in the West of the U.S., 0 otherwise 
Number of children Continuous variable measuring the number of own children under 18 years of age in the household2 
Occupation: (Base: Works in a management or professional occupation) 
  Service occupations Dummy variable, equals 1 if works in a service occupation, 0 otherwise 
  Sales Dummy variable, equals 1 if works in a sales or office occupation, 0 otherwise 
  Construction Dummy variable, equals 1 if works in natural resources, construction or maintenance, 0 otherwise 
  Production and transport. Dummy variable, equals 1 if works in production, transportation or materials moving, 0 otherwise 
Industry: (Base: Employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, or mining) 
  Construction Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in construction, 0 otherwise 
  Manufacturing Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
  Wholesale trade Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in wholesale trade, 0 otherwise 
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Table D.1 (continued) 
Variable Description 
  Retail trade Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in retail trade, 0 otherwise 
  Transport. and utilities Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in transportation and warehousing or utilities, 0 otherwise 
  Information Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in information, 0 otherwise 
  Finance and insurance Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in finance and insurance, real estate, rental or leasing, 0 otherwise 
  Professional and mgt. Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in professional, scientific, management, administration or waste management services, 
0 otherwise 
  Education and health Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in educational services, health care or social assistance, 0 otherwise 
  Arts and entertainment Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation or food services, 0 otherwise 
  Other services Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in other services (except public administration), 0 otherwise 
  Public administration Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed in public administration, 0 otherwise 
Year: (Base: Years 2000, 2005 and 2008 for the three respective samples) 
  Year 2006 Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual was surveyed in 2006, 0 otherwise 
  Year 2007 Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual was surveyed in 2007, 0 otherwise 
  Year 2009 Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual was surveyed in 2009, 0 otherwise 
  Year 2010 Dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual was surveyed in 2010, 0 otherwise 
Notes: 1 The 2000 Census and 2005-2007 ACS PUMS contain a "work-limiting disability" variable. This variable is highly correlated with the general disability variable, and 
alternative specifications reveal the results are only slightly affected by use of the alternative disability variable. 
2 This is the number of children that the householder identifies as their "natural born son/daughter", which we believe best captures the number of children that fall under the 
care of the householder and partner. In unreported regressions we recode number of children to include all persons in the household under the age of 18, regardless of 
relationship to the householder. Again, the results are not significantly affected by this change. 
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Table D.2. Discussion of state-level proxies and controls 
Variable Description/Source 
 Maternity risk proxies: 
  Mandated coverage Dummy variable, equals 1 whenever the individual resides within a state mandating insurance coverage of infertility treatment, 0 
otherwise.1 States with mandated insurance coverage of infertility treatment should increase the maternity risk of cohabiting and 
married heterosexuals relative to lesbians. Thus, if the maternity-risk hypothesis is correct, the lesbian premium should be higher 
relative to cohabiting and married heterosexuals in states with mandated coverage. 
Source: http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/insurance_coverage/state-coverage.html, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
  Legal partnership Dummy variable, equals 1 whenever the individual resides in a state allowing same-sex partners to enter into a domestic 
partnership or granting greater partnership status to same-sex couples, 0 otherwise. State laws granting greater partnership rights 
to same-sex couples are likely to increase the incidence of child-bearing among lesbian couples; we thus expect a decrease in the 
lesbian premium in these states relative to states where no such law is in effect.2  
Sources: http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/same-sex-marriage-developments-the-law.html, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
Last updated 3rd July, 2013. 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
Last updated 26th June, 2013. 
  Marriage bans Dummy variable, equals 1 whenever the individual lives in a state with a law or Constitutional Amendment banning same-sex 
marriage, 0 otherwise. Bans on same-sex marriage likely inhibit family formation among lesbian couples, increasing the sexual-
orientation maternity gap. As a result, the lesbian premium should be greater in states with such bans in place, ceteris paribus. 
Sources: http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/same-sex-marriage-developments-the-law.html, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
Last updated 3rd July, 2013. 
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/samesex_relationships_5_15_13.pdf, accessed on 5th July, 2013, last 
updated 15th May, 2013. 
 
  Same-sex percentage Standardised variable representing the size of the coupled lesbian population as a percentage of the female adult population 
within each state. We believe that the presence of support networks and other factors may increase child-bearing rates among 
lesbians. In such a case, we would expect a commensurate reduction in the lesbian premium. Due to within-sample variation for 
each state, several alternative variables were also used to ensure the robustness of the results: The coupled lesbian population as a 
percentage of the total female population in each state, the within-sample average value for each state (as opposed to the annual 
value), and the size of the coupled gay (male and female) population as a percentage of the adult population residing in each state. 
The results were highly consistent with those reported. 
Source: Own calculations from PUMS files. 
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Table D.2 (continued) 
Variable Description/Source 
State-level controls: 
  Citizen ideology Continuous measure capturing citizen ideology at the state level, based on the "revised 1960-2010 citizen ideology measure" 
derived by Berry et al. (1998). Citizen ideology is measured annually on a 0-10 scale, with zero reflecting the most conservative 
and ten representing the most liberal position.3 Each candidate's ideology score is calculated as the average of interest-group 
ratings reported by the Committee on Political Education (COPE) and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). District-
level ideology scores are then computed as a weighted average of the incumbent's and the challenger's (or potential challenger's) 
ideology score, with weights given by the share of support for each candidate. Finally, state-level ideology is given by an 
unweighted average of district ideology scores. The authors show that this measure improves on other available measures, 
particularly because it does not assume citizen ideology is constant over time. Further details surrounding the derivation and 
reliability of the measure can be found in the original article.  
Source: http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
  Government ideology Continuous measure capturing government ideology at the state level, based on the "ADA/COPE measure of state government 
ideology" derived by Berry et al. (1998). Government ideology is measured annually on a 0-10 scale, with zero again being the 
most conservative and ten representing the most liberal position. Construction of the measure entails several assumptions 
regarding the distribution of power among policymakers. Similarly to the citizen ideology measure, ideology values for each 
policymaker are given by the average of ADA and COPE scores. The final state-level government ideology score is a weighted 
average of the five ideology scores for the governor, and Democrats and Republicans in a state's lower and upper chambers, with 
weights given by the share of power held by each individual. Further details can again be found in the original paper. 
Source: http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/, accessed on 5th July, 2013.   
Percentage of GSP from 
manufacturing 
Continuous measure as used by Baumle and Poston (2011) to capture state-level labour-market conditions which may result in a 
sexual-orientation earnings differential. Specifically, states with a high proportion of Gross State Product (GSP) from 
manufacturing may afford residents fewer job opportunities or jobs with lower earnings prospects. If lesbians and heterosexual 
women exhibit different residency choices on the basis of the percentage of GSP from manufacturing, a lesbian pay gap will 
emerge. State-level values are calculated by dividing annual GSP from manufacturing by total annual GSP. 
Source: http://www.bea.gov/regional/, accessed on 17th July, 2013.    
148 
Table D.2 (continued) 
Variable Description/Source 
  State ENDA Dummy variable, equals 1 if the state in which the individual resides has an Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) which 
covers sexual orientation, 0 otherwise. Klawitter and Flatt (1998), Gates (2009) and Klawitter (2011) all use this variable to 
examine whether the presence of an ENDA covering sexual orientation enhances the earnings of lesbians by reducing sexual-
orientation discrimination. To the extent that the presence of an ENDA is correlated with the proxies, controlling for an ENDA 
may be important in obtaining the marginal effect of maternity risk. 
Sources: http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_6_13_color.pdf, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/employment_laws_072013.pdf, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
  Sodomy repeal Time-invariant dummy variable, equals 1 if the individual resides in a state where the state-level sodomy law was repealed prior 
to the 2003 federal repeal, 0 otherwise. We classify the law as repealed only when same-sex sexual intercourse is fully 
decriminalised. This measure serves to capture underlying attitudes towards homosexuals in each state. Similar measures are used 
in Klawitter and Flatt (1998) and Baumle and Poston (2011). 
Source: http://www.sodomy.org/laws/, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/legal.htm, accessed on 5th July, 2013. 
  2013 same-sex legal equality score Time-invariant ordinal variable, ranging from zero to six in half-point increments. This measure captures varying degrees of 
same-sex legal equality by state based on six categories (hate crimes, non-discrimination, marriage, freedom of gender, youth 
protection, and adoption), with higher values representing greater equality. The scores are intended to control for underlying 
levels of gay-friendliness and forward-looking expectations of employers regarding the future rights of same-sex couples. It is 
possible that including this measure may lead to an over-controlling problem, due to the inclusion of laws affecting maternity 
risk. 
Source: http://www.equalitygiving.org/States-of-Equality-and-Gay-Rights-Scorecard, accessed on 5th July, 2013. Last updated 
20th June, 2013. 
  
Notes: 1 As with all dummy variable proxies and controls, if a law becomes effective or is repealed during the year, we assign the value associated with the situation 
following the law change. As there are few law changes throughout the sample period, this coding choice does not appear to significantly affect the results. 
2 We group states with partnership, civil union, or marriage laws due to the limited number of states conferring such rights on same-sex couples. Moreover, individuals and 
employers likely take into account the probable extension of further rights to same-sex couples in states already offering domestic partnerships or civil unions. The lack of 
distinction between domestic partnerships conferring spousal rights and civil unions also motivated this choice. 
3 The original measures range from 0-100 but we divide all values by 10 to aide in the presentation of results. 
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Appendix E: On the Inclusion of a Maternity Risk Interaction Term 
The discussion in the text regarding the inclusion of a Maternity Risk × Lesbian interaction 
term provides no theoretical foundation as to why we might expect the effect of assigned 
maternity risk to differ by sexual orientation. This note briefly outlines potential reasons why 
an interaction term is warranted from an economic perspective, particularly in models that 
contain potential experience interactions to minimise bias in the maternity-risk coefficient. 
As previously discussed, lesbians generally share household responsibilities more 
equally than heterosexual couples, where household production is primarily undertaken by 
the female. Lesbians may thus be able to return to the workforce sooner, resulting in lower 
costs to the employer and a smaller erosion of human capital. On this basis, maternity risk 
should have a less detrimental effect on the earnings of lesbians than on heterosexuals, all 
other factors held constant.  
There are also several mechanisms by which maternity risk could cause a larger 
adverse earnings effect among lesbians. As lesbians pose a smaller risk to the employer, they 
may be placed in positions where training and turnover costs are greater. Furthermore, 
cohabitation may not be a strong signal of sexual orientation among young women. If 
employers lack sufficient alternative information to accurately assess sexual orientation, 
some young lesbians may be incorrectly perceived as being heterosexuals. Similarly, 
employers may assign a non-trivial probability to young lesbians switching groups in the 
near-term. The allocated rates used herein may thus understate employers' perceptions, 
necessitating a correction through a negative coefficient on the interaction term.  
Evidently, we cannot unambiguously ascertain whether the effect of maternity risk 
should be greater for lesbians or heterosexual women. It is likely, however, that the effects of 
occupational sorting and employer perceptions regarding sexual orientation and transition 
between groups outweigh household specialisation effects, leading to a negative coefficient 
on the interaction term. In unreported regressions, we further include Maternity Risk × 
Lesbian in all specifications which allow the effect of potential experience to vary by sexual 
orientation. We generally obtain a negative coefficient on the interaction term, but in each 
case the coefficient is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. As a result, in the main 
text we strictly consider models in which the maternity-risk effect does not vary by sexual 
orientation.   
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Appendix F: Supplementary Results 
Table F.1. Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions - heterosexual coefficients
Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Gross differential: 0.4693*** 0.2973*** 0.5712*** 0.3801*** 0.5295*** 0.3227***
Excluding maternity risk
Explained:
 Work characteristics 0.1406*** 0.1588*** 0.1765*** 0.2137*** 0.1427*** 0.1701***
 Other controls 0.2733*** 0.1177*** 0.3250*** 0.1312*** 0.3189*** 0.1117***
Total explained: 0.4139*** 0.2765*** 0.5015*** 0.3449*** 0.4615*** 0.2818***
Total unexplained: 0.0554*** 0.0208** 0.0697*** 0.0351*** 0.0679*** 0.0409***
Including maternity risk
Explained:
 Work characteristics 0.1405*** 0.1588*** 0.1764*** 0.2137*** 0.1426*** 0.1701***
 Other controls 0.2596*** 0.1186*** 0.3115*** 0.1322*** 0.3046*** 0.1136***
 Maternity risk 0.0215*** 0.0145*** 0.0200*** 0.0061 0.0237*** 0.0129***
Total explained: 0.4217*** 0.2919*** 0.5079*** 0.3520*** 0.4708*** 0.2966***
Total unexplained: 0.0476*** 0.0053 0.0633*** 0.0280*** 0.0586*** 0.0262**
Observations 81,534 35,434 61,383 57,083 67,776 59,791
2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: We assume the coefficients from the heterosexual female regressions represent the non-discriminatory 
earnings structure, as opposed to a weighted average of the individual regressions. The generalised decomposition is 
also overlooked due to problems cited in the text regarding unobservable human capital accumulation. Models include 
all variables specified in the text (Model (A2p)), but we group work characteristics and all other controls for reporting 
purposes. ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 
2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
2000 Census
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Table F.2. Summary of control values by sample period 
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS 
Mean state-level citizen ideology 5.06 5.55 5.47 
Mean state-level government ideology 4.63 5.32 5.88 
Mean percentage of GSP from manufacturing (%) 14.59 12.50 11.32 
Percentage of states with ENDA's covering 
22.00 35.33 41.33 
sexual orientation (%) 
Percentage of states which repealed their sodomy 
72.00 72.00 72.00 
law prior to the 2003 federal repeal (%) 
Mean 2013 same-sex legal equality score 3.01 3.01 3.01 
Sources: A list of sources for each control is provided in Table D.2. 
Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0415*** 0.0099 0.0597*** 0.0327*** 0.0534*** 0.0305***
(0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0096) (0.0080)
Mandated coverage 0.0230* 0.0153 0.0170 -0.0050 0.0289*** 0.0141
   x lesbian (0.0149) (0.0130) (0.0181) (0.0193) (0.0118) (0.0111)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6322 0.6750 0.6517 0.6885 0.6653
Full-time, no hours/weeks controls:
Lesbian 0.0654*** 0.0466*** 0.0765*** 0.0459*** 0.0827*** 0.0599***
(0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0090) (0.0075)
Mandated coverage 0.0267** 0.0173 0.0466*** 0.0432*** 0.0125* 0.0066
   x lesbian (0.0149) (0.0168) (0.0152) (0.0169) (0.0097) (0.0108)
Observations 119,964 163,718 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.3658 0.3332 0.4050 0.3677 0.4146 0.3641
Log(hourly wages):
Lesbian 0.0457*** 0.0196** 0.0665*** 0.0414***
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0115) (0.0116)
Mandated coverage 0.0222* 0.0142 0.0191 0.0029
   x lesbian (0.0148) (0.0136) (0.0160) (0.0172)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584
R2 0.2556 0.2338 0.3129 0.2740
Heckman two-step method:
Lesbian 0.0414*** 0.0188** 0.0597*** 0.0415*** 0.0483*** 0.0411***
(0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0103) (0.0078)
Mandated coverage 0.0231* 0.0156 0.0157 0.0009 0.0190* 0.0184**
   x lesbian (0.0152) (0.0126) (0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0141) (0.0111)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 - - - - - -
Including sodomy law repeal:
Lesbian 0.0411*** 0.0091 0.0591*** 0.0315*** 0.0530*** 0.0300***
(0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0094) (0.0071)
Mandated coverage 0.0243* 0.0158 0.0181 -0.0039 0.0300*** 0.0146*
   x lesbian (0.0149) (0.0129) (0.0182) (0.0198) (0.0120) (0.0113)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6323 0.6751 0.6518 0.6885 0.6653
Further including SS equality score:
Lesbian 0.0415*** 0.0090 0.0579*** 0.0306*** 0.0525*** 0.0305***
(0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0097) (0.0073)
Mandated coverage 0.0221* 0.0123 0.0201 -0.0036 0.0310*** 0.0138
   x lesbian (0.0136) (0.0109) (0.0190) (0.0202) (0.0128) (0.0118)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6382 0.6324 0.6752 0.6520 0.6887 0.6654
Table F.3. Mandated Coverage supplementary regression estimates
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Adding potential exper. interactions:
Lesbian 0.0663*** 0.0450*** 0.0872*** 0.0727*** 0.0826*** 0.0736***
(0.0096) (0.0088) (0.0123) (0.0112) (0.0127) (0.0108)
Mandated coverage 0.0257** 0.0198* 0.0178 -0.0034 0.0312*** 0.0176*
   x lesbian (0.0147) (0.0127) (0.0186) (0.0202) (0.0127) (0.0122)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6380 0.6324 0.6751 0.6521 0.6887 0.6657
Further including educ. interactions:
Lesbian 0.0758*** 0.0586*** 0.0924*** 0.0813*** 0.0883*** 0.0773***
(0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0106)
Mandated coverage 0.0250** 0.0189* 0.0179 -0.0019 0.0306*** 0.0181*
   x lesbian (0.0149) (0.0129) (0.0187) (0.0198) (0.0128) (0.0122)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6380 0.6325 0.6752 0.6521 0.6887 0.6657
Including only full-time employed:
Lesbian 0.0561*** 0.0298*** 0.0662*** 0.0308*** 0.0733*** 0.0479***
(0.0089) (0.0085) (0.0105) (0.0096) (0.0089) (0.0071)
Mandated coverage 0.0261** 0.0189 0.0470*** 0.0379** 0.0132* 0.0058
   x lesbian (0.0145) (0.0162) (0.0150) (0.0173) (0.0099) (0.0106)
Observations 119,964 163,718 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.4024 0.3625 0.4344 0.3993 0.4422 0.3943
Including only white women:
Lesbian 0.0441*** 0.0130* 0.0620*** 0.0328*** 0.0559*** 0.0330***
(0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0103) (0.0086)
Mandated coverage 0.0273* 0.0185* 0.0233 0.0021 0.0330*** 0.0208**
   x lesbian (0.0170) (0.0139) (0.0182) (0.0196) (0.0118) (0.0112)
Observations 137,365 213,342 95,191 144,206 102,969 142,195
R2 0.6442 0.6403 0.6750 0.6564 0.6902 0.6708
Only women aged 40 or under:
Lesbian 0.0131 -0.0389*** 0.0181* -0.0346*** -0.0128* -0.0609***
(0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0127) (0.0140) (0.0093) (0.0086)
Mandated coverage 0.0292** 0.0196 0.0059 -0.0243 0.0300** 0.0232*
   x lesbian (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0269) (0.0273) (0.0137) (0.0166)
Observations 129,424 119,455 77,569 64,706 83,507 60,418
R2 0.6547 0.6571 0.6941 0.6815 0.7055 0.6965
Only women over 40 years old:
Lesbian 0.0785*** 0.0705*** 0.0964*** 0.0780*** 0.1072*** 0.0952***
(0.0162) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0158) (0.0119) (0.0112)
Mandated coverage 0.0048 0.0116 0.0198 0.0132 0.0262* 0.0146
   x lesbian (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0227) (0.0213) (0.0174) (0.0187)
Observations 46,185 135,730 40,031 106,878 43,459 108,616
R2 0.5531 0.6079 0.6099 0.6313 0.6324 0.6478
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Table F.3 (continued)
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Smaller sample
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0368*** 0.0303*** 0.0641*** 0.0714*** 0.0288** 0.0507***
(0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0088)
Mandated coverage 0.0227* 0.0207 -0.0054 -0.0202 0.0308** 0.0190*
   x lesbian (0.0156) (0.0175) (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0181) (0.0136)
Observations 28,419 36,463 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 0.6305 0.6209 0.6583 0.6429 0.6885 0.6614
Multilevel estimation:
Lesbian 0.0363*** 0.0286** 0.0659*** 0.0717*** 0.0308*** 0.0548***
(0.0113) (0.0124) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0127) (0.0121)
Mandated coverage 0.0108 0.0074 -0.0116 -0.0426** 0.0266* 0.0108
   x lesbian (0.0194) (0.0229) (0.0219) (0.0230) (0.0196) (0.0182)
Observations 28,419 36,463 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 - - - - - -
Gay-male comparison
Female estimates:
Lesbian 0.0415*** 0.0099 0.0597*** 0.0327*** 0.0534*** 0.0305***
(0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0096) (0.0080)
Mandated coverage 0.0230* 0.0153 0.0170 -0.0050 0.0289*** 0.0141
   x lesbian (0.0149) (0.0130) (0.0181) (0.0193) (0.0118) (0.0111)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6322 0.6750 0.6517 0.6885 0.6653
Male estimates:
Lesbian -0.0299*** -0.1650*** -0.0004 -0.1240*** 0.0122 -0.1058***
(0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0126) (0.0105) (0.0132) (0.0116)
Mandated coverage 0.0606*** 0.0510*** 0.0720*** 0.0410** 0.0705*** 0.0321*
   x lesbian (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0242) (0.0195) (0.0244) (0.0213)
Observations 178,186 295,674 120,413 192,527 128,821 187,391
R2 0.5100 0.4312 0.5607 0.4774 0.5987 0.5145
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only
the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010
American Community Surveys PUMS.
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0719*** 0.0364*** 0.0728*** 0.0381***
(0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0085) (0.0053)
Legal partnership -0.0261 -0.0368** -0.0249* -0.0097
   x lesbian (0.0215) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0108)
Observations 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6754 0.6522 0.6888 0.6654
Full-time, no hours/weeks controls:
Lesbian 0.1001*** 0.0700*** 0.0912*** 0.0626***
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0095) (0.0075)
Legal partnership -0.0160 -0.0314** -0.0129 -0.0058
   x lesbian (0.0203) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0165)
Observations 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.4056 0.3687 0.4153 0.3645
Log(hourly wages):
Lesbian 0.0808*** 0.0496***
(0.0080) (0.0087)
Legal partnership -0.0315* -0.0405**
   x lesbian (0.0197) (0.0182)
Observations 117,600 171,584
R2 0.3139 0.2750
Heckman two-step method:
Lesbian 0.0713*** 0.0477*** 0.0690*** 0.0482***
(0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0058)
Legal partnership -0.0260 -0.0357** -0.0437*** -0.0012
   x lesbian (0.0215) (0.0180) (0.0159) (0.0114)
Observations 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 - - - -
Including sodomy law repeal:
Lesbian 0.0718*** 0.0358*** 0.0727*** 0.0378***
(0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0054)
Legal partnership -0.0260 -0.0367** -0.0246* -0.0094
   x lesbian (0.0216) (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0108)
Observations 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6754 0.6522 0.6889 0.6654
Further including SS equality score:
Lesbian 0.0703*** 0.0348*** 0.0737*** 0.0389***
(0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0056)
Legal partnership -0.0182 -0.0328* -0.0275* -0.0120
   x lesbian (0.0249) (0.0208) (0.0176) (0.0107)
Observations 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6755 0.6522 0.6890 0.6656
Table F.4. Legal Partnership supplementary regression estimates
2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Adding potential exper. interactions:
Lesbian 0.1004*** 0.0784*** 0.1051*** 0.0862***
(0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0082)
Legal partnership -0.0284* -0.0413*** -0.0320** -0.0208**
   x lesbian (0.0211) (0.0167) (0.0182) (0.0118)
Observations 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6755 0.6525 0.6890 0.6659
Further including educ. interactions:
Lesbian 0.1053*** 0.0879*** 0.1105*** 0.0901***
(0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0081)
Legal partnership -0.0279* -0.0425*** -0.0317** -0.0207**
   x lesbian (0.0215) (0.0170) (0.0184) (0.0120)
Observations 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6755 0.6526 0.6891 0.6659
Including only full-time employed:
Lesbian 0.0897*** 0.0521*** 0.0819*** 0.0502***
(0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0086) (0.0065)
Legal partnership -0.0154 -0.0297** -0.0120 -0.0056
   x lesbian (0.0200) (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0145)
Observations 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.4353 0.4004 0.4429 0.3947
Including only white women:
Lesbian 0.0752*** 0.0379*** 0.0773*** 0.0448***
(0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0061)
Legal partnership -0.0199 -0.0308** -0.0273* -0.0157
   x lesbian (0.0250) (0.0172) (0.0211) (0.0148)
Observations 95,191 144,206 102,969 142,195
R2 0.6755 0.6570 0.6905 0.6710
Only women aged 40 or under:
Lesbian 0.0284*** -0.0373*** 0.0035 -0.0542***
(0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0083) (0.0070)
Legal partnership -0.0404** -0.0427* -0.0094 0.0121
   x lesbian (0.0185) (0.0272) (0.0225) (0.0241)
Observations 77,569 64,706 83,507 60,418
R2 0.6945 0.6817 0.7058 0.6966
Only women over 40 years old:
Lesbian 0.1073*** 0.0890*** 0.1353*** 0.1114***
(0.0131) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0098)
Legal partnership -0.0125 -0.0370 -0.0586*** -0.0405**
   x lesbian (0.0397) (0.0309) (0.0239) (0.0188)
Observations 40,031 106,878 43,459 108,616
R2 0.6102 0.6319 0.6329 0.6480
2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Table F.4 (continued)
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Smaller sample
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0719*** 0.0636*** 0.0464*** 0.0621***
(0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.0086)
Legal partnership -0.0498** -0.0324* -0.0150 -0.0168
   x lesbian (0.0226) (0.0237) (0.0169) (0.0158)
Observations 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 0.6586 0.6430 0.6885 0.6614
Multilevel estimation:
Lesbian 0.0726*** 0.0618*** 0.0427*** 0.0619***
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0117)
Legal partnership -0.0797*** -0.0558** -0.0151 -0.0134
   x lesbian (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0289) (0.0252)
Observations 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 - - - -
Gay-male comparison
Female estimates:
Lesbian 0.0719*** 0.0364*** 0.0728*** 0.0381***
(0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0085) (0.0053)
Legal partnership -0.0261 -0.0368** -0.0249* -0.0097
   x lesbian (0.0215) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0108)
Observations 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6754 0.6522 0.6888 0.6654
Male estimates:
Lesbian 0.0229** -0.1061*** 0.0481*** -0.0881***
(0.0098) (0.0083) (0.0171) (0.0155)
Legal partnership 0.0340 -0.0036 -0.0038 -0.0007
   x lesbian (0.0330) (0.0284) (0.0381) (0.0322)
Observations 120,413 192,527 128,821 187,391
R2 0.5609 0.4778 0.5983 0.5137
Table F.4 (continued)
2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only
the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2005-2010 American Community Surveys PUMS.
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0337** 0.0040 0.0230 -0.0139 0.0907*** 0.0363**
(0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0285) (0.0281) (0.0254) (0.0182)
Marriage bans 0.0226 0.0161 0.0511** 0.0507* -0.0290 -0.0002
 x lesbian (0.0202) (0.0195) (0.0301) (0.0312) (0.0259) (0.0196)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6322 0.6750 0.6517 0.6884 0.6651
Full-time, no hours/weeks controls:
Lesbian 0.0335** 0.0102 0.0605*** 0.0307 0.1020*** 0.0725***
(0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0256) (0.0286) (0.0229) (0.0210)
Marriage bans 0.0575*** 0.0593*** 0.0427** 0.0392* -0.0164 -0.0122
 x lesbian (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0259) (0.0287) (0.0223) (0.0222)
Observations 119,964 163,718 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.3659 0.3332 0.4048 0.3674 0.4139 0.3634
Log(hourly wages):
Lesbian 0.0276** 0.0032 0.0438* 0.0174
(0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0300)
Marriage bans 0.0363** 0.0301** 0.0361 0.0287
 x lesbian (0.0188) (0.0182) (0.0318) (0.0328)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584
R2 0.2556 0.2338 0.3130 0.2740
Heckman two-step method:
Lesbian 0.0335** 0.0130 0.0220 -0.0006 0.0845*** 0.0464***
(0.0165) (0.0154) (0.0285) (0.0291) (0.0284) (0.0172)
Marriage bans 0.0227 0.0163 0.0516** 0.0486* -0.0328 0.0028
 x lesbian (0.0208) (0.0188) (0.0300) (0.0316) (0.0290) (0.0185)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 - - - - - -
Including sodomy law repeal:
Lesbian 0.0328** 0.0006 0.0233 -0.0138 0.0905*** 0.0362**
(0.0172) (0.0162) (0.0283) (0.0277) (0.0253) (0.0184)
Marriage bans 0.0239 0.0198 0.0506** 0.0499* -0.0288 -0.0003
 x lesbian (0.0214) (0.0203) (0.0298) (0.0306) (0.0258) (0.0195)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6380 0.6323 0.6751 0.6517 0.6884 0.6651
Further including SS equality score:
Lesbian 0.0294** -0.0045 0.0243 -0.0113 0.0921*** 0.0387**
(0.0166) (0.0078) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0254) (0.0186)
Marriage bans 0.0279 0.0247* 0.0492** 0.0463* -0.0306 -0.0031
 x lesbian (0.0219) (0.0182) (0.0296) (0.0300) (0.0258) (0.0195)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6382 0.6324 0.6753 0.6519 0.6887 0.6654
Table F.5. Marriage Bans supplementary regression estimates
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Adding potential exper. interactions:
Lesbian 0.0593*** 0.0403*** 0.0509** 0.0271 0.1259*** 0.0891***
(0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0300) (0.0286) (0.0281) (0.0211)
Marriage bans 0.0227 0.0167 0.0510** 0.0505** -0.0349 -0.0097
 x lesbian (0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0295) (0.0304) (0.0273) (0.0219)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6380 0.6325 0.6752 0.6521 0.6886 0.6656
Further including educ. interactions:
Lesbian 0.0695*** 0.0551*** 0.0564** 0.0368 0.1324*** 0.0939***
(0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0276) (0.0203)
Marriage bans 0.0212 0.0145 0.0509** 0.0501* -0.0346 -0.0105
 x lesbian (0.0205) (0.0196) (0.0297) (0.0313) (0.0273) (0.0221)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6380 0.6325 0.6752 0.6521 0.6886 0.6656
Including only full-time employed:
Lesbian 0.0286** -0.0018 0.0546** 0.0109 0.0944*** 0.0554***
(0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0244) (0.0253) (0.0213) (0.0202)
Marriage bans 0.0512*** 0.0532*** 0.0376* 0.0420* -0.0182 -0.0066
 x lesbian (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0251) (0.0258) (0.0209) (0.0213)
Observations 119,964 163,718 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.4024 0.3625 0.4343 0.399 0.4417 0.3937
Including only white women:
Lesbian 0.0364** 0.0087 0.0195 -0.0258 0.0910*** 0.0405**
(0.0177) (0.0152) (0.0299) (0.0272) (0.0281) (0.0212)
Marriage bans 0.0243 0.0155 0.0607** 0.0684** -0.0248 0.0011
 x lesbian (0.0228) (0.0196) (0.0335) (0.0311) (0.0297) (0.0233)
Observations 137,365 213,342 95,191 144,206 102,969 142,195
R2 0.6442 0.6403 0.6751 0.6564 0.6901 0.6706
Only women aged 40 or under:
Lesbian 0.0001 -0.0505*** -0.0061 -0.0712*** 0.0024 -0.0786***
(0.0190) (0.0117) (0.0305) (0.0293) (0.0278) (0.0086)
Marriage bans 0.0331* 0.0263 0.0309 0.0292 -0.0022 0.0325
 x lesbian (0.0234) (0.0220) (0.0353) (0.0365) (0.0316) (0.0285)
Observations 129,424 119,455 77,569 64,706 83,507 60,418
R2 0.6547 0.6571 0.6942 0.6815 0.7055 0.6964
Only women over 40 years old:
Lesbian 0.0637*** 0.0716*** 0.0462* 0.0307 0.1514*** 0.1284***
(0.0208) (0.0231) (0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0329) (0.0238)
Marriage bans 0.0224 0.0044 0.0681** 0.0607* -0.0384 -0.0320
 x lesbian (0.0279) (0.0296) (0.0384) (0.0389) (0.0326) (0.0265)
Observations 46,185 135,730 40,031 106,878 43,459 108,616
R2 0.5531 0.6079 0.6100 0.6313 0.6323 0.6477
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Smaller sample
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0259 0.0127 0.0387 0.0079 0.0529** 0.0381**
(0.0206) (0.0199) (0.0369) (0.0323) (0.0258) (0.0221)
Marriage bans 0.0268 0.0346* 0.0270 0.0589** -0.0127 0.0241
 x lesbian (0.0220) (0.0235) (0.0360) (0.0335) (0.0266) (0.0222)
Observations 28,419 36,463 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 0.6305 0.6209 0.6584 0.6428 0.6883 0.6612
Multilevel estimation:
Lesbian 0.0235 0.0062 0.0398* 0.0041 0.0541** 0.0410**
(0.0192) (0.0209) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0248)
Marriage bans 0.0237 0.0350* 0.0244 0.0592** -0.0188 0.0199
 x lesbian (0.0233) (0.0256) (0.0307) (0.0312) (0.0316) (0.0272)
Observations 28,419 36,463 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 - - - - - -
Gay-male comparison
Female estimates:
Lesbian 0.0337** 0.0040 0.0230 -0.0139 0.0907*** 0.0363**
(0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0285) (0.0281) (0.0254) (0.0182)
Marriage bans 0.0226 0.0161 0.0511** 0.0507* -0.0290 -0.0002
 x lesbian (0.0202) (0.0195) (0.0301) (0.0312) (0.0259) (0.0196)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6322 0.6750 0.6517 0.6884 0.6651
Male estimates:
Lesbian 0.0054 -0.1290*** 0.0026 -0.1343*** 0.1006** -0.0554
(0.0213) (0.0223) (0.0320) (0.0316) (0.0476) (0.0464)
Marriage bans -0.0139 -0.0196 0.0350 0.0334 -0.0649 -0.0413
 x lesbian (0.0272) (0.0290) (0.0382) (0.0352) (0.0517) (0.0492)
Observations 178,186 295,674 120,413 192,527 128,821 187,391
R2 0.5100 0.4312 0.5607 0.4770 0.5985 0.5137
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only
the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010
American Community Surveys PUMS.
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0530*** 0.0184*** 0.0683*** 0.0303*** 0.0684*** 0.0383***
(0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0058)
Same-sex percentage -0.0245** -0.0364*** -0.0147** -0.0188*** -0.0215*** -0.0214***
   x lesbian (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0066)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6323 0.6751 0.6518 0.6884 0.6652
Full-time, no hours/weeks controls:
Lesbian 0.0783*** 0.0561*** 0.0985*** 0.0649*** 0.0893*** 0.0628***
(0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0059)
Same-sex percentage -0.0250** -0.0368*** -0.0140** -0.0212*** -0.0134*** -0.0177***
   x lesbian (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0050) (0.0056)
Observations 119,964 163,718 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.3658 0.3333 0.4047 0.3677 0.4140 0.3636
Log(hourly wages):
Lesbian 0.0567*** 0.0276*** 0.0763*** 0.0428***
(0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0072) (0.0073)
Same-sex percentage -0.0217** -0.0351*** -0.0155** -0.0206***
   x lesbian (0.0130) (0.0117) (0.0067) (0.0058)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584
R2 0.2556 0.2390 0.3131 0.2742
Heckman two-step method:
Lesbian 0.0529*** 0.0276*** 0.0677*** 0.0420*** 0.0588*** 0.0512***
(0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0079) (0.0058)
Same-sex percentage -0.0250** -0.0347*** -0.0147** -0.0178*** -0.0238*** -0.0201***
   x lesbian (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0064) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0064)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 - - - - - -
Including sodomy law repeal:
Lesbian 0.0532*** 0.0178*** 0.0684*** 0.0301*** 0.0685*** 0.0381***
(0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0057)
Same-sex percentage -0.0253** -0.0374*** -0.0156** -0.0206*** -0.0217*** -0.0217***
   x lesbian (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0063)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6324 0.6751 0.6518 0.6885 0.6652
Further including SS equality score:
Lesbian 0.0528*** 0.0165** 0.0681*** 0.0296*** 0.0685*** 0.0384***
(0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0058)
Same-sex percentage -0.0264** -0.0394*** -0.0146** -0.0205*** -0.0213*** -0.0209***
   x lesbian (0.0116) (0.0102) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0054) (0.0060)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6382 0.6325 0.6753 0.6520 0.6887 0.6654
Table F.6. Same-Sex Percentage supplementary regression estimates
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds Cohabs Marrieds
Adding potential exper. interactions:
Lesbian 0.0789*** 0.0554*** 0.0964*** 0.0716*** 0.0984*** 0.0829***
(0.0069) (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0088)
Same-sex percentage -0.0255** -0.0381*** -0.0158*** -0.0208*** -0.0220*** -0.0222***
   x lesbian (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0076)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6380 0.6325 0.6752 0.6521 0.6886 0.6656
Further including educ. interactions:
Lesbian 0.0875*** 0.0681*** 0.1014*** 0.0806*** 0.1037*** 0.0867***
(0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0102) (0.0097) (0.0104) (0.0086)
Same-sex percentage -0.0241** -0.0368*** -0.0153*** -0.0199*** -0.0218*** -0.0223***
   x lesbian (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0077)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6380 0.6326 0.6752 0.6522 0.6887 0.6656
Including only full-time employed:
Lesbian 0.0686*** 0.0395*** 0.0879*** 0.0471*** 0.0802*** 0.0506***
(0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0071) (0.0055)
Same-sex percentage -0.0234** -0.0352*** -0.0127** -0.0187*** -0.0126*** -0.0165***
   x lesbian (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0050) (0.0059)
Observations 119,964 163,718 79,050 110,628 87,238 114,129
R2 0.4024 0.3627 0.4343 0.3993 0.4417 0.3938
Including only white women:
Lesbian 0.0573*** 0.0225*** 0.0736*** 0.0338*** 0.0726*** 0.0438***
(0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0062)
Same-sex percentage -0.0306*** -0.0420*** -0.0188*** -0.0226*** -0.0233*** -0.0238***
   x lesbian (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0070) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0067)
Observations 137,365 213,342 95,191 144,206 102,969 142,195
R2 0.6442 0.6404 0.6751 0.6565 0.6901 0.6707
Only women aged 40 or under:
Lesbian 0.0274*** -0.0280*** 0.0245*** -0.0427*** 0.0017 -0.0496***
(0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0084) (0.0080)
Same-sex percentage -0.0280*** -0.0424*** -0.0366*** -0.0375*** -0.0153** -0.0124*
   x lesbian (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.0069) (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0088)
Observations 129,424 119,455 77,569 64,706 83,507 60,418
R2 0.6547 0.6572 0.6943 0.6815 0.7055 0.6964
Only women over 40 years old:
Lesbian 0.0827*** 0.0771*** 0.1036*** 0.0812*** 0.1223*** 0.1040***
(0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0087) (0.0087)
Same-sex percentage -0.0194 -0.0313 0.0055 -0.0040 -0.0287*** -0.0287***
   x lesbian (0.0241) (0.0249) (0.0110) (0.0090) (0.0071) (0.0087)
Observations 46,185 135,730 40,031 106,878 43,459 108,616
R2 0.5532 0.6080 0.6099 0.6314 0.6323 0.6477
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
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Smaller sample
Base results:
Lesbian 0.0474*** 0.0397*** 0.0624*** 0.0586*** 0.0440*** 0.0601***
(0.0081) (0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0090) (0.0081)
Same-sex percentage -0.0229** -0.0400*** -0.0145** -0.0082 -0.0196** -0.0215***
   x lesbian (0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0079)
Observations 28,419 36,463 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 0.6306 0.6210 0.6582 0.6427 0.6884 0.6612
Multilevel estimation:
Lesbian 0.0415*** 0.0315*** 0.0610*** 0.0551*** 0.0413*** 0.0599***
(0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0090)
Same-sex percentage -0.0130 -0.0290** -0.0132 -0.0071 -0.0173** -0.0173**
   x lesbian (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0094)
Observations 28,419 36,463 20,991 26,344 22,271 26,506
R2 - - - - - -
Gay-male comparison
Female estimates:
Lesbian 0.0530*** 0.0184*** 0.0683*** 0.0303*** 0.0684*** 0.0383***
(0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0058)
Same-sex percentage -0.0245** -0.0364*** -0.0147** -0.0188*** -0.0215*** -0.0214***
   x lesbian (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0066)
Observations 175,609 255,185 117,600 171,584 126,966 169,034
R2 0.6379 0.6323 0.6751 0.6518 0.6884 0.6652
Male estimates:
Lesbian -0.0118* -0.1501*** 0.0263*** -0.1119*** 0.0414*** -0.0940***
(0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0092) (0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0086)
Same-sex percentage 0.0436*** 0.0279** 0.0265** 0.0164* 0.0201** 0.0092
   x lesbian (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0125) (0.0100) (0.0116) (0.0094)
Observations 178,186 295,674 120,413 192,527 128,821 187,391
R2 0.5100 0.4314 0.5608 0.4773 0.5985 0.5137
2000 Census 2005-2007 ACS 2008-2010 ACS
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Models include all variables specified in the text, but we report only
the coefficients on the lesbian indicator and lesbian-proxy interaction term. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, in a one-tailed test, respectively. Sources: 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2010
American Community Surveys PUMS.
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